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Abstract
This thesis investigates the optimal enforcement of competition policy in innova-
tive industries and in the banking sector. Chapter 2 analyses the welfare impact
of compulsory licensing in the context of unilateral refusals to license intellectual
property. When the risk-free rate is low, compulsory licensing is shown unam-
biguously to increase consumer surplus. Compulsory licensing has an ambiguous
effect on total welfare, but is more likely to increase total welfare in industries
that are naturally less competitive. Compulsory licensing is also shown to be an
effective policy to protect competition per se. The chapter also demonstrates the
robustness of these results to alternative settings of R&D competition.
Chapter 3 develops a much more general framework for the study of optimal
competition policy enforcement in innovative industries. A major contribution of
this chapter is to separate carefully a firm’s decision to innovate from its decision to
take some generic anti-competitive action. This allows us to differentiate between
firms’ counterfactual behaviour, according to whether or not they would have
innovated in the absence of any potentially anti-competitive conduct. In contrast
to the existing literature, it is shown that the stringency of optimal policy will
be harsher towards firms that have innovated in addition to taking a given anti-
competitive action.
Chapter 4 develops a framework for competition policy in the banking sector,
which takes explicit account of capital regulation. In particular, conditions are
derived under which increases in the capital requirement increase the incentives of
banks to engage in a generic abuse of dominance in the loan market, and to exploit
depositors through the sale of ancillary financial products. Thus the central con-
tribution of this chapter is to clarify the conditions under which stability-focused
capital regulation conflicts with competition and consumer protection policy in
the banking sector.
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Chapter 1
Introduction & Preliminaries
The term “competition policy” describes the set of measures that are implemented
in order to ensure that competition works effectively for consumers, by preventing
three classes of anti-competitive actions: collusion or price fixing, anti-competitive
mergers, and abuses of a dominant position.1 The economic literature in the field
of competition policy may be broadly split into two phases: while early work
focused quite narrowly on establishing conditions under which various business
practices might exhibit pro- or anti-competitive effects, economists have much
more recently begun to consider questions relating to the optimal design of compe-
tition authority decisional and enforcement procedures (concerning, for example,
optimal fine levels, the role of courts, etc.).2 The aim of this thesis is to extend
the academic literature on optimal competition policy enforcement in abuse of
dominance cases.3 In particular, we investigate the welfare impact of compulsory
licensing in the context of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property in
Chapter 2, before considering competition policy enforcement in innovative in-
dustries more generally in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 considers the implications of
prudential regulation for abuse of dominance cases in the banking sector.
The debate around optimal competition policy enforcement is not limited to
academic circles. In the policy-making arena, competition enforcement bodies at
both the national and cross-national (i.e. EU) level have, in recent years, been
subject to numerous reforms, notable among which has been a move towards
a more economics- or effects-based approach to competition policy, rather than
one based on per se decision rules. While per se rules ban or permit an entire
class of actions, without regard to sub-classes of actions that may merit exception
from the standard, under an effects-based approach, the competition authority is
required to conduct an investigation and arrive at a conclusion based on explicit
1Etro (2007)
2The notion of ‘optimality’ that applies in these discussions is discussed in Section 1.1.
3There is a separate, growing literature that investigates optimal competition policy enforce-
ment for mergers (see, e.g., Nocke (2013, 2010)) and cartels (see, e.g., Harrington (2013, 2011,
2010) and related literature).
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criteria for deeming actions to be pro- or anti-competitive.4
Other recent reforms of EU competition policy procedures include the Com-
mission’s Regulation 1/2003 and the 139/2004 Regulation on the Control of Con-
centrations. Moreover, the Commission and many national competition author-
ities have, since 2004, undertaken a series of further important changes to their
enforcement structures.5 In the context of these ongoing reforms, an important
secondary objective of this thesis is to inform, at a policy level, the optimal enforce-
ment of competition policy in abuse of dominance cases that occur in innovative
industries and in the banking sector.
Before setting out our precise research questions in Section 1.4, we begin by
describing a very general framework for competition policy enforcement, which
draws on existing work. This general framework covers three broad themes that
have a bearing on our research at a fundamental level, and that will help to place
our work in the context of the literature. These are:
1. the characterisation of “optimal” competition policy,
2. the appropriate choice of welfare standard, and
3. the implications of legal uncertainty.
Detailed reviews of the literature relevant to each research question are provided
in the appropriate chapters.
1.1 Characterising “Optimal” Competition Policy
A first issue that arises in the analysis of optimal competition policy is the very
characterisation of “optimality”. Key to this question is a recognition that the
decision-making environment faced by a competition authority is invariably one
of imperfect information concerning the true nature of an action, be it harmful
or benign. It follows that the decisions made by a competition authority will
be subject to errors of type I (false convictions) and type II (false acquittals).
It is in terms of these decision errors that early contributions characterised the
“optimal” policy. Intuitively, under this decision-theoretic approach, the optimal
policy minimises the cost of decision errors of both type I and II.6
Importantly, however, this approach only considers the decision-making abil-
ity of the authority in those cases that actually come to its attention. It does not
take account of the fact that the stringency of competition policy may influence
4See, e.g., EAGCP Report (2005), Vickers (2005, 2007).
5Concerning, for example, the introduction of system review panels, chief economists depart-
ments. See Lianos and Kokkoris (2010) for further discussion of these reforms.
6See, in particular, Easterbrook (1984), and also Ahlborn et al. (2005), Beckner and Salop
(1999), Christiansen and Kerber (2006), Evans and Padilla (2005a, 2005b), Hylton and Salinger
(2001), Joskow (2002), Salinger (2006) and Tom and Pak (2000). In relation to the debate on
effects-based vs. per se decision rules, it is worth noting that a per se rule will only ever be
associated with errors of one type (type I errors in the case of per se illegality, and type II errors
for per se legality), while effects-based rules will typically generate errors of both types.
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the decisions of firms to engage in anti-competitive conduct in the first place.
In other words, it ignores deterrence effects. Under a welfare approach to “op-
timal” competition policy, the deterrence and procedural aspects of competition
policy must be added to decision-theoretic concerns. Thus Will and Schmidtchen
(2008), for example, examine the impact of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 from
a welfare perspective.7 This piece of legislation replaced the mandatory notifica-
tion and authorisation for cartels with a legal exception system: rather than all
agreements having to be notified, they can be conducted without notification but
are subject to penalties if investigated and found to be anti-competitive by the
competition authority. The authors find that such a relaxation in the notification
requirements need not necessarily produce adverse deterrence effects in the form
of increased cartel formation.8
Sorgard (2009) also bridges the gap between the decision-theoretic approach
and a full welfare analysis by including deterrence effects. This is done in the
context of coverage rates9 for merger investigations. Increasing the coverage rate
brings about two effects: less mergers are proposed (deterrent effect) and the wel-
fare effect of possible prohibitions following an investigation changes (enforcement
effect). Since the mergers that are deterred are assumed to be the most harmful
ones, the authority’s investigation itself is shown to have a potentially negative
impact on welfare, due to a large probability of type I errors. Moreover, if the
authority cannot commit to a coverage rate ex ante, but rather decides the cover-
age rate once the number of proposed mergers is observed, welfare may be lower
than with commitment.
Similarly to Sorgard (2009), Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006) examine the optimal
coverage rate, this time in a model of collusion. Both types of decision-making
errors are shown to lead to an increased incidence of anti-competitive behaviour.
Type II errors decrease the expected fine, while increased probability of type I
errors leads firms to collude as a precautionary measure. Hence there is a link
between decision errors and deterrence: imperfect competition law enforcement
can bring about an increase in anti-competitive behaviour.
While these papers are set in the context of specific anti-competitive practices
(mergers and cartels), Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) develop a welfare-based model
for a very general action (which may also capture an abuse of dominance type
action), and use this to compare the desirability of per se and effects-based decision
rules. This action is assumed to entail both a private benefit for firms taking the
action, but, depending on the circumstances under which the action is taken, it
may be socially harmful. More precisely, firms taking the action may come from
7In fact, they use a measure of “effectiveness” – comprising a no cartel formation (i.e. deter-
rence) component and the probability of type I and II errors — as a proxy for welfare.
8Intuitively, to ensure cartel formation does not increase, the fine must be sufficiently high.
9Generally, resource constraints mean that a competition authority cannot investigate every
incidence of a given competition offence. In many models of competition policy, the ‘coverage
rate’ therefore defines that fraction of all actions of a given type that, if undertaken, will be
investigated by the competition authority under an effects-based approach.
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either a harmful or benign environment, with associated harm from taking the
action given by hH > 0 and hB < 0, respectively. The model assumes that a
fraction γ, 0 < γ < 1, of firms come from the harmful environment, which implies
that the average harm, denoted by h, is equal to
h = γhH + (1− γ)hB.
Actions are then characterised according to whether they are presumptively
legal (if h < 0) or presumptively illegal (if h > 0). Furthermore, the strength
of presumption of legality (denoted sL) or illegality (denoted sI), which indicates
how far a particular action is from being borderline presumptively legal or illegal,
is defined as
sL =
(1− γ)(−hB)
γhH
and
sI =
γhH
(1− γ)(−hB) ,
respectively.
Under an effects-based regime, the competition authority is assumed to make,
with exogenous probability, errors in determining the true harm associated with
a given action. Specifically, the parameters (pH , pB) define the probability that
an action taken by a firm from the harmful or benign environment, respectively,
will be correctly identified as such.
A necessary and sufficient condition for an effects-based rule to have lower cost
of decision errors than the appropriate per se rule is then shown to be that the
quality of the authority’s decision-making rule, denoted by qe, e = H,B and itself
a function of (pH , pB), is greater than the strength of presumption of legality or
illegality. That is, for a presumptively legal action, we require that
qH ≡ pH
(1− pB) > sL, (1.1)
while, for a presumptively illegal action, we require that
qB ≡ pB
(1− pH) > sI . (1.2)
When considering a full welfare comparison of effects-based vs. per se, there are
two distinct impacts to consider. Besides the (absolute) deterrent effect, whereby
firms (from either environment) are deterred from taking a given action, an effects-
based rule is shown to generate differential deterrence effects, whereby firms from
the harmful environment are deterred more strongly than firms from the benign
environment, which are absent under a per se rule. On the other hand, per se rules
will outperform effects-based rules in absolute deterrence terms, since an effects-
based rule will have too strong a deterrent effect when the action is presumptively
10
legal, and so on balance benign, while it will have too weak a deterrent effect when
the action is presumptively illegal, and so on balance harmful.
However, it is shown that, if the strength of presumption of legality or ille-
gality is weak, then an effects-based rule will be welfare superior to per se. This
follows because, with a weak presumption of (il)legality, the conditions for effects-
based rules to be superior in decision-error terms will be met (see (1.1) and (1.2)).
Furthermore, the average harm h will, in such cases, not be significantly different
from zero, implying that absolute deterrence will be low. Finally, since the dif-
ferential deterrence effect always works in favour of an effects-based rule, it will
welfare dominate per se.
In Katsoulacos and Ulph (2011a), this framework is extended to analyse the
impact of judicial reviews and internal error correction mechanisms. Since these
will tend to reduce the costs of false convictions (type I errors) and increase
the cost of false acquittals (type II errors), they will increase the attractiveness
(in decision error terms) of effects-based rules when the former effect outweighs
the latter. Furthermore, mechanisms operating under the principle of unanimity
will tend to reduce deterrence, and therefore tend to improve overall welfare for
presumptively legal actions, and worsen overall welfare for presumptively illegal
actions.
In this thesis, we will make use of both notions of optimality, depending on the
specific modelling context. We describe our research aims and modelling approach
more carefully in Section 1.4.
1.2 Welfare Standards
Another issue, which is closely related to the definition of optimal policy, concerns
the choice of welfare standard for competition policy. The welfare standard speci-
fies the terms in which the harm from a given competition offence is measured, be
it consumer surplus, or the sum of producer and consumer surplus (that is, total
welfare).10 Against the background of conventional welfare economics, which has
tended to rely heavily on total welfare as the underlying social objective,11 it is
notable that competition authorities in practice (including in the US and EU)
tend to use a consumer surplus standard.12 This has also led the majority of the
academic work in the competition policy field to assume, albeit at times implicitly,
a consumer surplus standard.13
10A hybrid standard, attaching different weights to the consumer and producer surplus ele-
ments of total welfare, is also possible.
11As, for example, in the textbook treatment of deadweight loss from monopoly.
12Canada and New Zealand are rare examples of countries that employ a total welfare standard
to judge competition issues, see, e.g., Heyer (2006).
13As, for example, in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009), where firm profits are not aggregated
with the standalone ‘harm’ of the action. Some authors have, however, relied on a total welfare
standard in their analysis of competition policy enforcement. See, e.g., Connor and Lande (2005,
2006) in the context of optimal cartel penalties.
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This divergence between the conventional welfare economics approach on the
one hand, and the practice of competition authorities on the other, raises a number
of interesting questions. Firstly, are there factors specific to the competition policy
context, which make a consumer surplus standard optimal? Secondly, even if total
welfare were the relevant standard for competition policy, are there operational
factors which might make the delegation of a consumer surplus standard to the
authority optimal?
With regard to the first question, there are a number of factors that may
be suggested. Firstly, there may be a distributional issue, in the sense that the
gains and losses of competition law infringements may accrue to different income
groups.14 To the extent that losses are suffered primarily by lower-income con-
sumers, while gains accrue to shareholders of firms that, on average, enjoy higher
income, the competition authority should indeed (assuming decreasing marginal
utility of income) attach greater significance to the losses suffered by consumers
than to the gains enjoyed by firms. In other words, it should move from a total
welfare standard towards a consumer surplus standard.15
This line of argument also relates to the case for a total welfare standard
made by Carlton (2007). Since, he argues, firms’ profits ultimately accrue to
consumers in their shareholding capacity, consumer and producer groups are not
clearly delineated. Therefore, a consumer surplus standard is ultimately equiv-
alent to one based on total welfare. This does not hold if we take account of
distributional issues: if shareholders are, on average, a higher income group than
non-shareholders, producer and consumer groups can be meaningfully separated,
and the distributional issue would imply that a stronger emphasis on consumer
surplus is justified.16
A second factor concerns the ability of affected parties to seek private re-
dress or, more broadly, represent their interests to the competition authorities.
Since firms represent a unified organisation, it is typically supposed that they face
fewer challenges in representing their views to the competition authority than do
the (very disparate) consumers associated with any given product.17 Neven and
Ro¨ller (2005) have shown that, if firms (but not consumers) can lobby the com-
petition authority, and the authority is imperfectly monitored in how it applies
its delegated welfare standard, adopting a standard that favours consumers can
compensate for their lack of lobbying capacity. Essentially, the argument for a
consumer surplus standard that emerges here is that, since firms typically have the
14Such distributional issues are typically ignored in the conventional welfare economics ap-
proach, implying that gains and losses can simply be netted off against each other.
15See, e.g., Cseres (2007).
16Carlton (2007) further argues against the use of a consumer surplus standard on the basis
that it favours short run price reductions over long run efficiency gains, and that fixed cost
savings are ignored. Moreover, disregarding producers would also ignore issues of monopsony
power, making buying cartels perfectly legal. See also Farrell and Katz (2006) for arguments in
favour of a total welfare standard.
17See, e.g., Neven and Ro¨ller (2005).
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ability to lobby and seek redress for themselves, it is the uncorrected externality
suffered by consumers that should be the focus of competition policy.
These are two factors that suggest consumer surplus may indeed be the ap-
propriate welfare standard for competition policy. We now turn to the second
question, namely, what operational factors may make the implementation of a
consumer surplus standard optimal, even if total welfare were the ultimate objec-
tive? A first factor to consider here is the feasibility of measuring the total welfare
effects of competition infringements. In particular, problems arise when it comes
to measuring ‘harm’ suffered by competitor firms. There are many examples of
firms taking actions (such as innovating) that can harm competitors, but that are
not anti-competitive in and of themselves.18 Salop (2010) has made a separate
feasibility argument in favour of a consumer surplus standard, claiming that it
would be difficult for consumers to be compensated by a tax authority for welfare
losses due to specific mergers, if total welfare remained the objective and income
redistribution were attempted via this channel.
In addition to these feasibility issues, another reason why it may be optimal
to delegate a consumer surplus standard to a competition authority, even if total
welfare were deemed to be the appropriate welfare measure, relates to the strategic
choices by firms over anti-competitive actions. It has been shown that there are
situations in which delegating a consumer surplus standard to the competition
authority can bring about higher total welfare than would have arisen, had the
authority implemented a total welfare standard directly. The intuition is that,
while the authority can approve or disallow an action based on its likely impact
on the chosen welfare measure, it cannot directly influence firms to take another
action which might have brought about even higher welfare. However, when
firms choose actions strategically, implementing a consumer surplus standard can
influence firms’ decisions as to which action to choose, potentially (though not
always) resulting in higher total welfare.
This insight is originally due to Lyons (2002). In his model of merger choice,
firms propose the most profitable merger to the competition authority. Adopting
a (more stringent) consumer surplus-based rule can result in higher welfare when
it directs firms towards a less profitable, but socially preferable merger – a phe-
nomenon now commonly referred to as the “Lyons Effect”. Other authors have
demonstrated similar results. Besanko and Spulber (1993), for example, develop
a model of asymmetric information, in which firms have better information about
the marginal cost savings arising from a merger. It is shown that total welfare is
maximised when the authority implements a welfare standard that gives greater
weight to consumers than to producers. Finally, Fridolfsson (2007) develops a
two-firm model, in which the firms may either merge or bring about an alterna-
18This issue also comes out in the ongoing disputes between Microsoft and Google, for example,
concerning dominance in the search engine market. The arguments are typically not made in
terms of harm suffered by consumers as a result of Google’s dominance, but rather in terms of
the harm suffered by competitor firms.
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tive change in the market structure (for example via a partial merger). Although
there is no endogenous merger formation game as in Lyons (2002), it is shown
that, in order to maximise total welfare, the competition authority should follow
a standard that is biased in favour of consumers.
While all of the above analysis is carried out in the context of mergers, Kat-
soulacos and Ulph (2011b) develop a model which demonstrates the potential for
a Lyons effect in a more general setting. The general action that is modelled in
this paper includes a price-cost margin raising component and a marginal cost
reducing component. These action parameters interact with the “competitive en-
vironment” from which the firm comes (as captured in the inverse price elasticity
of demand) to generate a given consumer surplus and total welfare effect. The
model shows that, for actions that are equivalent in their cost-reducing potential,
total welfare for any given environment is lower when higher-profit actions are
chosen. Moreover, higher profit actions may pass a total welfare standard, but
not a consumer surplus standard. As such, there will exist environments for which
a consumer surplus standard pushes firms to adopt lower-profit actions that result
in higher total welfare – giving rise to a Lyons Effect.19
Throughout this thesis, we will typically follow the practice of the majority
of competition authorities around the globe, by relying on a consumer surplus
standard. In cases where it is interesting to investigate the implications of different
welfare standards (as we do in Chapter 2), total welfare will also be considered.
See Section 1.4 for further details.
1.3 Legal Uncertainty
A final important and overarching issue relating to the optimal enforcement of
competition policy, and in particular to the choice between effects-based and per
se decision rules, is that of legal uncertainty. This term may be defined loosely
as the inability to predict the outcome of a legal process.20 Until recently, it was
argued that, because effects-based rules generate greater legal uncertainty than
do per se rules, per se should be used.21 Moreover, if effects-based rules are used,
penalties should be lower.22
In Katsoulacos and Ulph (2014a), the question of legal uncertainty is subjected
to a first systematic analysis from an economic perspective, yielding quite different
results. The paper firstly clarifies the dimensions in which legal uncertainty can
arise. These are twofold: firstly, firms may not know the true nature of their action
(whether it is harmful or benign); secondly, firms may not know with certainty
19An important limitation of this model is that it does not incorporate profit effects running
via rival firms in the market. This is an important question for future research that will not be
addressed in this thesis.
20See D’Amato (1983) and Davis (2011).
21Easterbrook (1992)
22Dethmers and Engelen (2011)
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whether their action will be deemed to be harmful by the competition authority,
if investigated.
With reference to these two dimensions of potential legal uncertainty, Kat-
soulacos and Ulph (2014a) identify three scenarios that are of particular relevance
in the competition policy context. Firstly, in a setting of no legal uncertainty,
firms know what the outcome of the competition authority’s investigation would
be, should its action come under scrutiny. Secondly, under partial legal uncer-
tainty, firms know the true harm that is implied by their action if they take it.
However, they do not know with certainty how their action would be judged by
the competition authority, if investigated. Rather, they only know the average
conviction rate that applies to actions of their type (harmful or benign). Finally,
under complete legal uncertainty, firms do not know even the nature of their own
action, and therefore base their inferences on an average conviction probability,
where the average is taken across the conviction probabilities for both harmful
and benign actions.
A first implication of this approach is that an effects-based rule need not
necessarily imply legal uncertainty: if the authority bases its decisions on publicly
available data and makes its methods public, firms will be able to infer the decision
the authority would make (regardless of whether they know the true nature of the
action). Katsoulacos and Ulph (2014a) also show that, with exogenous penalties,
there is no monotonic link between legal uncertainty and welfare. Indeed, welfare
can be higher when there is some degree of legal uncertainty rather than none.
When the additional condition is imposed that fines are set optimally,23 however, a
clear welfare ranking of decision rules does emerge: effects-based with partial legal
uncertainty dominates effects-based with no legal uncertainty, which dominates
effects-based with complete legal uncertainty, which in turn is welfare-equivalent
to per se. So, in this setting, there is no situation in which a per se standard is
optimal.24
As described more carefully in Section 1.4, while we do not go into questions
relating to legal uncertainty in great detail, we can characterise the legal uncer-
tainty setting in most of this thesis as one of partial legal uncertainty (Chapter 2
being the exception).
23Another interesting result is that, when there is partial legal uncertainty, the authority will
set fines at such a level as to deter all firms from the harmful environment, while deterring
none from the benign environment. Thus the view put forward by Schinkel and Tuinstra (2006,
p.1274) that, “since imposing fines is assumed to involve next to no cost for the competition
authority whereas investigation is costly, fine levels should in fact be set as high as possible, so
that expected fines are high despite low detection efforts” (itself an expression of the “Becker
Argument”, see Immordino and Polo (2008), Becker (1968)) ignores the fact that too high a fine
will deter too many benign firms (i.e. cause a type I deterrence error), which is revealed more
clearly in this framework.
24These results are also proved at a greater level of generality in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2014b).
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1.4 Research Questions and Contribution
Against the backdrop of this general framework, our starting point in this thesis is
the following observation: there are important circumstances in which competition
policy does not operate in insolation, but rather in the context of other important
forms of regulation. In particular, we focus on intellectual property rights (as a
means to incentivising innovation) and stability-focused banking regulation. In a
broad sense, the question to be addressed in this thesis is: how should competition
policy be enforced optimally in the presence of these competing regulatory aims?
1.4.1 Part I: Innovative Industries
In the innovation context, there is a vast literature exploring the links between
competition and innovation incentives. A debate going back to Arrow (who ar-
gued that competition enhances innovation since a competitive firm will have
greater incentives than a monopolist to innovate in order to avoid the pressures of
competition) and Schumpeter (who argued that competition lowers the incentives
to innovate by reducing the monopoly rents attainable by a successful innova-
tor) has more recently emphasised that the relationship between competition and
innovation may be non-monotonic, as in Aghion et al. (2005).25
In contrast to this literature, our focus is not on the competitiveness of the
economic environment in a broad sense (as captured by the number of active
firms, for example), but rather on the incidence of well-defined anti-competitive
actions (that is, abuses of dominance). In particular, we will be interested in (i)
the incentives of firms both to engage in anti-competitive conduct and to innovate,
and (ii) the associated implications for optimal competition policy enforcement.
In Chapter 2 – “Welfare Effects of Compulsory Licensing” – we explore a
specific type of potentially anti-competitive action, namely the refusal on the part
of a dominant firm to license its intellectual property. The literature (reviewed in
more detail in the introduction to Chapter 2) has so far emphasised the trade-off
that competition authorities face when considering a compulsory licensing remedy:
while such a policy will promote competition, it should also be expected to reduce
the incentives for innovation by undermining the intellectual property rights of
innovators. Yet, so far, there are no analytical results characterising the conditions
under which welfare will rise or fall in response to compulsory licensing.
Chapter 2 presents a simple model that allows us to derive necessary and
sufficient conditions for compulsory licensing to improve welfare. This chapter
considers optimal policy from a welfare perspective (deterrence issues are key)
and, moreover, covers both a consumer surplus and a total welfare standard.26
From a legal uncertainty standpoint, the chapter compares two structural alter-
25See also Vives (2008), Boone (2000, 2001) and Schmutzler (2013) among many others.
26Furthermore, we also consider a ‘foreclosure standard’, under which the competition au-
thority cares about protecting competition in the market per se, by preventing the dominant
firm from foreclosing its less efficient rival.
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natives for competition policy (voluntary vs. compulsory licensing), which may be
interpreted as per se legality and per se illegality rules towards refusals to license
intellectual property, respectively. Therefore, this is a setting in which there is no
legal uncertainty.
We show that, when the risk-free rate of interest is low, compulsory licensing
unambiguously increases consumer surplus, because it guarantees that the most
preferred consumer outcome (that associated with technology transfer) is realised.
The effect on total welfare is, in general, ambiguous, but is more likely to be pos-
itive when the industry in question is naturally less competitive. Compulsory
licensing is also shown to be an effective measure to prevent leading firms fore-
closing their less-efficient rivals, since such a policy guarantees that the technology
gap between rival firms cannot exceed the critical level beyond which foreclosure
occurs. These results are particularly significant given the controversy over several
recent, high-profile refusal to license cases, discussed in Chapter 2.
The issue of refusals to license intellectual property and, relatedly, compul-
sory licensing is closely related to the broader issue of optimal competition policy
enforcement in innovative industries. In general, there are two ways in which this
question may be approached. Firstly, how should competition policy enforcement
differ across industries, depending on their underlying degree of innovative in-
tensity? Secondly, how should competition policy differentiate between offending
firms within a given industry, depending on whether or not they have also inno-
vated?27 In both respects, the existing literature (as discussed in more detail in
the introduction to Chapter 3) has so far stressed that innovation brings benefits
to society, which necessarily makes the optimal policy more lenient in innovative
industries, respectively towards firms that innovate in addition to engaging in
some anti-competitive conduct.28
In Chapter 3 – “Competition Policy in Innovative Industries” – we subject
this question to a more systematic analysis. We develop a framework that allows
us to separate clearly a firm’s decision to innovate from its decision to take some
potentially anti-competitive action. This is important, as the firm’s decision with
respect to innovation falls completely outside the scope of competition policy. In
that sense, we can think of the firm’s decision as to whether or not to innovate,
ignoring any potentially anti-competitive actions that it may take, as defining
the appropriate counterfactual relative to which the harm from any competition
offence should be calculated. Throughout the model, the setting is one of partial
legal uncertainty, since firms are assumed to know the true harm implied by their
action, but not the precise verdict that the competition authority would come to
in case of an investigation.
The first contribution of Chapter 3 is to develop a notion of the ‘true harm’
27In fact, as argued in Chapter 3, this distinction is not always clear in the existing literature,
where innovative industries are often taken to be those where firms will always innovate if they
take some anti-competitive action.
28See, e.g., Manne and Wright (2010), Spulber (2008).
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that results from a given competition offence, which takes account of a firm’s
innovation behaviour in the counterfactual position, absent any anti-competitive
conduct. In a decision error cost framework, we show that the optimal competition
policy should in fact be more stringent towards firms that innovate in addition to
taking some anti-competitive action, in the sense that the authority should base
its decisions on a lower “liability standard” (reflecting a lower burden of proof).
This follows because firms that innovate in addition to taking harmful actions are
also more likely, ceteris paribus, to have innovated in the counterfactual position.
In the context of a simple effects-based enforcement process, we show that this
biases the authority’s decision errors towards type II (acquittal) errors and away
from type I (conviction) errors, in response to which the optimal liability standard
should be lowered.
Finally, the framework also suggests that more innovative industries as a whole
are more prone to type II errors, which goes against the view expressed (in largely
informal terms) in the existing literature that more innovative industries are as-
sociated with a greater tendency towards type I errors (e.g. Manne and Wright
(2010)). As such, the argument that more innovative industries should face a
more lenient competition policy to mitigate this bias towards type I errors is also
not supported in our framework.
1.4.2 Part II: The Banking Sector
Paralleling the debate around the interactions between competition and innova-
tion incentives, there is an ongoing debate in the banking literature concerning the
link between competition and the stability of banks (as reflected in the riskiness
of the assets that they invest in, or the probability of bank runs, see Chapter 4).
Influential papers, from Keeley’s (1990) ‘charter value hypothesis’ onwards, have
argued that excessive competition may be detrimental to stability, although, as in
the innovation context, this result is highly dependent on the specific modelling
assumptions (for example, whether competition takes place on the asset or liabil-
ities side of banks’ balance sheets). Besides the potentially negative impact that
competition may have on stability, the banking literature has focused heavily on
the effectiveness of various measures that may be employed to ensure the stability
of banks, most importantly minimum capital requirements.29
This focus on banking stability, the means of safeguarding it, and in particular
the damage that competition may cause to it, may be seen as part of a more gen-
eral tendency among both regulators and economists to subordinate competition
to stability objectives in the banking sector. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 4, there
have been very recent and economically meaningful instances in which dominant
banks have abused their market power to the detriment of consumers. The study
of dominant banks’ incentives to behave anti-competitively, and the influence that
prudential regulation (in particular minimum capital requirements) has on these
29See, e.g., Furlong and Keeley (1989), Hellman et al. (2000).
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incentives, is therefore highly relevant.
We address this question in Chapter 4 – “Competitive Effects of Bank Cap-
ital Regulation”. Since this chapter deals with the incentives to behave anti-
competitively, we are implicitly taking a deterrence view of optimal competition
policy. In this banking context, the question of appropriate welfare standards
takes on particular significance, since banks’ customers typically include both
small and medium-sized firms on the loans side, and individual customers on
the deposit side.30 As motivated more carefully in Chapter 4, we follow the ap-
proach taken by competition authorities in practice, by considering both customer
groups to fall within the consumer surplus mandate of competition policy.31 We
then characterise generic abuse of dominance actions in both the loan and de-
posit markets,32 and investigate the impact of higher capital requirements on the
incentives of dominant banks to exploit their market power via these actions.33
In general, the effect of increasing capital requirements on the incentives for
dominant banks to abuse their market position vis-a`-vis its loans customers is
shown to depend on the divergence in the equity funding cost between the incum-
bent and rival banks: when this is sufficiently large, higher capital requirements,
by increasing the absolute loan volume of the incumbent, increase the incentives
to act anti-competitively. The incentives to exploit depositors via the sale of an-
cillary financial products – the avenue by which we model abuses of dominance
in the deposit markets – is also shown to depend on the magnitude of the equity
funding cost differential, as well as on the slope of demand. In order for higher
capital requirements to increase the incentives of dominant banks to exploit de-
positors, the equity cost gap must again be sufficiently large, and the demand
curve must be sufficiently flat. Therefore, the central contribution of this chap-
ter is to clarify the conditions under which stability-focused capital regulation
conflicts with competition and consumer protection policy in the banking sector.
30We are thinking here of simple retail or commercial banks, rather than investment banks.
31The inclusion of banks’ profits under a total welfare standard is another interesting avenue
for research, which will not be explored in this thesis.
32Since, in the latter case, the mechanism operates via the sale of ancillary financial products
to depositors, we are effectively considering both competition policy and consumer protection
policy in this chapter.
33The legal uncertainty setting is again one of partial legal uncertainty.
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Part I
Innovative Industries
20
Chapter 2
Welfare Effects of Compulsory
Licensing
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that the unregulated exploitation by firms of their intellectual
property (IP) rights can limit competition.1 This chapter examines a particular
type of anti-competitive conduct relating to a firm’s use of its IP: the unilateral
refusal by a dominant firm to license. As with the broader class of anti-competitive
actions known as ‘refusals to deal’, such a refusal to license represents a potential
abuse of a dominant position under competition law. A competition authority may
therefore impose a compulsory licence – a legal obligation to share IP in exchange
for fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) compensation2 – on a firm
that does not license its innovation voluntarily, in order to promote competition
in the market. Of course, the argument against compulsory licensing is that, by
undermining the IP protection of innovating firms, it reduces firms’ incentives to
innovate.3 The impact of compulsory licensing on welfare is, therefore, ambiguous,
since it promotes competition only at the expense of reduced innovation incentives.
This chapter analyses these conflicting effects in a systematic fashion, and derives
necessary and sufficient conditions for compulsory licensing to improve welfare.
The appropriate legal treatment of refusals to license IP has been a central
issue in numerous high-profile competition cases. Notably, however, the US and
European competition authorities have so far adopted quite different approaches
to this question. While the US has consistently upheld the rights of IP holders
1See, e.g., Pate (2003).
2This was the remuneration principle implemented in the European Microsoft case. See
Carlton and Shampine (2013) and Sidak (2013) for a wider discussion of the issues surrounding
FRAND licensing.
3See, e.g., Feldman (2009).
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by ruling against compulsory licensing – for example in Xerox 4 and Kodak5 –
the European Commission has imposed compulsory licensing in several landmark
cases, most notably in Microsoft, but also in IMS Health and Magill.6 Katsoulacos
(2009) relates this divergence in approaches to the appropriate choice of legal
standard by which refusals to license IP should be judged. The US approach in
Xerox is equated to per se legality, while the Commission’s legal standard in the
Microsoft case is considered an example of a low-false-acquittals discriminating
rule. The legal standard in the Magill and IMS Health cases, meanwhile, is argued
to be a low-false-convictions test. In a welfare framework, the desirability of these
competing legal standards is related to the underlying or average degree of harm
associated with refusals to license IP. This average harm is, in turn, reflected in
the ‘presumption of legality’, defined as the ratio of the expected benefit from
refusals to license IP that are benign (that is, for which welfare falls if compulsory
licensing is imposed) to the expected harm from refusals to license that are truly
harmful (that is, for which compulsory licensing would improve welfare). The
key insight is that the per se legality standard adopted in the US Xerox case is
welfare-preferred to the discriminating rules (be they of the low-false-acquittals
or low-false-convictions type) adopted by the Commission only if the presumption
of legality is strong. However, the extent to which refusals to license IP should be
viewed as presumptively legal is discussed only informally.
This chapter therefore also builds on Katsoulacos (2009), by investigating more
carefully the presumption of legality that should apply to refusals to license IP.
In particular, we take explicit account of innovation effects and investigate when
compulsory licensing improves welfare, relative to the case where a dominant firm
would refuse to license its innovation voluntarily.7 Our innovation results are
derived within the framework of a single innovation tournament model of R&D
competition,8 in which the imposition of compulsory licensing (by weakening the
4CSU, LLC v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
5Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services Inc., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
6Microsoft v. Commission, Case T201/04 (2007); IMS Health and NDC Health v. Commis-
sion, Case C418/01 (2004), ECR I-5039; and Magill ITP, BBC and RTE v. Commission, Cases
C241/91 and C242/91 P (1995), ECR I-743.
7The welfare effects of compulsory licensing have previously been discussed in Chen (2014),
Stavropoulou and Valletti (2013) and Bond and Saggi (2012). Our results extend Chen (2014),
by treating innovation as a continuous rather than a binary variable. While the latter approach
gives insights into the cases where innovation either falls to zero or remains unchanged following
the imposition of compulsory licensing, our approach allows us to look at the intermediate cases
where innovation rates may fall somewhat in response to compulsory licensing. Stavropoulou and
Valletti (2013) and Bond and Saggi (2012) investigate the welfare effects of compulsory licensing
in the specific context of North-South pharmaceutical trade, while our model is general.
8This is to be contrasted with the general class of “non-tournament” models of R&D. In
tournament models, there can only be a single successful innovator, and firms invest in R&D in
order to influence their likely date of success. The incentives to invest in R&D here depend on
both a profit incentive (the difference in profits from innovating successfully and current profits)
and the competitive threat (the difference in profits from innovating successfully and having the
rival innovate successfully), with the relative magnitude of these effects determining the likely
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IP protection of innovators) always lowers innovation incentives. While several
models have shown that weakening IP protection can actually increase innovation
rates,9 we justify this modelling assumption as follows. The majority of competi-
tion authorities around the world, including in the US and EU, follow a consumer
surplus standard.10 In that context, were innovation rates to rise in response
to a compulsory licence, such a policy would represent a win-win situation for
consumers. To make the trade-off between innovation and competition real, we
must therefore have a reduction in R&D incentives when compulsory licensing is
imposed. While this may be achieved in more complex dynamic models,11 the
simplest such model is a one-shot tournament model.12
We derive our welfare results on the basis of both a consumer surplus and
a total welfare standard, as well as in the case where the competition authority
cares about protecting competition per se under a so-called foreclosure standard.
We are able to show that, when the risk-free rate is low, consumer surplus is
always higher when a dominant firm is forced to license via compulsory licensing,
because this guarantees that the most preferred consumer outcome (that associ-
ated with technology transfer) is realised. This result therefore contradicts the
view that refusals to license IP should be viewed as strongly presumptively le-
gal, and consequently treated under a per se legality standard.13 Instead, on the
basis of Katsoulacos (2009), the discriminating rules adopted by the Commission
appear more reasonable. The effect of compulsory licensing on total welfare is
more complex, but is shown to be positive whenever the underlying degree of
competitiveness in the industry is sufficiently low. We also show that compulsory
licensing is an effective policy to protect competition per se, since it guarantees
that the incumbent cannot foreclose its less-efficient rival.
While these results are derived in a baseline model in which the incumbent is
innovator. (See the models of Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Lee and Wilde (1980),
Reinganum (1982, 1983, 1985a,b), Harris and Vickers (1985).) In non-tournament models, there
are multiple equivalent ways of attaining a new technology, so there can be multiple innovators.
See Beath et al. (1989b) for a more extensive survey.
9See, e.g., Segal and Whinston (2007), who emphasise the front-loading effect, according
to which weaker protection for innovative entrants may increase R&D, since it increases the
incentives to innovate in order to replace the (more protected) incumbent. In models of sequential
innovation, the neck-and-neck effect predicts that firms will invest more in R&D when they are
closer together, so that the bunching of firms that is brought about by compulsory licensing may
promote R&D spending in subsequent stages of innovation. See Aghion et al. (2001). These
effects are discussed in more detail in Vickers (2010).
10Two exceptions are Canada and New Zealand, which follow a total welfare standard.
11See, e.g., Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). They show that a so-called trickle-down effect
makes a staggering of compulsory licensing fees optimal, whereby firms that are furthest behind
pay more for the licence. While this mitigates the fall in innovation rates compared to a uni-
form compulsory licensing policy, innovation rates do still fall relative to the full IP protection
benchmark.
12See also Gilbert and Shapiro (1996) and Ku¨hn and Van Reenen (2008) for more general
discussion of the R&D effects of compulsory licensing.
13Rather, this results suggests that refusals to license should be viewed as strongly presump-
tively illegal if consumer surplus is the relevant welfare measure.
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the predicted winner of the innovation race – a scenario we refer to as persistent
dominance – we also demonstrate their validity in an action-reaction setting, in
which the less-efficient firm is predicted to overtake the incumbent by innovating
successfully.14 It is important to verify that the incentives for dominant firms to
refuse to license, and the welfare effects of compulsory licensing carry over to the
action-reaction setting, since here the dominance of the incumbent firm is, at least
in the dynamic sense, weaker.15
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the
model. Section 2.3 discusses the innovation effects of compulsory licensing in the
benchmark, persistent dominance case, while Section 2.4 derives the main welfare
results. Section 2.5 discusses the action-reaction case before Section 2.6 concludes.
All proofs that are not immediate from the context are collected in Appendix A.1.
2.2 The Model
We analyse a homogeneous-product industry in which firms produce under con-
stant marginal costs. The model consists of three stages – innovation, fixed-fee
licensing and production – and is solved by backward induction.
2.2.1 Stage 1 – Innovation
Consider an innovation race defined in terms of the gap between a given firm’s
marginal cost and an existing industry standard. Suppose there are just two firms:
the follower has the technology that defines the existing industry standard, while
the leader has a technology that is ahead of this industry standard as a result of
some previous innovation, to be understood in the sense of lower cost. We write
these gaps in the initial position as gF = 0 and gL = G, 0 < G < 1, for the
follower and leader, respectively, where the maximum conceivable gap has been
normalised to 1. These gaps translate into marginal costs for firm i of ci = 1− gi,
so that the initial marginal cost levels are cF = 1 and cL = 1−G for the follower
and leader, respectively. Firms invest in R&D in order to be the first to discover
a new technology that, for whoever is the first to discover, will increase their gap
over the industry standard by the amount g, 0 < g < 1−G.16
We adopt the approach taken elsewhere in the innovation literature by ap-
proximating a firm’s choice of hazard rate (that is, its instantaneous innovation
14This follows Beath et al. (1995). See also Carlton and Gertner (2002), who argue that
most R&D-intensive industries, such as the IT, pharmaceutical and chemical industries, are
characterised by action-reaction competition.
15Another concern in the action-reaction setting is that dominant firms may refuse to license
in an attempt to limit the innovative advantage that less efficient firms enjoy.
16Our set-up is also consistent with certain representations of product quality. For example,
in Ha¨ckner (2000) (assuming homogeneous products), demand for firm i takes the form pi(Q) =
αi −Q, where Q is total output and αi is firm i’s quality parameter. Since costs are normalised
to zero in that framework, this is equivalent to our demand environment in which costs vary and
quality remains constant (see Section 2.2.3 below).
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probability, conditional on no firm having innovated up to that point) by its com-
petitive threat.17 Let the hazard rate chosen by the leader be denoted by x ≥ 0
and that of the follower by y ≥ 0. To gain closed-form solutions, we further as-
sume that the R&D costs are quadratic in hazard rates. In these circumstances,
it is straightforward to show that the hazard rates chosen by the firms are18
x =
1
2r
(piwL − pilL) and y =
1
2r
(piwF − pilF ), (2.1)
where r is the risk-free rate of interest, and piwi and pi
l
i denote the operating
profits earned by firm i = L,F as a result of winning and losing the innovation
race, respectively.
For many of our results, it will be sufficient to consider the rate-adjusted hazard
rate, which we define as X = 2r · x for the leader and Y = 2r · y for the follower.
Note that these are independent of the risk-free rate r. The preceding discussion
therefore implies that the leader is the predicted winner of the innovation race if
and only if X > Y .
2.2.2 Stage 2 – Licensing
For compulsory licensing to be a meaningful policy, it must be the case that not
all firms decide to license their innovations voluntarily. Several papers have shown
that precisely such an equilibrium involving full diffusion of innovations will result
when licensing is based (in whole or in part) on per-unit royalties.19 Hence, in
order for the refusal to license problem to arise, it is necessary to assume that
licensing is based on fixed fees only.
In our model, firms bargain over the licence fee at which the technology is
shared, and this is assumed to result in a Pareto-efficient outcome. This implies
that licensing will only occur voluntarily if it increases the firms’ joint profits.
We define compulsory licensing as a licensing deal that is (i) imposed by the
competition authority when voluntary licensing is not feasible and (ii) priced
below the total economic benefit that the innovation brings to the non-innovator
(FRAND).
17See, e.g., Ulph and Ulph (1998) and related literature. The reliance on the competitive
threat as the sole determinant of firms’ innovation incentives may also be justified by the following
scenario. Suppose the innovator is in fact an outside firm, which auctions off any innovation it
discovers. In this auction game, the producing firms’ incentives to bid will be given exactly by
their competitive threats, since one firm will inevitably acquire the patent rights. In this setting,
the competitive threat represents an exact solution to the firms’ R&D investment problem.
18See Beath et al. (1989a) for a more detailed derivation of these results.
19See Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Kamien et al. (1992) for licensing based purely on
royalties, and Sen and Tauman (2007) for the case of optimally combined fixed fees and royalties.
In Chen (2014), refusals to license may occur, even with royalties. In particular, in a vertically
integrated industry, it is shown that the upstream monopolist may refuse to license in order to
maintain vertical control when the upstream market becomes competitive. We will not deal with
vertical integration as a motivation for refusals to license in this chapter.
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2.2.3 Stage 3 – Production
We consider both a general demand environment, as well as a linear demand exam-
ple where necessary for the results (see Section 2.2.4 below). At a general level, we
suppose that competition takes the form of Cournot, with inverse demand given
by twice continuously differentiable function P (Q), with P ′(Q) < 0 whenever
P (Q) > 0, where Q = qL + qF is aggregate output. Furthermore, we assume that
P (0) > 1 and P (Q) < 1 − (G + g) for Q sufficiently high. Finally, we make the
standard assumption that P ′(Q) + QP ′′(Q) < 0 for all Q ≥ 0 with P (Q) > 0.20
These assumptions ensure the existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium,
with intuitive comparative static properties. In particular, letting pii(gL, gF ) de-
note the operating profits of firm i = L,F as a function of the cost gaps, we have
∂pii
∂gi
> 0 and ∂pii∂gk < 0, k 6= i.21
As is standard in homogeneous-product Cournot, equilibrium price, output
and therefore consumer surplus depend only on the average cost (equivalently,
cost gap). Consequently, in what follows, it is assumed that consumer surplus
is a strictly increasing function of the combined cost gap, which we denote by
CS(gL + gF ), with CS
′ > 0. Let
Σ(gL, gF ) = piL(gL, gF ) + piF (gL, gF )
denote industry profits associated with gaps (gL, gF ). Finally, let the sum of
consumer surplus and firm profits (that is, total welfare) be denoted by
TW (gL, gF ) = Σ(gL, gF ) + CS(gL + gF ).
Unless otherwise stated, we consider a non-drastic innovation, so that both
firms produce positive output, both before and after innovation has occurred.
2.2.4 Linear Demand Example
Many of the results to be derived in this chapter depend on the effect of dis-
crete changes in the firms’ marginal costs on industry profits. Whenever this
rearrangement of costs is such that their sum (and therefore the average cost) re-
mains constant, well-known results can be used to determine the profit effect for
general demand functions.22 However, the majority of cost changes we consider
do not satisfy this requirement: not only do costs change across firms, the average
cost is also affected. In this case, there are no general results that determine the
sign of the aggregate profit effect associated with discrete cost changes.23
20Novshek (1985)
21Amir et al. (2013), Linnemer (2003)
22Because, in that simple case, aggregate output, price, industry revenue and consumer surplus
are unaffected. See Salant and Shaffer (1999).
23Fe´vrier and Linnemer (2004) develop general results for marginal cost changes. Since we
are concerned with discrete cost changes, these results apply here only in the sense of first-order
approximations. While the nature of the results is unchanged under the approximation method,
we focus on the linear demand set-up for tractability.
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We therefore introduce a simple linear-demand set-up to deal with this com-
plication where it arises. Suppose then, for the sake of this example, that inverse
demand is given by
P (Q) = (1 + )−Q,  > 0.
The benefit of this specification is that we can interpret the  parameter as a
measure that is inversely related to the ‘competitiveness’ of the market. This
follows since, under the price-output combination (P,Q) = (1, ) (that is, the one
which prevails if price equals marginal cost under the initial industry standard),
 = −P
′(Q)Q
P (Q)
.
Therefore  measures the inverse elasticity of demand at the competitive equilib-
rium corresponding to the initial industry standard.24
In a Cournot equilibrium, industry profits are symmetric and are given by
Σ(gL, gF ) =
1
9
[
(+ 2gL − gF )2 + (+ 2gF − gL)2
]
,
while consumer surplus is equal to
CS(gL + gF ) =
1
18
(2+ gL + gF )
2 .
In terms of notation, we write zjsi for the value of variable z that accrues to
firm i = L,F if the winner of the race is firm j = L,F , and if the degree of
information sharing is s = N,V,C, where N denotes no licensing, V denotes a
voluntary licensing regime and C denotes compulsory licensing. If a variable z is
written without subscript i, it accrues to society as a whole rather than to either
of the firms.
2.3 Innovation Effects of Compulsory Licensing
Having outlined the individual components of our modelling framework, this sec-
tion considers the innovation effects of compulsory licensing, relative to a bench-
mark case in which firms are permitted to license voluntarily. As will be shown,
compulsory licensing indeed imposes a cost by reducing aggregate R&D spending.
Before deriving these results, it is useful to start by considering firms’ innovation
behaviour in the absence of licensing.
The predicted winner of the innovation race can be determined with reference
to the rate-adjusted hazard rates, which depend solely on the difference in profits
associated with winning and losing the innovation race. Noting that the cost gaps,
conditional on the leader innovating, are (gLNL , g
LN
F ) = (G + g, 0), while, if the
24This measure of industry competitiveness is also used in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2013), for
example. Measuring elasticity at the competitive equilibrium avoids the cellophane fallacy.
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follower innovates, they are (gFNL , g
FN
F ) = (G, g), these rate-adjusted hazard rates
are given by
XN = piL(G+ g, 0)− piL(G, g)
and
Y N = piF (G, g)− piF (G+ g, 0)
for the leader and follower, respectively. So, if there is no licensing, the leader has
a strictly greater incentive to innovate if and only if XN > Y N , which is to say
Σ(G+ g, 0) > Σ(G, g). (2.2)
As proved in Lemma 1 below, this condition is always satisfied, even in our general
demand environment. It follows that we are in a persistent dominance setting.
Lemma 1. In the absence of licensing, the leader is the predicted winner of the
innovation race, XN > Y N .
Proof. Appendix A.1.
2.3.1 Voluntary Licensing Benchmark
Now consider the incentives of each firm to license its innovation voluntarily,
conditional on innovating successfully. The consequence of either firm’s decision
to license its discovery is that both firms’ cost gaps will increase by an amount
g following innovation. Therefore, if the leader wins and licenses, the cost gaps
are equal to (gLVL , g
LV
F ) = (G + g, g). Conditional on the leader being the first
to innovate, we can write the minimum price that the leader would be willing to
accept for the licence and the maximum price that the follower would be willing
to pay for the licence as
PL = piL(G+ g, 0)− piL(G+ g, g) (2.3)
and
P
L
= piF (G+ g, g)− piF (G+ g, 0), (2.4)
respectively. So, if the leader innovates, voluntary licensing will take place if and
only if
Σ(G+ g, g) > Σ(G+ g, 0). (2.5)
That is, voluntary licensing will occur if and only if such an agreement increases
industry profits.
If the follower wins the innovation race and licenses, the cost gaps are also equal
to (gFVL , g
FV
F ) = (G + g, g). Therefore, provided licensing takes place, operating
profits and consumer surplus are the same, regardless of which firm makes the
innovation. The minimum price that the follower would be willing to accept for
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the licence and the maximum price that the leader would be willing to pay are,
respectively,
PF = piF (G, g)− piF (G+ g, g) (2.6)
and
P
F
= piL(G+ g, g)− piL(G, g). (2.7)
Therefore, if the follower innovates, licensing will take place if and only if
Σ(G+ g, g) > Σ(G, g). (2.8)
Notice that, given that (2.2) holds, it follows from (2.5) and (2.8) that if
the leader licenses the innovation, then the follower certainly will. Conversely,
if the follower does not license the discovery, then neither will the leader. For
competition authorities to want to compel firms to license, it must be the case
that at least one of the firms would choose not to license voluntarily. So it certainly
has to be the case that the leader does not license. Consequently, in what follows,
it will be assumed that25
Σ(G+ g, g) < Σ(G+ g, 0). (2.9)
Since, if the follower licenses, both the average cost gap and the variance of
costs increase, it is natural to assume that the follower will license, conditional
on innovating.26 Hence it is assumed that (2.8) holds, which in combination with
(2.9) implies that
Σ(G+ g, 0) > Σ(G+ g, g) > Σ(G, g). (2.10)
Let us denote the voluntary licence payment in case the follower discovers first
and licenses by PF , and write this as a weighted average of the reservation prices
(2.6) and (2.7), so that
PF = σ [piF (G, g)− piF (G+ g, g)] + (1− σ) [piL(G+ g, g)− piL(G, g)] .
Here σ, 0 < σ < 1, is a parameter capturing the bargaining strength of the leader.
Consequently, with voluntary licensing, the rate-adjusted hazard rates are given
by
XV = XN − σ [Σ(G+ g, g)− Σ(G, g)] ,
Y V = Y N + (1− σ) [Σ(G+ g, g)− Σ(G, g)] .
25In the context of our linear demand set-up, this condition is equivalent to the requirement
that 2 < 3g + 8G.
26See Salant and Shaffer (1999). In the context of our linear demand example, it is straight-
forward to verify that a sufficient condition for the follower to license is that g < G. This
condition is far from being necessary, however. Indeed, the necessary and sufficient condition
for the follower not to license is 3g > 2 + 10G. In other words, a necessary condition for the
follower to refuse to license is that the gap opened up by the new discovery is more than three
times as large as the initial gap of the leader.
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From (2.10) it follows that, if firms can license, this will reduce the hazard rate
of the leader but raise the hazard rate of the follower.27 Nonetheless, the leader
still remains the predicted winner of the innovation race, since, by (2.10)
XV − Y V = Σ(G+ g, 0)− Σ(G+ g, g) > 0. (2.11)
In other words, the persistent dominance result in Lemma 1 is robust to the
addition of voluntary licensing.
Before considering the innovation and welfare impacts of compulsory licens-
ing, the following section discusses briefly the relevance of expectations and the
“regulatory threat” for bargaining outcomes at the voluntary licensing stage. Im-
portantly, the results presented in this section are robust to an alternative speci-
fication based on expectations.
2.3.2 Voluntary Licensing and the “Regulatory Threat”
So far, we have not taken explicit account of the fact that firms may anticipate
a compulsory licence being imposed, in case no voluntary agreement is reached.
One may think that the mere threat of regulatory intervention could spur firms
to agree voluntary deals that would not be agreed in the absence of such a threat.
In that case, the threat of a compulsory licence being imposed might resolve the
refusal to license problem in and of itself. This is closely related to the issue of
voluntary agreements in environmental regulation, where the regulatory threat
can have precisely this effect.28
However, if we let θj , 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1, denote the (common) probability with
which firms anticipate a compulsory licence being imposed on innovating firm
j = L,F in case no voluntary agreement is reached, it is possible to show that
the licensing conditions (2.5) and (2.8) are unchanged when we allow for arbitrary
expectations. Intuitively, a higher probability of compulsory licensing distorts the
firms’ reservation prices towards the expected, exogenous FRAND fee. Since this
just represents a transfer between firms that does not affect industry profits, the
licensing condition is still determined on the basis of (2.5) and (2.8). Hence the
threat of compulsory licensing alone cannot solve the underlying refusal to license
problem (see Appendix A.2 for details).
27This replicates the result of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and others, who show that voluntary
licensing has an ambiguous effect on industry-wide innovation incentives, relative to no licensing.
As in that paper, aggregate innovation incentives will rise if the bargaining strength of the licensor
(here: the follower) is high, specifically if σ < 1
2
.
28See, e.g., Manzini and Mariotti (2003), Arguedas (2005) and Segerson and Miceli (1998).
A notable difference in the bargaining context analysed in those papers is that all firms lose out
as a result of environmental regulation. In the compulsory licensing context, the non-innovator
actually benefits when compulsory licensing is imposed.
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2.3.3 Compulsory Licensing
Having developed this benchmark voluntary licensing case, we now consider the
innovation effects of compulsory licensing. Under a policy of compulsory licensing,
the leader will be obliged by the competition authority to share its discovery at
FRAND prices if it innovates successfully. Moreover, firms will take this into
account when investing in R&D. As discussed in Section 2.2, we assume that such
a FRAND licence must be priced below the economic benefit that the innovation
brings to the non-innovator. This implies that the FRAND licence price must
satisfy29
PFRAND ≤ piF (G+ g, g)− piF (G+ g, 0),
which we can write more conveniently as
PFRAND = φ [piF (G+ g, g)− piF (G+ g, 0)] , (2.12)
where φ is a constant in the interval [0, 1]. This FRAND price is, moreover,
assumed to be commmon knowledge. By simple algebraic comparison, it then
follows that the hazard rates of the firms are always identical under compulsory
licensing. Therefore the outcome of the innovation race becomes indeterminate.
Lemma 2. Under compulsory licensing, the hazard rates of the leader and follower
are identical, XC = Y C = PFRAND + PF .
The intuition for this result is clear. Regardless of whether a given firm wins
or loses the innovation race, its operating profits will be constant because the
innovation is shared in either case. Since what matters in determining the hazard
rates is the difference in profits from winning and losing the innovation race, the
incentives of the leader (to win so as to earn the FRAND fee and avoid paying
under the voluntary licensing deal if the follower wins) are now exactly equal to
those of the follower (to win so as to earn the voluntary licensing fee and avoid
paying the FRAND price). Note also that this result is independent of the precise
level at which the FRAND licence price is set.
The next result summarises the innovation incentives of firms across the vol-
untary and compulsory licensing regimes under persistent dominance.30
Lemma 3. The (rate-adjusted) hazard rates of the firms are ranked as follows,
XV > Y V ≥ XC = Y C .
Proof. Appendix A.1.
This result therefore confirms the cost side of the welfare trade-off discussed
in the introduction: compulsory licensing reduces industry-wide innovation incen-
tives.
29Note that the FRAND requirement is therefore equivalent to the requirement that (see
(2.4)) PFRAND ≤ PL. That is, the FRAND price must be below the total willingness of the
non-innovator to pay for the licence in a voluntary licensing scenario.
30Since the focus of the chapter is the effect of compulsory licensing relative to a voluntary
licensing benchmark, we exclude for brevity the no-licensing regime from these comparisons.
31
2.4 Welfare Effects of Compulsory Licensing
This section presents the main results of the chapter, relating to the welfare
effect of compulsory licensing when the costs of reduced innovation incentives
(demonstrated in Lemma 3) are balanced against the pro-competitive benefits (in
the form of increased industry output) of technology transfer. We consider in turn
three welfare standards: consumer surplus, total welfare, and foreclosure.
2.4.1 Consumer Surplus
As a first step towards a full welfare analysis of compulsory licensing on the basis
of a consumer surplus standard, we derive an expression for the expected present
discounted value of consumer surplus, which accounts for R&D effects. Let v(x, y)
denote this present discounted consumer surplus, given hazard rates x and y. We
know that consumer surplus before an innovation occurs is given by CS(G), while
consumer surplus following an innovation by firm j = L,F and given licensing
regime s = V,C is denoted by CSjs. We can then write the present discounted
value of consumer surplus as31
v(xs, ys) =
xs CS
Ls
r + y
s CSF
r + CS(G)
xs + ys + r
. (2.13)
The necessary and sufficient condition for consumer surplus to be higher under
compulsory licensing than under voluntary licensing is
v(xC , yC) > v(xV , yV ).
In order to isolate the effect of the risk-free interest rate r, we can write the above
condition in terms of rate-adjusted hazard rates as
XCXV
r2
[CS(G+ 2g)− CS(G+ g)] + CS(G) (XV + Y V − 2XC)
> XV CS(G+ g)− CS(G+ 2g) (2XC − Y V ) . (2.14)
This expression may be interpreted as follows. The first term is positive and re-
flects the fact that, post-innovation, consumers will on average enjoy a higher level
of surplus under compulsory licensing than under voluntary licensing, because the
possibility that the leader will innovate and refuse to license is removed. The sec-
ond term is positive because, as shown in Lemma 3, aggregate innovation rates
are lower under compulsory licensing, which implies that consumers will enjoy the
status quo surplus for longer in expectation. Hence the inequality can only fail
on account of the terms on the second line, the sign of which is ambiguous. On
average, consumers will jump to a higher level of consumer surplus sooner under
31The derivation of this expression parallels the derivation of present discounted profits in
Grossman and Shapiro (1987, p. 374) and Beath et al. (1989, p. 165), for example.
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voluntary licensing since innovation rates are higher. On the other hand, the
level of surplus that consumers will enjoy post-innovation under voluntary licens-
ing is lower than that which they would enjoy post-innovation under compulsory
licensing, due to the technology transfer effect.
In what follows, we will simplify the problem by considering an economic
environment in which the risk-free rate r is ‘low’.32 Multiplying (2.14) through
by r2 and letting r → 0, the consumer surplus effect is then positive if and only
if 33
CS(G+ 2g)− CS(G+ g) > 0, (2.15)
which is clearly satisfied. Hence we have the following welfare result.
Proposition 1. When the risk-free rate is low, compulsory licensing increases
consumer surplus, even when dynamic incentive effects are taken into account,
v(xC , yC) > v(xV , yV ).
Intuitively, when the risk-free rate is low, consumers are more concerned with
the identity of the innovating firm and the associated licensing outcome than the
precise timing of the innovation.34 Since both firms’ innovations result in a cost
reduction of magnitude g, forcing the leader to license via compulsory licence is
equivalent here (from a consumer surplus point of view) to the follower licensing
voluntarily. Therefore, compulsory licensing guarantees that the most preferred
consumer outcome (that associated with technology transfer) is achieved with
certainty,35 making it unambiguously preferred to voluntary licensing in consumer
surplus terms.
It also follows that the presumption of legality that applies to refusals to
license IP, as judged by a consumer surplus standard, is extremely weak in these
circumstances. We next consider the implications of compulsory licensing for total
welfare.
32Note that, since the risk-free rate scales the magnitude of the competitive threats in (2.1), the
assumption of low r is also implicit in the assumption that the competitive threats dominate firms’
innovation decisions, as in Ulph and Ulph (1998). The economic implication of this assumption is
that dynamic concerns relating to the likely identity of the innovating firm take precedence over
the precise timing of the innovation. This assumption is therefore most reasonable in high-tech
industries, where the rate of innovation is relatively high.
33Note that the limit argument is adopted for convenience only. Collecting the terms in (2.14)
that are discounted by r2 in a new term, call it A, and those that are not in another term, call it
B, so that (2.14) can be written as A
r2
+B > 0, what is strictly required in order for the risk-free
rate to be considered “low” in the sense we have in mind here is that r <
√
A/|B| whenever
B < 0.
34Of course, if B > 0 in the preceding footnote (a sufficient condition for which is that
CS(G+ 2g)
(
2XC − Y V ) > CS(G+ g)XV ) then Proposition 1 also holds for arbitrarily large r.
35This is an important difference to the action-reaction case analysed in Section 2.5, where
the identity of the innovating firm does still matter under compulsory licensing.
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2.4.2 Total Welfare
Using analogous notation to that in Section 2.4.1, we can write the present dis-
counted total welfare resulting from hazard rates x and y, given information shar-
ing regime s = V,C, as
W (xs, ys) =
1
xs + ys + r

xs
(
TWLs
r
)
+ ys
(
TWF
r
)
+ TW (G, 0)− (xs)2 − (ys)2
 . (2.16)
In terms of total welfare, compulsory licensing will be preferred to voluntary
licensing if and only if
W (xC , yC) > W (xV , yV ). (2.17)
When the risk-free rate is low, the condition implied by (2.17) can be written as
XCXV ∆TW + ∆c > 0,
where
∆TW = [Σ(G+ g, g)− Σ(G+ g, 0)] + [CS(G+ 2g)− CS(G+ g)] (2.18)
captures the difference in total welfare levels, absent R&D costs, and ∆c > 0 is
a term capturing the R&D cost savings under compulsory licensing relative to
voluntary licensing. The term ∆TW is made up of both a negative (see (2.10))
profit effect and a positive consumer surplus effect. Since, moreover, we can say
on the basis of our linear demand example that ∆TW is increasing in  (that is,
the degree to which the market is uncompetitive) and positive whenever36
8 > 3g + 14G, (2.19)
we have the following result.37
Proposition 2. When the risk-free rate is low, the total welfare effect of compul-
sory licensing is positive whenever the underlying degree of competitiveness in the
industry is sufficiently low.
Therefore, in industries that are uncompetitive, the consumer gain from in-
creased output associated with compulsory licensing will outweigh the loss in
terms of aggregate profits suffered by firms. If, on the other hand, the industry is
sufficiently competitive, it is total welfare improving to allow the dominant firm
to refuse to license, rather than imposing a compulsory licence.
36This follows because ∆TW =
g
18
(8− 3g − 14G).
37It is well known that tournament models provide incentives for socially excessive investment
in R&D (see, e.g., Beath et al. (1995)). It should be noted in this regard that our results are
robust to the inclusion of spillovers (by which innovation incentives can be made arbitrarily
small) and, as such, they are not driven by this average over-investment issue. See Appendix
A.3 for details.
34
2.4.3 Foreclosure
We now consider the final welfare standard that a competition authority may
implement: a foreclosure standard. This is motivated by the concern that a
refusal to license by the dominant firm may result in the follower exiting the
market. Relaxing the assumption of a non-drastic innovation for this section, we
can see that, in our linear demand example, foreclosure will occur whenever
gL > ĝL (gF ) ≡ + 2gF . (2.20)
It follows that forcing the leader to share its innovation guarantees that its lead
over the follower will not exceed the critical level ĝL (gF ) defined in (2.20).
This result holds far more generally, however. In homogeneous-product Cournot
with constant marginal costs, each firm’s output necessarily increases in response
to a cost shock that reduces all firms’ costs symmetrically.38 For our purposes,
we can restate this existing result as follows.
Proposition 3. If both firms are active before any innovation occurs, compulsory
licensing guarantees that both firms remain active post-innovation.
Compulsory licensing is therefore an effective policy to protect competition per
se.
In the remainder of the chapter, we explore the robustness of our welfare
results by considering an alternative R&D setting, in which, rather than the leader
being the predicted winner of the innovation race (persistent dominance), the
follower is predicted to innovate, and this innovation allows the follower to overtake
the leader’s technology (action-reaction). As will be shown, our welfare results
continue to hold under this alternative setting of R&D competition.
2.5 Action-Reaction R&D Competition
2.5.1 Innovation Effects of Compulsory Licensing
In order to generate action-reaction, assume from now on that, if the follower
innovates, its cost gap will increase by an amount G + g, while if the leader
innovates, its gap will increase by g. This implies that both firms are now racing
to achieve a post-innovation gap of G + g. In the absence of licensing, it is then
straightforward to show that the rate-adjusted hazard rates of the firms can be
written as
XN = piL(G+ g, 0)− piL(G,G+ g),
Y N = piF (G,G+ g)− piF (G+ g, 0).
It follows that the necessary and sufficient condition for the follower to be the
predicted winner of the innovation race is
Σ(G,G+ g) > Σ(G+ g, 0), (2.21)
38See, e.g., Fe´vrier and Linnemer (2004).
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which, in the context of our linear Cournot example, requires that
2 > 8g + 3G. (2.22)
Thus action-reaction will occur in industries in which the baseline level of compet-
itiveness is sufficiently low. Since we are interested in investigating the innovation
and welfare effects of compulsory licensing in action-reaction industries, we assume
that (2.21), and therefore (2.22), are satisfied.
Voluntary Licensing Benchmark
Turning to the firms’ voluntary licensing decisions, note that the cost gaps, condi-
tional on the leader innovating and licensing, are (gLVL , g
LV
F ) = (G+ g, g). Hence
the minimum price that the leader would accept in order to sell the licence and
the maximum price that the follower would be willing to pay are as in (2.3) and
(2.4), which in turn implies that the leader will again license if and only if
Σ(G+ g, g) > Σ(G+ g, 0). (2.23)
If the follower innovates and licenses, then (gFVL , g
FV
F ) = (2G + g,G + g).
Hence the minimum price that the follower would accept for the licence, and the
maximum price that the leader would be willing to pay are now
PF = piF (G,G+ g)− piF (2G+ g,G+ g), (2.24)
and
P
F
= piL(2G+ g,G+ g)− piL(G,G+ g), (2.25)
respectively, and so licensing will take place if and only if
Σ(2G+ g,G+ g) > Σ(G,G+ g). (2.26)
Now, on the basis of our linear demand example, (2.23) holds if and only if
2 > 3g + 8G, while (2.26) holds if and only if 2 > 3g − 7G. So it will again be
the case that if the leader chooses to license, the follower certainly will, while if
the follower chooses not to license, then neither will the leader. Note, moreover,
that condition (2.22) guarantees that the follower will license, conditional on
innovating. We therefore assume that (2.26) is satisfied while (2.23) is not, and
instead we have
Σ(G+ g, 0) > Σ(G+ g, g). (2.27)
As in the persistent dominance case, this implies that only the follower will license
its discovery voluntarily.
Writing the voluntary licence payment in case the follower innovates as a
weighted average of the reservation prices (2.24) and (2.25), this licence payment
is equal to
PF =σ [piF (G,G+ g)− piF (2G+ g,G+ g)]
+ (1− σ) [piL(2G+ g,G+ g)− piL(G,G+ g)] ,
36
where σ, 0 < σ < 1, is again the bargaining strength of the leader. The hazard
rates under voluntary licensing then follow as
XV = XN − σ [Σ(2G+ g,G+ g)− Σ(G,G+ g)] ,
Y V = Y N + (1− σ) [Σ(2G+ g,G+ g)− Σ(G,G+ g)] .
With reference to (2.26), we can see that, despite the follower having been more
likely to innovate in the first place, introducing voluntary licensing increases the
hazard rate of the follower and decreases the hazard rate of the leader.39
Compulsory Licensing
Following the same definition of FRAND licensing given in Section 2.2, the FRAND
licence fee must again satisfy
PFRAND = φ [piF (G+ g, g)− piF (G+ g, 0)] ,
with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. Unlike in the persistent dominance scenario, however, the
operating profits of a given firm associated with winning and losing the innovation
race are not equal under compulsory licensing, because the magnitude of the cost
saving now depends on the identity of the innovating firm. As the next Lemma
shows, this in turn implies that, under action-reaction, the innovation incentives
are not equalised when compulsory licensing is imposed.
Lemma 4. Under action-reaction, the follower remains the predicted winner of
the innovation race when compulsory licensing is imposed, Y C > XC .
Proof. Appendix A.1.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that compulsory licensing does not equalise the
hazard rates, since it reduces the hazard rate of the leader and (weakly) reduces
the hazard rate of the follower, it will again reduce the industry-wide innovation
incentives relative to the voluntary licensing benchmark. Therefore the cost of
compulsory licensing in terms of reduced innovation rates remains, as summarised
in the next result.
Lemma 5. Under action-reaction, compulsory licensing reduces aggregate R&D
incentives relative to a voluntary licensing regime, XV + Y V > XC + Y C .
Proof. Appendix A.1.
Finally, denoting the absolute magnitudes of the changes in hazard rates by
∆X = XV −XC > 0 and ∆Y = Y V − Y C ≥ 0, it is also possible to show that
∆X > ∆Y whenever Σ(G + g, 0) > Σ(G + g, g), which, given (2.27), is satisfied.
Hence we have the following result.40
39Of course, this also implies that the follower will remain the predicted winner of the race.
By (2.21) and (2.26), we have XV − Y V = Σ(G+ g, 0)− Σ(2G+ g,G+ g) < 0.
40In this sense, the refusal by the leader to license voluntarily can also be seen as an attempt
to limit the extent of action-reaction in the market.
37
Lemma 6. The imposition of compulsory licensing further strengthens the action-
reaction properties of the innovation race, since ∆X > ∆Y .
We may now consider the welfare effects of compulsory licensing under action-
reaction, as judged both by a consumer surplus standard and a total welfare
standard.41
2.5.2 Welfare Effects of Compulsory Licensing
Consumer Surplus
In order to assess the consumer surplus implications of compulsory licensing, first
consider the consumer surplus levels associated with the various outcomes of the
innovation race. Let CSF = CS(3G+2g) denote the level of consumer surplus that
results if the follower innovates under either voluntary or compulsory licensing,
CSLC = CS(G+2g) denote the level of surplus that results if the leader innovates
under compulsory licensing, and CSLV = CS(G + g) the level of surplus that
results if the leader innovates (and refuses to license) under voluntary licensing.
Since CS′ > 0, we know that CSF > CSLC > CSLV .
We know that compulsory licensing will be consumer surplus preferred to
voluntary licensing if and only if
v(xC , yC) > v(xV , yV ).
With reference to (2.1) and (2.13), and assuming that the risk-free rate is low,
this condition holds if and only if
XCXV (CSLC − CSLV ) +XV Y C(CSF − CSLV )−XCY V (CSF − CSLC) > 0.
(2.28)
Relative to the corresponding expression in the persistent dominance case (see
(2.15)), the condition now includes a negative term. This reflects the fact that
compulsory licensing no longer guarantees the most preferred consumer outcome:
there is a chance now that the leader will innovate under compulsory licensing,
yielding CSLC , while under voluntary licensing it would have been the follower
that innovates, yielding CSF > CSLC (this occurs with probability xCyV ). Com-
pared to the persistent dominance case, this makes compulsory licensing relatively
less attractive when we have action-reaction.
Nonetheless, compulsory licensing must still be preferred to voluntary licensing
in a probabilistic sense. This follows because compulsory licensing strengthens
the relative likelihood that the follower will innovate, yielding the more valuable
innovation to consumers (Lemma 6), while, if the leader were to innovate, the
innovation will still be shared by compulsory licensing.
41The results from the foreclosure standard carry over unchanged to the action-reaction set-
ting.
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Formally, bearing in mind that CSLC > CSLV , a sufficient condition for (2.28)
to hold is
XV Y C > XCY V ,
which can be rewritten as
1 +
∆X
XC
> 1 +
∆Y
Y C
. (2.29)
Since ∆X > ∆Y (Lemma 6) and XC < Y C (Lemma 4), this is always satisfied.
Hence we have the following result.
Proposition 4. When the risk-free rate is low, compulsory licensing increases
consumer surplus under action-reaction, v(xC , yC) > v(xV , yV ).
This section also makes clear that, even when r is low, dynamic effects could
still make the consumer surplus impact of compulsory licensing ambiguous. This
is true whenever such a policy shifts the innovation probabilities in favour of
those firms that make less significant innovations. The effect is unambiguous here
because compulsory licensing makes it relatively less likely that the leader will
innovate.
Total Welfare
In this section, we let ΣF = Σ(2G+g,G+g) denote industry profits if the follower
innovates under either voluntary or compulsory licensing, ΣLC = Σ(G + g, g)
denote industry profits if the leader innovates under compulsory licensing, and
ΣLV = Σ(G + g, 0) denote profits if the leader innovates (and refuses to license)
under voluntary licensing. We know from (2.21), (2.26) and (2.27) that ΣF >
ΣLV > ΣLC . Given the ranking of consumer surplus outcomes in Section 2.5.2,
this also implies that TWF > max
[
TWLC , TWLV
]
.
The necessary and sufficient condition for compulsory licensing to be total
welfare preferred to voluntary licensing is
W (xC , yC) > W (xV , yV ),
where the W function is given in (2.16). When the risk-free rate is low and
excluding the cost savings term for simplicity,42 this condition can be written in
terms of rate-adjusted hazard rates as
XCXV
[
TWLC − TWLV ]+XV Y C [TWF − TWLV ]
−XCY V [TWF − TWLC] > 0. (2.30)
Therefore, if TWLC > TWLV , so that compulsory licensing would increase
total welfare in a persistent dominance scenario, then this will also hold under
42These would of course tend to favour compulsory licensing over voluntary licensing in the
total welfare comparison.
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action-reaction (since XV Y C > XCY V , see (2.29)). If, on the other hand, TWLV
exceeds TWLC to a sufficient degree, then the expression in (2.30) may turn
negative. Given that, in the context of our linear demand example, the difference
TWLC − TWLV is increasing in  (that is, the degree to which the industry is
uncompetitive, see (2.19)), this leads to our final welfare result.
Proposition 5. When the risk-free rate is low, the total welfare effect of compul-
sory licensing is positive under action-reaction whenever the underlying degree of
competitiveness in the industry is sufficiently low.
Moreover, given that (2.30) still holds when TWLC = TWLV , it follows that
the threshold degree of “un-competitiveness” above which the total welfare effect
is definitely positive is lower in the case of action-reaction that under persistent
dominance. In other words, the total welfare effect of compulsory licensing is
in fact more likely to be positive under action-reaction than under persistent
dominance.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a framework that clarifies the trade-off between com-
petition and innovation incentives that competition authorities face when consid-
ering a compulsory licensing remedy. Our welfare results show that, despite the
fact that innovation incentives fall when compulsory licensing is imposed, such a
policy nonetheless increases consumer surplus when the risk-free rate is low. It fol-
lows that the presumption of legality surrounding refusals to license IP, assuming
a consumer surplus standard, is not strong. This result therefore supports the ap-
proach taken by the European Commission in Microsoft, IMS Health and Magill,
in which it ruled in favour of compulsory licensing on the basis of discriminating
decision rules, rather than upholding the rights of IP holders by implementing a
per se legality standard, as in the US Xerox case.43 The imposition of compul-
sory licensing was also shown to be justified if the competition authority follows a
foreclosure standard, since it guarantees that the dominant firm cannot foreclose
its less-efficient rival.
The total welfare effect of compulsory licensing, meanwhile, depends on the
underlying degree of competitiveness of the industry, and is more likely to be
positive when the industry in question is naturally less competitive. This result
(abstracting from any conflicts with the stated consumer surplus goal of US com-
petition policy) gives qualified support to the position adopted by the Federal
Circuit in the landmark Xerox case, namely that refusals to license should be
viewed as presumptively legal. Provided the underlying degree of competitiveness
characterising the relevant industries is sufficiently high, allowing a dominant firm
to refuse to license is superior to compulsory licensing in total welfare terms.
43See Katsoulacos (2009).
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Chapter 3
Competition Policy in
Innovative Industries
3.1 Introduction
There are two ways in which the question of optimal competition policy enforce-
ment in innovative industries may be approached.1 Firstly, by asking how optimal
competition policy should vary between industries that differ in their underlying
degree of innovative intensity. Secondly, we may ask how optimal policy should
differentiate between firms within a given industry, depending on whether or not
a competition offence has occurred in isolation or in combination with socially
beneficial innovation.2 In both respects, the existing literature has so far em-
phasised that innovation brings benefits that will make the optimal competition
policy more lenient in more innovative industries, respectively towards firms that
innovate besides taking some anti-competitive action.3 This chapter develops a
framework that is primarily targeted at the latter of these approaches: how does
the stringency of optimal competition policy differ according to whether or not
competition law infringements occur in combination with innovation? In contrast
to the existing literature, we show that there is a sense in which the optimal strin-
gency of competition policy will be harsher when competition infringements occur
1Our notion of optimality throughout this chapter will be based on decision-theoretic con-
cerns, which focus on the costs of decision errors of type I (false convictions) and type II (false
acquittals). This approach to competition law enforcement was first developed by Easterbrook
(1984), and is also used in Hylton and Salinger (2001) and Ahlborn et al. (2004, 2005), for
example. For more general discussion of the issues around competition policy and innovation,
see Katz and Shelanski (2007), Shapiro (2002) and Encaoua and Hollander (2002).
2As will be discussed, this distinction is not always clear in the existing literature, where
“innovative industries” are frequently treated as those where firms always innovate if they take
an anti-competitive action.
3Manne and Wright (2010) argue that competition policy should be more lenient in innovative
industries, so as to recognise the benefits of innovation and avoid costly type I (conviction) errors.
Spulber (2008) puts forward the view that competition policy should not be too harsh, so as not
to deter innovation.
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in combination with innovation, rather than in isolation.4 The idea behind this
result is that the authority should implement a lower burden of proof or “liability
standard” (implying a more stringent policy) for firms that have innovated besides
taking some anti-competitive action, to account for the fact that such firms are
also more likely, ceteris paribus, to innovate in the counterfactual situation.
In practice, the issue of how to treat competition infringements when firms may
also innovate has been central to numerous high-profile competition cases. The
view that innovation should lead to a more lenient policy has featured prominently,
though arguably more so in the US than in the EU. In Jerrold,5 for example, the
court evaluated alleged tying conduct under a rule of reason approach, rather
than convicting on the basis of per se illegality, ostensibly in recognition of the
important role that Jerrold had played in innovating to create the market in the
first place. In several cases involving refusals to license intellectual property, the
US has consistently rejected calls for compulsory licensing on the grounds that
this would diminish the incentives for innovation, notably in Xerox,6 as well as
in the long list of cases detailed in American Bar Association (2003). In Europe,
on the other hand, the Commission has made clear on several occasions that a
refusal to license could violate competition law, most notably in Microsoft, but
also in IMS Health and Magill.7
This variation in approaches may in part be explained by the lack of formal
economic models that clarify what role innovation should play in competition
cases. Two recent papers which have looked at this question are Hylton and
Lin (2014) and Immordino et al. (2011), both of which conclude that taking
innovation into account will result in a more lenient optimal policy. Indeed, in
Hylton and Lin (2014) it may even be optimal to reward the anti-competitive
action of a firm if that firm has also innovated.
However, these results are, at least in part, a consequence of the fact that the
two actions – innovation on the one hand and some anti-competitive action on
the other – are not truly separated from one another. In Hylton and Lin (2014),
the firm’s decision to innovate is undertaken, conditional on the expected profits
from taking a secondary, anti-competitive action. That is, there is no explicit
consideration of a case in which the firm may innovate without taking an anti-
competitive action, and without the associated risk of antitrust intervention. This
has two main implications. Firstly, in such a context, any policy that deters the
4In fact, our framework can also shed light on the first approach to optimal competition
policy. We show that, to the extent that an industry is more “innovative” (in a sense to be made
clear) it will in fact be prone to type II (acquittal) errors, in contrast to what the literature has
emphasised to-date (see previous footnote).
5United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 365 US 567 (1961). This case is discussed in
Hylton and Lin (2014), who argue that it in fact represents an exception to the usual approach
in exclusionary conduct cases in the US, which typically do not compensate for innovation.
6CSU, LLC v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
7Microsoft v. Commission, Case T201/04 (2007); IMS Health and NDC Health v. Commis-
sion, Case C418/01 (2004), ECR I-5039; and Magill ITP, BBC and RTE v. Commission, Cases
C241/91 and C242/91 P (1995), ECR I-743. See Vickers (2010) for further details.
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anti-competitive action will necessarily deter innovation, since there is no scope
for the firm to innovate without taking the anti-competitive action. Secondly,
the harm from taking the anti-competitive action is always calculated net of the
benefit brought about by innovation. This is consistent with a story where in-
novation cannot occur without anti-competitive actions. If for some parameter
values, however, the firm did have profitable innovation opportunities absent the
anti-competitive action, it is not appropriate to attribute the innovation benefit
to the firm having undertaken the anti-competitive action.
In Immordino et al. (2011), innovation is similarly bundled with a secondary,
potentially anti-competitive action, in the sense that the profits from innovation
are realised only via taking the secondary action. There is no separate profit and
welfare effect of innovation, which might render it a profitable venture in isolation.8
Again, the results suggest that the optimal policies in innovative industries should
be softer, in order to encourage costly investments in R&D.9,10
Relative to this existing literature, a major contribution of this chapter is to
unpack the decision of a given firm to innovate from that to take a secondary,
potentially anti-competitive action. This is important since a firm’s decision as to
whether or not to innovate (ignoring any potentially anti-competitive actions that
it may take) falls completely outside the scope of competition policy. As such,
we can think of the firm’s decision with respect to innovation as defining the
appropriate counterfactual on which to base a calculation of the ‘harm’ resulting
from any competition offence.11
We first develop a very general framework, in which the firm faces a choice
over two actions – innovation and some potentially anti-competitive action – that
are specified in a generic way. In particular, the profit and consumer surplus
outcomes associated with each action are assumed to depend on an underlying
random parameter, capturing the idea that the effect of any given action may vary
to some extent randomly, depending on the precise circumstances in which it is
8The framework is extended in a working paper (Immordino and Polo (2012)) in which
innovation does bring about a stand-alone profit and welfare effect. There the innovation decision
is still implicitly tied to anti-competitive conduct, however, because innovation always brings
about the potential for competition authority intervention and related fines.
9Another paper that explores competition policy in innovative industries is Segal and Whin-
ston (2007), who look at policies that restrict incumbent behaviour towards new entrants. When
only the potential entrant can innovate, stronger protection from the incumbent increases entrant
profits, but at the same time reduces the incentives to take the incumbent’s place by investing in
R&D. Nonetheless there are cases in which stronger competition policy unambiguously increases
innovation incentives.
10This chapter is also related to the extensive literature on the relationship between competi-
tion and innovation, as in Vives (2008), Aghion et al. (2005), Boone (2000, 2001) and Schmutzler
(2013), among many others. The distinction lies in the fact that, whereas these papers focus
on the competitiveness of the economic environment, we are considering specific, potentially
anti-competitive actions.
11In this chapter, we will consider only the case in which the authority uses a consumer surplus
standard to judge competition infringements, so that the harm of any given competition offence
is equal to the associated change in consumer surplus.
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taken. The firm is assumed to observe the realisation of all random parameters,
allowing it to choose the most profitable action accordingly. Importantly, the firm
may also decide to innovate and take the anti-competitive action simultaneously.
The competition authority, on the other hand, is assumed to be able to ob-
serve the situation that prevails after the potentially anti-competitive action is
taken. Conditional on this action having been taken, it can also observe whether
or not it was accompanied by innovation. This corresponds to a scenario in which
potentially anti-competitive actions are always reported to the authority by con-
sumers or other market participants, for example, at which point the authority
can also observe whether or not the firm has innovated. The authority does not
know the realised value of the random parameters corresponding to either the
anti-competitive action or innovation, however. Since these action parameters
determine the effect of any action relative to the counterfactual scenario, this is
equivalent to saying that the authority does not observe the counterfactual on the
basis of which to calculate harm.
In this context, the authority is assumed to implement an effects-based deci-
sion rule, under which it launches a competition investigation whenever the firm
takes the potentially anti-competitive action (irrespective of whether this occurs
in isolation or in combination with innovation). This investigation allows the au-
thority to form an estimate of harm, and we assume that the authority will ban
the action whenever this harm estimate exceeds its specified ‘liability standard’.
Since the authority can observe whether or not the potentially anti-competitive
action was undertaken in combination with innovation or not, it can in principle
condition the liability standard it implements on the observed action choice of
the firm. Indeed, we take the level of the liability standard that should be im-
plemented in each case as our measure of stringency: a lower liability standard,
corresponding to a lower burden of proof, representing a harsher policy.
Since firms that innovate in addition to taking the potentially anti-competitive
action are also more likely to innovate in the counterfactual,12 we show that it
will be optimal from a decision error cost point of view to set a more stringent
competition policy (a lower liability standard) when the firm is observed as inno-
vating besides taking the potentially anti-competitive action. This reflects that
fact that, to the extent that a firm would innovate in the counterfactual, the au-
thority’s estimate of harm will be biased downward, leading to an increase in type
II (acquittal) errors unless the liability standard is also lowered.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we de-
velop our general model. We describe the information setting and the investigative
process employed by the competition authority, and derive the main results re-
lating to the optimal stringency of competition policy. Section 3.3 presents a
12This fact is, in the first instance, ensured by an appropriate assumption on the correlation
between the profits from the various actions. This assumption, which represents the main working
assumption of the general framework, is later verified in the context of a more specific micro-
founded example.
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specific micro-founded example, which underpins the key working assumptions of
our general model. In Section 3.4, some further implications of our micro-founded
example concerning the role of innovation in competition cases, and potential
extensions to a deterrence framework are discussed. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 A General Model
3.2.1 The Economic Setting
Consider a firm with constant marginal costs of production, which operates in a
market subject to inverse demand curve p(X), p′ < 0, where p is price and X is
output. We collect all relevant parameters of this demand function (such as the
price elasticity of demand), as well as any parameters describing the competitive
environment (such as the threat of entry) in the vector ω. These ω parameters
are treated as constants at the level of any given industry, although they may in
general vary from one industry to another.
We denote the level of consumer surplus associated with any given equilibrium
price pe and associated output Xe by
CS(pe) =
∫ Xe
0
[ p(u)− pe ] du,
from which it follows that CS′ < 0.
Finally, we suppose that in the initial equilibrium, before any actions are taken,
marginal costs are equal to c0 > 0, while price and output are equal to p0 and
X0, respectively (these will generally depend on c0 and ω). This in turn implies
revenue and profits in the initial equilibrium equal to
R0 = p0 ·X0 and pi0 = (p0 − c0)X0,
respectively.
3.2.2 Actions and Firm Behaviour
Our focus in this chapter will be on the choices that this firm makes over actions
that may impact the initial equilibrium. We denote the set of feasible actions by
A, with generic element a ∈ A. We assume that A always includes the trivial
action a = 0 of doing nothing and remaining in the initial equilibrium. Since this
initial equilibrium as captured in (p0, X0, c0, R0, pi0) will be the baseline relative
to which all random effects are measured, we treat these variables as constants
from now on.
We will, however, only consider cases in which the set A also includes at least
one non-trivial action. In particular, as we are interested in the enforcement
of competition policy in innovative industries, the non-trivial actions that we
will explore in some detail in this chapter are (i) innovation and (ii) a generic
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abuse of a dominant position. These non-trivial actions will, depending on the
precise circumstances in which they are taken, exert a particular effect on the
initial equilibrium. We capture this fact by relating the effect of any non-trivial
action a 6= 0 in A on the equilibrium variables (p0, X0, c0, R0, pi0) to one random
parameter Ψa, the realisation of which ψa is drawn from a suitably defined density
on support Da ⊆ R. Therefore, the precise equilibrium that prevails following any
non-trivial action depends on the realisation of the relevant random variable.13
These Ψa variables are, moreover, assumed to be distributed independently of one
another. By relating the impact of each non-trivial action to a random parameter,
we ensure that there will be random variation in firm profits (and other equilibrium
variables) within an industry.14
Of course, whenever the firm faces a choice of multiple actions that may be
profitable in isolation, it may be profit maximising to choose a combination of
these actions (i.e. to innovate and take the abusive action simultaneously). We
therefore also allow the firm to choose combinations of actions in A.15 This raises
the prospect that certain action choices that the firm could make will have random
parameters in common, causing the profits (and consumer surplus outcomes) of
these actions to be correlated. Indeed, the form of this correlation between the
profits of various actions will turn out to be key for the analysis in Section 3.2.4.
In terms of notation, we denote the profit function for any non-trivial action
a 6= 0 in A by pia : Da −→ R. We can think of these profit functions yielding
both a random profit variable pia(Ψa) and a realised value of profits pia(ψa) for
all ψa ∈ Da. The profit from taking any two non-trivial actions a and a′ in A in
combination will similarly be written as pia+a′ : Da ×Da′ → R.16 We also make
the following assumption concerning the firm’s choice over actions.
Assumption 1. The firm knows the precise realisation of the random parameters
Ψa, and chooses the most profitable action or combination of actions on that basis.
Finally, besides this economic distinction between trivial and non-trivial ac-
tions, it will also be useful to differentiate between non-trivial actions according
to the following legal criterion. We have in mind that some actions, despite the
impact they have on the initial equilibrium, will never be the focus of competi-
13In the micro-founded example of Section 3.3, the random parameters are assumed to impact
the firm’s marginal cost.
14As opposed to the variation between industries generated by the ω variables. In general,
it is not important to associate each non-trivial action with only one random parameter. This
assumption merely makes the exposition clearer. In other work (e.g. Katsoulacos and Ulph
(2009, 2014a)), distributions for benefit and harm are often directly assumed. In our framework,
relating the distribution of harm to these underlying random parameters will be helpful when it
comes to a discussion of the decision errors that the competition authority may make.
15Therefore, we could also think of the firm choosing subsets of actions from the power set
P(A).
16We will not go into great detail concerning the distribution of profits in this chapter. In
particular, we do take the approach of defining a transformation function and finding the derived
density function of profits, as we will do in relation to harm in Section 3.2.3.
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tion policy intervention. We refer to such actions as ‘per se legal’ and, in our
set-up, innovation will belong to this class of actions. All actions that are not per
se legal are assumed to represent potential abuses of competition law, for which
reason we refer to such actions as ‘potentially illegal actions’. Examples of this
type of action include refusals to deal, bundling and other abuses of a dominant
position. The point is that the economic impact of any non-trivial action is not
the only relevant factor for competition policy. Whether or not the action satisfies
the legal criterion which determines whether or not it can be investigated by the
competition authority also matters.
Before considering the enforcement of competition policy in innovative indus-
tries, we first develop a benchmark case in which the only non-trivial action is
a generic abuse of a dominant position (a potentially illegal action). This will
allow us to describe the competition policy setting and develop a benchmark for
the cost of decision errors before we move on to the innovative industry case in
Section 3.2.4.
3.2.3 A Benchmark Case
Consider a case where the set of actions is composed of only one non-trivial action
A, which is a potentially illegal action. Therefore A = {0, A}. While we do not
impose any restrictions on the impact that this action has on price, so that it may
in general be either harmful or benign from the viewpoint of consumers, we make
the following assumption concerning the profitability of the action.17
piA(ψA) > pi0 for all ψA ∈ DA.
This ensures that the action is economically meaningful in the sense that, in the
absence of any competition policy intervention, there is a strict profit incentive
for the firm to take the action.
Throughout the chapter, it is assumed that the competition authority follows
a consumer surplus standard.18 Consequently the ‘harm’19 that results from this
potentially anti-competitive action A can be written as
H = t(ΨA) = CS(p0)− CS
[
pA(ΨA)
]
, (3.1)
where we refer to t as the ‘transformation function’, and where pA(ΨA) denotes the
post-action price as a function of the random variable.20 It will also be convenient
to make the following assumption concerning this transformation function t.
17As part of the micro-founded example presented in Section 3.3, we specify in detail a po-
tentially harmful action that satisfies this condition.
18This is by far the most common approach adopted by competition authorities in practice,
including in the EU and US.
19This ‘harm’ could also be negative, i.e. a benefit, if the post-action price is lower than that
in the initial equilibrium, pA < p0.
20In general, we take it as given throughout this chapter that the price that prevails following
any non-trivial action depends on the random parameters, and suppress this dependence in our
notation. Therefore, we generally write pa for pa(Ψa) for all a 6= 0 in A.
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Assumption 2. The function t : DA → B is a monotonic, differentiable function
of the random variable ΨA, mapping domain DA ⊆ R one-to-one onto range
B ⊆ R.
Notice that, since the harm in (3.1) is a function of the underlying random
parameter ΨA, it represents a random variable in its own right. More specifically,
letting H denote the random harm variable and h a given realisation of harm, we
can denote the density function of harm by21
νH(h) for all h ∈ B. (3.2)
Competition Policy Enforcement
We will assume that the competition authority recognises that harm is given by
(3.1), and that it can observe accurately and without cost what has happened,
given that the firm has taken the action, that is (pA, XA, cA, RA, piA). This may
be the result of any potentially illegal action coming to the authority’s attention
via complaints from consumers, for example. However, the authority does not
observe the variables (p0, X0, c0, R0, pi0) corresponding to the initial equilibrium.
In other words, the authority, unlike the firm, does not observe the parameters of
the action. Thus the uncertainty about the harm from this action on the part of
the competition authority surrounds the counterfactual position of the firm.22
In this context, we assume that the authority uses an effects-based enforcement
procedure, so that, in any particular case, it first conducts an investigation of the
likely harm caused by the action. On the basis of this investigation, the authority
forms an estimate of harm, which, for any h ∈ B, is equal to
h˜ = h+ ,
where  is the estimation error. In what follows, this estimation error  will be
treated (for all actions) as uniformly distributed on [−E,E], E > 0, where E is
exogenous.23
We further suppose that the decision rule used by the authority is the follow-
ing: ban any action for which the estimate of harm exceeds its specified liability
standard, denoted by λ.24 This means that the authority will ban the potentially
illegal action whenever h˜ > λ. We can therefore also think of λ as a measure that
21Assumption 2 ensures that this derived density function can be obtained by a simple appli-
cation of the change of variables technique. See, e.g., Grimmet and Stirzaker (1982).
22In general, the industry-specific characteristics ω may represent a further source of uncer-
tainty for the competition authority.
23Our results should extend readily to more general error distributions. Our motivation for
using a uniform distribution is to gain explicit solutions, which will simplify the analysis in
Section 3.2.4.
24While our representation of the competition authority is close to existing work, e.g. Kat-
soulacos and Ulph (2009, 2014a, 2014b), our approach differs in that we do not normalise this
liability standard to zero.
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is inversely related to the stringency of competition policy – indeed all our results
relating to the stringency of competition policy will be based on the optimal level
for the liability standard λ.
This decision rule implies that any action with realised harm level equal to h
will be approved by the competition authority with probability
α(h|λ,E) =

1 if h < λ− E,
E − (h− λ)
2E
if h ∈ [λ− E, λ+ E],
0 if h > λ+ E.
(3.3)
In keeping with our notion that λ is inversely related to the stringency of compe-
tition policy, it is straightforward to verify that ∂α∂λ ≥ 0 (strictly so whenever h is
in the interval [λ− E, λ+ E]).
Noting that a type I error (false conviction) will occur whenever h˜ > λ and
h < 0, while a type II error (false acquittal) occurs when h˜ < λ and h > 0, we can
write the expected cost of type I and II decision errors across all potential actions
of this type that the authority may be called to investigate as
C1 =
∫ 0
λ−E
[
E + (h− λ)
2E
]
(−h) νH(h) dh (3.4)
and
C2 =
∫ λ+E
0
[
E − (h− λ)
2E
]
h νH(h) dh, (3.5)
respectively, where νH(h) is the probability density function given in (3.2). It
follows that, if competition policy is extremely lenient, so that λ > E, the cost of
type I decision errors is zero, while, if competition policy is very harsh, so that
λ < −E, there is zero cost of type II decision errors.
Some further comparative statics results for these decision error cost expres-
sions are given in the following lemma.
Lemma 7. For all λ < E, C1 is decreasing and strictly convex in λ. For all
λ > −E, C2 is increasing and strictly convex in λ.
Proof. Straightforward differentiation under the integral in (3.4) and (3.5).
Decision error cost expressions of this form will be the basis for determining
the optimal level of stringency λ∗ in the innovative industry setting, which we
analyse in the following section.25
25As described in Section 3.2.4, we will consider two scenarios in this chapter, which differ
in terms of how the optimal stringency level is chosen. First, we consider the case where λ∗ is
chosen to equalise the probability of type I and II decision errors. Secondly, we consider the case
where λ∗ is chosen to minimise the total cost of decision errors C = C1 + C2.
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3.2.4 Innovative Industries
We now turn to the main focus of the chapter: the enforcement of competition
policy when firms may also innovate. To that end, we suppose that the set of
potential actions A now includes cost-reducing innovation, in addition to the
trivial action and the same non-trivial, potentially illegal action A discussed in
the benchmark case. Innovation is represented by the element I ∈ A and, as
discussed in Section 3.2.2, this is assumed to represent a per se legal action. We
will maintain the assumption that, while the potentially illegal action k = A may
in general be either harmful or benign, innovation is unambiguously beneficial to
consumers, in the sense that26
pI(ψI) < p0 for all ψI ∈ DI . (3.6)
The full set of actions is therefore now given by A = {0, I, A}. For our
purposes, it will be useful to partition this set into per se legal and potentially
illegal actions, so that
A = {{0, I}, {A}} .
In what follows, we will identify variables corresponding to a per se legal action
by a subscript j ∈ {0, I} and variables corresponding to a potentially illegal action
(bearing in mind that actions can also be taken in combination) by a subscript
k ∈ {A, I +A}, where I +A indicates that innovation I and the potentially anti-
competitive action A are taken simultaneously. It is important to note that the
combination of a per se legal action and a potentially illegal action is therefore
also considered to be potentially illegal. This is plausible, as the authority is likely
to be concerned that the harm from any potentially illegal action will outweigh
the benefit from the per se legal action.
Firm Behaviour
The first point to note with respect to the firm’s choice over actions is that it
now faces a choice over per se legal actions (innovate or remain in initial equi-
librium), which is completely outside the scope of competition policy. We may
therefore consider the firm’s decision as to whether or not to innovate, ignoring
the potentially harmful action A, as defining its counterfactual position.27 Unlike
in the benchmark case, it follows that there are now two potential counterfactual
scenarios. We introduce the following definition to differentiate between firms
according to their counterfactual behaviour.
26This is a very weak assumption that, in the context of process innovation, is satisfied in all
standard oligopoly models. Under product innovation, a further interesting issue that arises is
that, even if the counterfactual situation were observable, errors could be made in estimating
harm, due to the fact that price increases for the product may have occurred simultaneously
with (unobservable) increases in product quality. We do not explore this issue in this chapter.
27This counterfactual can therefore also be thought of as specifying which action the firm
would choose, were it banned from undertaking any potentially illegal actions.
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Definition 1 (Innovative Firms). A firm is innovative if it faces profitable inno-
vation opportunities in the absence of any potentially illegal actions, that is if ψI
is such that piI(ψI) > pi0. Otherwise, the firm is referred to as non-innovative.
It should be clear that, since the innovation profits depend on the random com-
ponent ΨI , there will generally be a whole range of realisations of this random
parameter for which the firm would choose to innovate. Therefore, this classifica-
tion of firms according to their innovativeness does not pin down a unique firm
type as such, but rather identifies a class of firms. In what follows, we will denote
the (unconditional) probability that the firm is innovative by θ, and assume that
0 < θ < 1, so that there is always some probability ex ante that the firm will be
innovative or not.
We are now in a position to make two important assumptions regarding prof-
its.28 The first ensures that, irrespective of the counterfactual behaviour, the firm
will always decide to engage in a potentially illegal action (be it with or without
also innovating) in the absence of any competition policy interventions. Therefore,
these potentially illegal actions indexed by k ∈ {A, I + A} are still economically
meaningful.
Assumption 3. max[piA(ψA), piI+A(ψI , ψA)] > max [piI(ψI), pi0] for all ψA ∈ DA
and ψI ∈ DI .
The second assumption, which is key for our results, states that firms that
innovate as part of any potentially illegal action are also more likely to innovate
in the counterfactual position.
Assumption 4. corr
[
(piI(ΨI)− pi0) , (piI+A(ΨI ,ΨA)− piA(ΨA))
]
> 0
An important implication of Assumption 4 is that, conditional on action I+A
being chosen over A, the probability that the firm is innovative is greater than in
the converse case. Letting θˆk denote the probability of the firm being high-tech,
conditional on the chosen action being k ∈ {A, I +A}, it follows that
θˆI+A > θˆA. (3.7)
Competition Policy Enforcement
We carry over the assumptions concerning the enforcement of competition policy
from the benchmark case. In particular, we assume that the authority is again able
to observe the situation that prevails once any potentially illegal action is taken,
that is (pk, Xk, ck, Rk, pik), k ∈ {A, I +A}. Therefore, irrespective of whether the
potentially illegal action was undertaken in isolation or in combination with inno-
vation, the competition authority can observe the vector of equilibrium variables
that results. Moreover, we assume that the authority can differentiate between
28Both will be verified in the context of our micro-founded example in Section 3.3.
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potentially illegal actions, so that, if the potentially harmful action A comes to its
attention, it is also able to determine whether or not this was undertaken in com-
bination with innovation. Nonetheless, the authority again does not know what
the firm’s counterfactual behaviour would have been. Therefore, despite being
able to identify the potentially illegal actions that were taken, the parameters of
these actions are unknown to the competition authority.
The authority follows an effects-based procedure that is identical to that de-
scribed in the benchmark case, up to a relabelling of actions. That is, irrespective
of which potentially illegal action is undertaken, the authority is able to arrive at
an estimate of harm, which is always calculated relative to the initial equilibrium.
In other words, the counterfactual price used by the authority in arriving at its
harm estimate is always p0.
29 This estimate differs from the actual harm by an
estimation error , which is uniformly distributed on [−E,E], which in turn im-
plies that the probability that any potentially illegal action will be approved is
again given by (3.3).
The decision rule of the authority is to ban any action for which its harm
estimate exceeds its liability standard. However, since the authority can observe
whether or not the potentially harmful action A was accompanied by innovation,
it can in principle implement two different liability standards, depending on which
potentially illegal action is observed. We denote the liability standard for action
k ∈ {A, I + A} by λk. Our main results will focus on how the optimal choice of
liability standard differs between potentially illegal actions.
True Harm and Mis-measured Harm
In order to get at an expression for the cost of decision errors in innovative indus-
tries, on the basis of which to draw conclusions about optimal stringency levels,
we first need to consider the distribution of harm. In evaluating the harm implied
by any potentially illegal activity, it is clear that proper account must be taken
of the firm’s counterfactual position. We introduce the following notion to make
this more explicit.
Definition 2 (True Harm). True harm, denoted by Hj,k, is the change in con-
sumer surplus implied by a firm choosing potentially illegal action k ∈ {A, I +A}
when, in the counterfactual position, it would have chosen per se legal action
j ∈ {0, I}.
It follows that there are now four true harm variables, which we can write
generically as
Hj,k = CS(pj)− CS(pk),
29This corresponds to a setting in which the authority, though able to observe whether or not
a potentially harmful action was accompanied by innovation, cannot disentangle the effects of
these two actions, but rather estimates harm relative to a counterfactual where no actions were
taken.
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j ∈ {0, I}, k ∈ {A, I + A}. These harm functions will generally be defined on
a domain covering all realisations of the random parameters (ΨI ,ΨA) that are
consistent with the action choices implied by that harm variable: let Dj,k ⊆
R2 denote this domain.30 Furthermore, let Bj,k ⊆ R denote the range of each
respective harm function.
As functions of the underlying random variables, it again follows that these
true harm variables are random variables in their own right. We denote the
marginal probability density function true harm variable by31
νHj,k(hj,k) for all hj,k ∈ Bj,k. (3.8)
Given the enforcement process specified for the competition authority, how-
ever, these true harms are not the only relevant variables in the innovative industry
context. Since the authority cannot observe the counterfactual and, in our simple
framework, receives a signal about harm that is calculated relative to the ini-
tial equilibrium price p0, the authority’s estimate of harm is based on the wrong
counterfactual whenever the firm in question is truly innovative. We therefore
introduce the following notion of mis-measured harm.
Definition 3 (Mis-measured Harm). Mis-measured harm, denoted by H ′I,k, is the
calculated change in consumer surplus when an innovative firm chooses action
k ∈ {A, I +A}, but the harm calculation is based on counterfactual price p0.
It follows that, whenever the firm is innovative, the authority arrives at an
estimate of mis-measured harm as a result of its investigation, rather than true
harm. Given (3.6), moreover, the counterfactual consumer surplus is (stochas-
tically) higher when the firm is innovative rather than not. Therefore, basing
inferences on mis-measured rather than true harm will tend to under-estimate
the true harm. Formally,
H ′I,k = CS(p0)− CS(pk) < CS(pI)− CS(pk) = HI,k, (3.9)
k ∈ {A, I+A}. Thus we have two mis-measured harm variables, each correspond-
ing to one of the potentially illegal activities, which cover the cases in which the
authority relies on its harm estimate relative to p0, but the firm is truly innovative.
To capture the idea that each value of true harm may be associated with
a range of mis-measured harm (and vice versa) due to the additional random
variation in the counterfactual price pI , we need to consider the joint distribution
between these variables. For each potentially illegal activity k ∈ {A, I + A},
30That is, the domain covers those realisations of the random variables for which the profit
maximising choices by the firm imply the correct counterfactual and potentially illegal action.
For now, we assume that these domains are non-empty, so that Dj,k 6= ∅ for all j, k. This implies
that the firm, irrespective of whether it is innovative or not, will prefer to undertake either
potentially illegal action for at least some realisations of the random variables. We again verify
this assumption in the context of our micro-founded example in Section 3.3.
31The derivation of these marginal density functions is discussed below.
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the true and mis-measured harm variables corresponding to an innovative firm
will be defined on the domain that corresponds to the true harm variable, that
is DI,k ⊆ R2. We assume that the transformations Tk : (ψA, ψI) 7→ (hI,k, h′I,k),
which, for each action k ∈ {A, I+A}, map from the pair of random variables to the
pair of true and mis-measured harms are one-to-one from domain DI,k onto range
B2I,k ⊆ R2.32 Then, provided the Jacobian determinant applied to the inverse
transformation T−1 satisfies standard conditions,33 the joint density of true harm
HI,k and mis-measured harm H
′
I,k can again be derived via a straightforward
change of variables. We denote this joint density by
νHI,k,H′I,k(hI,k, h
′
I,k) for all (hI,k, h
′
I,k) ∈ B2I,k, (3.10)
k ∈ {A, I+A}. The marginal density in (3.8) may be found simply by integrating
out mis-measured harm H ′I,k, while the marginal density for mis-measured harm,
which we denote νH′I,k(h
′
I,k), is found by integrating out true harm.
Cost of Decision Errors
Working on the basis of these notions of true harm, mis-measured harm, and the
relationship between them as captured by the joint density in (3.10), we may
now explore the decision errors that the authority is expected to make across all
potential actions that may come to its attention. We present the arguments for
general k ∈ {A, I+A}, since they apply equally to both potentially illegal actions.
The first case to consider is that in which the firm that comes to the authority’s
attention, having undertaken some potentially illegal action, is non-innovative. In
that case, for a given liability standard λk, the cost of decision errors follows in
standard form, based on the marginal density of true harm variable H0,k. The
decision error cost expressions parallel (3.4) and (3.5), and can be written as
C1k =
∫ 0
λk−E
[
E + (h0,k − λk)
2E
]
(−h0,k) νH0,k(h0,k) dh0,k (3.11)
and
C2k =
∫ λk+E
0
[
E − (h0,k − λk)
2E
]
h0,k νH0,k(h0,k) dh0,k, (3.12)
k ∈ {A, I +A}.
The more interesting case is that in which the action that comes to the au-
thority’s attention was undertaken by a firm that is innovative. In that case, since
inferences are based on a mis-measured harm variable that under-estimates harm,
there will be a bias towards type II errors and away from type I errors. Consider
type II errors first. We suppose that for each realisation of mis-measured harm
32We use B2 notation to differentiate this from the range of true harm BI,k ⊆ R.
33See Grimmet and Stirzaker (1982) for details.
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h′I,k, true harm may take values (as governed by the joint density in (3.10)) in the
range
hI,k ∈
[
h(h′I,k) , h(h
′
I,k)
]
.
This captures the idea that a given value of mis-measured harm need not be asso-
ciated with a unique value for true harm, due to the additional random variation
in the counterfactual price pI (see (3.9)).
34 The conditions for a type II error
(false acquittal) are now that
h˜′I,k < λk and hI,k > 0.
Note that the probability of an acquittal on the basis of mis-measured harm H ′I,k
(that is, the first half of our condition for a type II error to occur) is given by
Pr[h˜′ < λk] =
∫ λk−E
−∞
1 · νH′(h′) dh′
+
∫ λk+E
λk−E
[
E − (h′ − λk)
2E
]
νH′(h
′) dh′,
where we have dropped the I, k subscripts from harm variables throughout. As
long as h(h′I,k) > 0, there is still a chance that a given acquittal on the basis
of mis-measured harm h′I,k will be false (even if the mis-measured harm that is
erroneously being estimated is itself negative). Nonetheless, if we define X < 0
as the threshold level of h′I,k such that, for all h
′
I,k < X we have h(h
′
I,k) < 0,
then we know there can be no false acquittal on the basis of h˜′I,k when h
′
I,k < X.
Hence we can write the type II error component in the case of an innovative firm
(dropping the I, k subscripts for all harm variables) as
C2′k =
∫ λk−E
X
∫ h(h′)
0
h νH,H′(h, h
′) dh dh′
+
∫ λk+E
λk−E
∫ h(h′)
0
[
E − (h′ − λk)
2E
]
h νH,H′(h, h
′) dh dh′.
It follows the cost of decision errors of type II is therefore distorted, relative
to the hypothetical case in which inferences were based on an estimate of true
harm rather than mis-measured harm (see (3.12)). This follows because (i) false
acquittals can occur for the same range of true harm λk+E < hI,k < λk+E, but,
34In fact, when the action chosen is k = I +A, the post-action price is a function of both ΨA
and ΨI , implying that a given pI+A will pin down a unique value for pI , and therefore a given
value of mis-measured harm will be associated with a unique value of true harm, rather than a
range. This difference notwithstanding, the intuition underlying Lemmas 8 and 9 below is the
same for both actions. The difference is that the second integral term can be dropped from the
decision error cost expressions when the action chosen is k = I + A, and, in that case, we can
integrate over the marginal density of H ′I,k.
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in each case, the decision is based on a mis-measured harm variable h′I,k < hI,k
that makes acquittals more likely, and (ii) the range of true harm for which an
acquittal may now occur is expanded to include hI,k > λk +E. Thus we have the
following result.
Lemma 8. For a given liability standard λk, the competition authority’s enforce-
ment process leads to an inflation in the expected cost of type II decision errors
when the firm is innovative, relative to the hypothetical case in which inferences
were based on true harm.
Now consider the expected cost of type I errors when the firm is innovative.
A type I error is now defined by the conditions that
h˜′I,k > λk and hI,k < 0.
Note that there can be no false conviction when h′I,k > 0, since hI,k > h
′
I,k. The
probability of conviction based on mis-measured harm estimate h˜′I,k is equal to
(again omitting the repeated subscripts for clarity)
Pr[h˜′ > λk] =
∫ λk+E
λk−E
[
E + (h′ − λk)
2E
]
νH′(h
′) dh′
+
∫ ∞
λk+E
1 · νH′(h′) dh′.
Bearing in mind that there can be no false conviction when h′I,k > 0, the cost of
type I decision errors can therefore be written as
C1′k =
∫ 0
λk−E
∫ 0
min[h(h′),0]
[
E + (h′ − λk)
2E
]
(−h) νH,H′(h, h′) dh dh′.
Hence the cost of type I decision errors falls relative to the hypothetical case in
which inferences were based on true rather than mis-measured harm (see (3.11)).
This follows because (i) the range of true harm for which an error can occur is
reduced, and (ii) for those values of true harm for which where a false conviction
can occur, the decision is based on an estimate of mis-measured harm h′I,k < hI,k
that makes convictions less likely.
Lemma 9. For a given liability standard λk, the competition authority’s enforce-
ment process leads to a reduction in the expected cost of type I decision errors
when the firm is innovative, relative to the hypothetical case in which inferences
were based on true harm.
We close this section by noting some comparative statics results concerning
the cost of decision error terms when the firm is truly innovative. Firstly, it is
clear that the expected cost of type I errors is again decreasing in the magnitude
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of the liability standard, while the expected cost of type II errors is increasing in
the magnitude of the liability standard. In other words,
∂C1′k
∂λk
≤ 0 and ∂C2
′
k
∂λk
≥ 0.
It may also be verified that C1′k is unambiguously convex in λk, while C2
′
k is con-
vex in λk whenever (dropping the I, k subscripts from harm variables for clarity)∫ h(λk+E)
0
h νH|H′(h|λk + E) dh >
∫ h(λk−E)
0
h νH|H′(h|λk − E) dh, (3.13)
where νH|H′(h|h′) denotes the density of HI,k, conditional on H ′I,k = h′I,k. While
the limits of the integrals in this expression certainly suggest it will be satisfied, we
have to respect the difference between the conditional density functions. Through-
out the remainder of the chapter, we will maintain the assumption that (3.13) is
always satisfied, implying that decision error costs are (as in the benchmark case)
convex in the liability standard.
Assumption 5. C1′k is convex and decreasing in λk, while C2
′
k is convex and
increasing in λk.
In what follows, we will base our inferences on the incidence of these distortions
to the decision error costs when the firm is innovative. In doing so, we will not go
into the precise magnitude of these distortions across actions.35 Rather, we will
consider C1′k to be “small” relative to C1k, and C2
′
k to be “large” relative to C2k
for both k = A, I +A.
Discussion and Results
The discussion in the previous section shows that we can write the expected
cost of decision errors when the potentially illegal action that is observed by the
competition authority is k ∈ {A, I +A} as
Ck = θˆk
(
C1′k + C2
′
k
)
+ (1− θˆk)
(
C1k + C2k
)
, (3.14)
where θˆk is the conditional probability defined in Section 3.2.4. We are now in
a position to answer the question of how the optimal stringency of competition
policy varies according to the firm’s innovation behaviour.
As a preliminary observation, we can see that our framework does not agree
with the view expressed in the literature that innovative industries are associated
with a greater risk of type I errors.36 Instead, if we suppose that more innovative
35A judgement as to the precise magnitude of these distortions is not analytically possible at
this level of generality.
36For example, Manne and Wright (2010) argue that an imperfect understanding of the ben-
efits engendered in any given innovation raise the prospect of type I errors.
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industries are associated with higher (conditional) probabilities of firms being
innovative (that is, higher θk for both k), then, with reference to (3.14), there will
be more weight on the distortions towards type II errors and away from type I
errors in more innovative industries. Thus we have the following result.
Proposition 6. More innovative industries are characterised by a greater ten-
dency towards type II errors.
Now consider how the stringency of competition policy should differentiate
according to whether or not competition law infringements occur in combination
with innovation or in isolation. This is equivalent to the question of how the
optimal liability standards λ∗k should differ between potentially illegal actions. To
answer this question, we will consider two cases, which differ according to how
the optimal liability standard is chosen: in the first case, we suppose that the
authority cares about equalising the probability of making errors of both type I
and II,37 while, in the second case, we assume that λ∗k is chosen simply to minimise
the total cost of decision errors.
Given that the probability of the firm being innovative is greater when the
observed action is k = I +A rather than k = A (see (3.7): θˆI+A > θˆA), there will
be a greater tendency towards type II errors when the observed action includes
an innovation component. If the aim is to equalise the probability of type I and
II errors for each action k ∈ {A, I + A}, it follows from the fact that the cost
of type I (respectively, type II) errors is decreasing (respectively, increasing) in
λk that the optimal liability standard will be lower when the observed action is
k = I +A, rather than k = A. Hence we have the following.
Proposition 7. When the liability standard is chosen to equalise error probabil-
ities, the optimal competition policy is harsher towards firms that innovate beside
taking some potentially anti-competitive action than it is towards firms that do
not innovate, λ∗I+A < λ
∗
A.
We may check the robustness of this result by considering a second scenario, in
which the liability standard is chosen to minimise the total cost of decision errors.
In this case, it is the marginal cost of decision errors that matter. Nonetheless,
given that decision error costs are assumed to be convex, whenever they are suffi-
ciently convex, so that at the higher level of type II decision error costs associated
with the mis-identification case the marginal cost saving brought about by re-
ducing the liability standard is also large (conversely for type I errors), the same
result holds. Because the conditional probability of the firm being innovative is
greater when k = I +A, there is more emphasis on that part of the decision error
cost expression where the marginal cost of type II decision errors is large and
where the marginal cost of type I errors is small (or indeed zero). Therefore, to
37This approach is consistent with Manne and Wright (2010), for example, who propose a
series of rules that lower the level of type I errors (at the expense of higher type II errors) to
counter the supposed bias towards type I errors in innovative industries.
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minimise the total cost of decision errors, the optimal liability standard will again
be lower for a firm that is observed as taking action k = I+A rather than k = A.
Proposition 8. When the liability standard is chosen to minimise the total cost of
decision errors, and provided costs are sufficiently convex, the optimal competition
policy is harsher towards firms that innovate beside taking some potentially anti-
competitive action than it is towards firms that do not innovate, λ∗I+A < λ
∗
A.
Therefore both Propositions 7 and 8 contradict the view that optimal competi-
tion policy should necessarily be more lenient towards firms that innovate besides
taking some potentially harmful action. The idea underlying our results is that
the competition authority should implement a harsher liability standard for firms
that innovate as part of some potentially illegal action, in order to reflect the
fact that such firms are also more likely to have innovated in the counterfactual
position.
3.3 Micro-founded Example
It is clear that the results presented in the preceding section rely on the divergence
in conditional probabilities θˆk. This divergence is, in turn, a direct consequence of
Assumption 4. At this stage, we therefore consider a specific, micro-founded ex-
ample, in which we assume a particular demand function and characterise specific
non-trivial actions, to verify this and other working assumptions of our general
model.
3.3.1 The Market & Initial Equilibrium
For the purpose of this example, consider a market in which demand is given by
p = X
− 1
η ,
where p and X are again price and output, respectively, and η > 1 is the point
elasticity of demand. For any given price p > 0, consumer surplus is therefore
equal to
CS(p) =
p1−η
η − 1 .
We characterise the initial equilibrium as follows. Suppose that, in the absence
of any non-trivial actions being taken, and given initial costs of c0 > 0, the ratio
of price to marginal cost in this market is
p0
c0
= 1 +
µ
η − 1 . (3.15)
In this expression, µ, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, provides a measure of the underlying degree of
monopolisation of the industry in the absence of any explicitly anti-competitive
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action: µ = 0 corresponds to perfect competition and µ = 1 to monopoly.38 The
industry-level parameters may therefore be summarised here as ω = (η, µ).
In this initial equilibrium, the firm would earn operating profits of
pi0 = σR0,
where
σ =
µ
µ+ η − 1 , 0 ≤ σ < 1, (3.16)
measures the share of revenue that is accounted for by profits (equivalently, the
ratio of profits to revenue) and R0 = (p0)
1−η denotes revenue in the initial equi-
librium.
3.3.2 Characterising Actions
We consider the innovative industry case in which A = {0, I, A}. First, we de-
scribe a particular characterisation for both the potentially illegal action A and
innovation I, before moving on to verify the working assumptions of our general
framework.
Potentially Illegal Action
We suppose that the potentially illegal action A, if undertaken, will exert two
effects relative to the initial equilibrium. Firstly, it raises the ratio of price to
marginal cost from the value captured in (3.15) to(
1 +
µ
η − 1
)
(1 + δm), δm > 0.
Secondly, it generates a potential efficiency gain which lowers marginal costs from
c0 to
39
cA =
c0
1 + ∆cA
, ∆cA ≥ 0.40
So a potentially anti-competitive action is defined by the pair (δm,∆cA) and is
characterised by the conditions that δm > 0, ∆cA ≥ 0.
Of course, it is natural to require that the price-cost margin that emerges after
the action has been taken should not exceed that under monopoly. This requires
that
δm ≤ 1− µ
µ+ η − 1 . (3.17)
38In this single firm set-up, we may consider this parameter as capturing the threat of entry
into the market, for example.
39For example, in the bundling context, this cost saving may be thought of as capturing
bundling or selling synergies. See, e.g., Salinger (1995) and Nalebuff (2004).
40Therefore ∆cA measures the efficiency gain as a percentage of the marginal costs the firm
would have if it takes the action.
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Therefore, in what follows, it will be assumed that the bound on δm given in (3.17)
always holds. Notice that the more competitive the baseline situation is (that is,
the lower is µ), the more scope there is for taking an anti-competitive action that
raises the price-cost margin.
The price that prevails if the if the firm takes the action is then
pA = p0
(
1 + δm
1 + ∆cA
)
. (3.18)
With reference to (3.18), it is clear that if δm > ∆cA the action is harmful,
and otherwise it is benign. To reflect the fact that the harm from this particular
action may depend on the precise circumstances in which it is taken (i.e. vary to
some degree randomly within an industry), it is sufficient to consider either of the
parameters δm or ∆cA to be random variables. In what follows, we will therefore
proceed by considering ∆cA to be the relevant random parameter (corresponding
to ΨA in the general model), while δm is treated as non-random.
41 The particular
realisation of this random cost-saving variable is denoted δcA , which is drawn from
a suitably defined density on support DA = R+.
Innovation
Innovation is assumed to bring about (with certainty) a cost saving equal to
∆cI ≥ 0 at a fixed R&D cost to the firm of z > 0. This implies that if the firm
takes action I ∈ A in isolation, marginal costs will be equal to42
cI =
c0
1 + ∆cI
.
The price that prevails if the firm innovates is in turn given by
pI =
p0
1 + ∆cI
< p0, (3.19)
from which it follows that innovation is indeed beneficial for consumers. Therefore,
(3.6) is always satisfied in this context.
Similarly to the treatment of ∆cA , we assume that ∆cI is itself distributed
randomly in the industry. In particular, the realisation of innovation cost savings
41It should be emphasised that our results do not depend on this assumption. As argued in
the context of the general model, a distribution for harm may also be found when both δm and
∆cA vary randomly. From an economic viewpoint, our set-up corresponds to a scenario in which
the price-raising effect of a potentially anti-competitive action can, on the basis of economic
models available to the authority, be determined accurately, but the presence of unobserved,
random efficiencies causes uncertainty about the true level of harm.
42It is worthwhile emphasising the difference between this marginal cost saving achieved as
a result of innovation and that realised as a by-product of the anti-competitive action (that is,
∆cA). While, in the former case, the firm faces a private cost of innovation for which it realises
a private benefit, in the latter case, the cost of the marginal cost reduction is effectively borne
by consumers via δm.
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δcI for the firm is obtained as the result of a random draw from a suitably defined
density function on support DI = R+. (Therefore, ∆cI corresponds to ΨI in
the general framework.) As in the general set-up, we assume that these random
variables (∆cI ,∆cA) are distributed independently of one another.
Finally, we denote the marginal cost saving relative to the status quo cost level
c0 that occurs if the potentially illegal action and innovation are undertaken simul-
taneously by δcI+A . Specifically, we assume that cost reductions are cumulative,
in the sense that
1
(1 + δcI+A)
=
1
(1 + δcA)(1 + δcI )
(3.20)
for all δcA ∈ DA and δcI ∈ DI .
3.3.3 Counterfactual Behaviour
In order to determine the relevant counterfactual behaviour of the firm, we need
to consider its decision as to whether or not to innovate in the absence of any
potentially illegal actions. On the basis of Definition 1, we know that the firm
will be innovative whenever the realised cost saving is such that piI(δcI ) > pi0.
Since the profits from innovating can be written for any δcI ∈ DI (and using a
first-order approximation for revenue43) as
piI(δcI ) = σR0
[
1 + (η − 1) δcI
1 + δcI
]
− z, (3.21)
this condition is satisfied whenever the realised innovation benefit δcI is sufficiently
large, specifically whenever
δcI > δ
∗
cI
≡ z
σR0(η − 1)− z . (3.22)
3.3.4 Action Choices
We are now in a position to evaluate the firms choice over potentially illegal ac-
tions. Firstly, we will show that, as postulated in Assumption 3, these potentially
illegal actions are always economically meaningful, in the sense that the firm will
always have a strict profit incentive to take its preferred action, irrespective of
its counterfactual behaviour. Secondly, we will verify Assumption 4, namely that
firms that innovate as part of any potentially illegal action are, ceteris paribus,
also more likely to do so in the counterfactual.
Using a first-order approximation for revenue, the profits associated with each
potentially illegal action k ∈ {A, I +A} can be written as
piA(δcA) = R0
(
σ + δm
1 + δm
)[
1− (η − 1)
(
δm − δcA
1 + δcA
)]
(3.23)
43That is, writing RI = (p0 + ∆pI)
1−η ≈ R0
[
1− (η − 1)
(
∆pI
p0
)]
.
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and
piI+A(δcA , δcI ) = R0
(
σ + δm
1 + δm
)[
1− (η − 1)
(
δm − δcI+A
1 + δcI+A
)]
− z (3.24)
for all δcA ∈ DA and δcI ∈ DI and where δcI+A is defined in (3.20). We are now
able to prove the following result, which confirms Assumption 3 from the general
framework.
Lemma 10. There is always at least one profitable anti-competitive action that
the firm can take, irrespective of whether or not it is innovative.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Before demonstrating that Assumption 4 is satisfied in this specific framework,
it is worth confirming the assumption that was made implicitly throughout the
general analysis, namely that the domains Dj,k are non-empty for all combinations
of j and k (see footnote 30). This implies that the firm will choose both potentially
illegal actions with positive probability, irrespective of whether or not it would
innovate in the counterfactual.
Lemma 11. Irrespective of whether the firm would innovate in the counterfactual
position or not, the firm may choose either action k = A or k = I +A, depending
on the precise realisation of the random variables ∆cI and ∆cA.
Proof. Appendix B.2.
Finally, we can now prove that Assumption 4 is satisfied in this specific con-
text, ensuring that firms observed engaging in potentially illegal action k = I +A
are indeed more likely to innovate in the counterfactual position, and that conse-
quently (3.7) holds.
Lemma 12. The firm is more likely to choose to innovate as part of any anti-
competitive action it chooses if it is high-tech rather than low-tech.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
3.4 Discussion & Extensions
Before concluding, we discuss some further implications that emerge from this
work, drawing on both the general framework and micro-founded example as
indicated.
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3.4.1 The Role of Innovation in Competition Law
A first point of interest concerns the role that innovation should play in compe-
tition cases at a general level. As discussed in the introduction, existing work
has so far emphasised the benefits that innovation brings, and used this as the
basis for arguing that the ‘harm’ from any given competition offence should be
offset by any innovation benefits that the infringing firm has also created. In our
framework, in which we take explicit account of the firm’s behaviour in the coun-
terfactual position, it is clear that this argument only holds to the extent that the
firm is non-innovative. To the extent that the firm would have innovated in the
counterfactual position, it is not appropriate to attribute the innovation benefits
it creates to its decision to engage in some potentially harmful action. This is the
reason why it is important to adjust the counterfactual price to account for the
firm’s innovation decisions in the counterfactual position.
We can illustrate the distinction between these two approaches using our
micro-founded example. There, the price that prevails following any potentially
illegal action is given by
pk = p0
1 + δm
1 + δck
,
while the price under innovation is given in (3.19).
It therefore follows that when the firm is non-innovative, and any innovation
was therefore undertaken conditional on also realising the profits from the poten-
tially illegal action, the innovation benefits may, in some circumstances, overturn
the anti-competitive harm associated with the action. In other words it is possible
that
H0,A = CS(p0)− CS
[
p0
(
1 + δm
1 + δcA
)]
> 0 (3.25)
but
H0,I+A = CS(p0)− CS
[
p0
(
1 + δm
1 + δcI+A
)]
< 0,
which will be true when the realised δcI is sufficiently large.
44 Thus the existing
view expressed in the literature is still reflected in our framework.
Nonetheless, it is also true that if the action k = A is harmful in isolation
(H0,A > 0), there will be no potentially illegal action k ∈ {A, I + A} that an
innovative firm could take for which true harm is negative. This follows since
(3.25) implies that
HI,I+A = CS
(
p0
1 + δcI
)
− CS
[
p0
(
1 + δm
1 + δcI+A
)]
> 0.
Therefore this framework makes clear exactly when the existing view of in-
novation in competition cases is justified (namely when the firm in question is
44Respecting also the constraint that δcI < δ
∗
cI implied by the fact that the firm is non-
innovative.
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non-innovative), while also demonstrating that innovation cannot represent a mit-
igating factor that may overturn the harm from a given competition infringement
for a firm that is innovative, once proper account is taken of the counterfactual
behaviour.
3.4.2 Deterrence
In this chapter, we have focused exclusively on the cost of decision errors as
the basis for determining the optimal stringency levels as captured in λ∗k. This
approach only considers the authority’s ability to adjudicate correctly in the cases
that may come to its attention, and therefore does not take account of the fact
that competition policy may influence the types of actions that firms are willing
to undertake in the first place – that is, it ignores deterrence effects.
While the intuition developed in this chapter should carry over at a general
level to a deterrence setting (in determining the extent to which a more strin-
gent policy deters innovation, we have to consider the extent to which firms have
profitable innovation opportunities in the absence of any potentially harmful ac-
tions) this raises several modelling difficulties. Firstly, the key to determining
the optimal policy when deterrence effects are included is the correlation between
profits and harm: as the stringency of competition policy is increased, is it the
most harmful or the least harmful actions that are deterred at the margin? When
considering deterrence effects in an innovative industry setting, however, the re-
lationship between profits and harm need not be monotone. As such, it may
be difficult to calibrate the stringency of competition policy to deter all harmful
actions. The precise assumptions that are reasonable concerning the joint den-
sity of profits and harm represent one difficulty in extending this framework to a
deterrence setting.45
Moreover, in addition to deterrence effects relating to the firm’s choice as to
whether or not to take a given action, there are now differential deterrence effects
to consider, which may alter the firm’s choice as to which potentially illegal action
to undertake when the stringency of competition policy changes. Therefore, to
the extent that a more stringent policy would encourage firms to take less harmful
actions (i.e. to choose k = I+A over k = A), such a policy may actually encourage
innovation. However, this also implies that the set of realisations of the random
parameters for which a given action is preferred will generally change when the
stringency of competition policy changes. This means, in turn, that the domains
of the true harm variables Dj,k are not constant, moving this problem outside the
scope of our present framework.
45Nonetheless, we can argue that the assumption that is typically made in the literature,
namely that profits and harm are distributed independently, is certain not to be true when we
relate the random variation in these variables to common underlying random parameters.
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a very general framework for the study of competition
policy enforcement in innovative industries, the principal working assumptions of
which were also verified in the context of a more specific, micro-founded exam-
ple. In contrast to existing work exploring the implications of innovation for the
enforcement of competition policy, we allow the firm’s decision with respect to
innovation to vary in the counterfactual position. This allows us to develop a
notion of the ‘true harm’ resulting from competition offences, which takes the
offender’s counterfactual behaviour into account.
The principal result of the chapter is that the stringency of competition policy,
as reflected in the liability standard according to which the competition authority
bans potentially harmful actions, should be lower (corresponding to a harsher
policy) for competition infringements that occur together with innovation rather
than in isolation. This follows since firms that are observed as innovating in
combination with some potentially harmful action are also more likely to innovate
in the (unobserved) counterfactual position. Since the authority’s simple estimate
of harm will be biased downward to the extent that the firm would have innovated
in the counterfactual, the optimal liability standard will be lower to compensate
for this.
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Part II
The Banking Sector
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Chapter 4
Competitive Effects of Bank
Capital Regulation
4.1 Introduction
In the banking sector, the promotion of competition may conflict with the objec-
tive of maintaining financial stability. An early and well-known theory formalising
the idea that excessive competition among banks promotes instability is the ‘char-
ter value hypothesis’, according to which banks that have their future earnings
potential (as reflected in their charter value) eroded by competition pursue more
risky asset-allocation strategies.1 More intense competition may also increase the
probability of bank runs.2 Since, moreover, the substantial costs of financial in-
stability are well documented,3 while the efficiency benefits of competition are
inherently difficult to quantify, it may be argued that stability concerns override
competition objectives for bank regulators.4
The implications of this are twofold. Firstly, competition infringements may
be tolerated in order to bolster charter values, avoid bank runs and therefore
safeguard stability.5 Secondly, policies may be put in place to promote stability,
without regard to their effect on the competitive behaviour of banks. Key among
such stability-enhancing policies has been the imposition of minimum bank cap-
1Keeley (1990). This result has subsequently been contested by extending the notion of
competition beyond deposit markets to loan markets (see, e.g., Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005) and
Caminal and Matutes (2002)) and interbank lending markets (see, e.g., Allen and Gale (2004)).
2See Vives (2013) and literature cited therein.
3The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) estimates the net present value cost
to output from financial crises at 19%-163%, with a median value of 63%. See BCBS (2010).
4For example, Carletti and Vives (2008, p.12) note that, even before the 2008 crisis, “central
banks in Europe were too complacent with collusion agreements among banks and even fostered
them.” See also Vives (2011) and Allen and Gale (2004).
5As noted by Carletti and Hartmann (2002, p.12) in the context of mergers, “it may be that
the very influential ‘charter value hypothesis’ [...] has convinced some countries to counterbalance
the competition-oriented antitrust review with a stability-oriented supervisory review of bank
mergers.”
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ital requirements.6 This chapter addresses these twin concerns by developing a
framework for competition policy in the banking sector (which is so far lacking in
the literature), which takes explicit account of capital regulation.7
As such, this chapter is most closely related to the literature on the strategic
effects of capital structure. Brander and Lewis (1986) show that capital structure
choices can affect the nature of competition between standard producing (non-
bank) firms. Higher debt levels commit a given firm to producing more output
in response to any output produced by its rivals. This corresponds to a “riskier”
strategy, since it increases the variance of the firm’s profit streams.8 Since the
effect of such commitments is to increase output, however, they can be viewed
as pro-competitive. Similar pro-competitive effects of debt have been found in
the context of collusive agreements. Maksimovic (1988) shows that firm owners
prefer to break collusive agreements and cash-in on the short-term gains from
deviation when the debt level is sufficiently high, due to limited liability.9 It
follows that, even in the context of standard producing firms, there is a sense in
which high levels of equity capital (by reducing debt levels) may be associated
with anti-competitive effects.
The most important difference when considering banks rather than standard
producing firms (besides the obvious difference in the nature of business opera-
tions) is that, in the presence of binding capital requirements, the capital structure
may not be freely chosen and adjusted by banks. Chami and Cosimano (2010)
show that capital requirements can strengthen the incentives of banks to sustain
collusion, since they impose a limit on the total volume of loans that a bank
can issue, and therefore also limit the extent to which any bank can steal rival
banks’ loan business by deviating from the collusive lending rate. However, the
decision by banks to enter into collusive behaviour in the first place is not mod-
elled endogenously. Finally, Schliephake and Kirstein (2013) show that, when
adjustments to the capital structure are costly, capital requirements represent an
imperfect pre-commitment to a particular loan capacity, which transforms the
outcome of the competitive process from Bertrand towards Cournot.10 In other
6As reflected in the most recent Basel III Accord, for example. The economic literature
concerning the effectiveness of such capital requirements in mitigating risk-taking incentives is
vast. See, e.g., Furlong and Keeley (1989), Hellman et al. (2000), Hakenes and Schnabel (2011)
and Besanko and Kanatas (1994).
7In fact, owing to the nature of the harmful actions we consider, the implications of our
framework cover both competition and consumer protection policy.
8As such, this can be viewed as an instance of the asset-substitution moral hazard problem
first discussed in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
9See also Stenbacka (1994) and Hege (1998) for similar results. This result has been contested
in Spagnolo (2000), however, who shows that, when firms hire conservative managers (with
high reputational costs of bankruptcy) in order to mitigate the asset-substitution moral hazard
problem, collusion becomes more sustainable for highly leveraged firms when credit markets are
concentrated.
10As noted by the authors, this effect may be taken to represent tacit collusion, but not
explicit collusion.
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words, capital requirements can soften the competitive environment (as rigid ca-
pacity constraints for standard producing firms were previously shown to do by
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)).
This chapter is also concerned with the competitive effects of capital regu-
lation in the banking sector. However, in focusing on competitive outcomes, it
is important to differentiate between the notions of (1) the competitive environ-
ment within which banks operate (as reflected, for example, in the number of
active banks, Cournot vs. Bertrand etc.11) and (2) anti-competitive actions that
banks operating in a given competitive environment may take.12 Our results will
touch upon both notions of competition and show that, in the first instance, an in-
crease in the capital requirement increases the market concentration. Since, in our
model, larger banks enjoy lower costs of raising equity,13 an increase in the capital
requirement can be viewed an asymmetric cost shock that impacts the marginal
costs of initially high-cost banks most strongly. Therefore, there is a strong sense
in which higher capital requirements diminish the degree of competitive intensity
in the market as a whole.
Nonetheless, our results show that this decrease in the competitiveness of the
market overall does not necessarily translate into increased incentives to take
anti-competitive actions. In the loan market, we represent a generic abuse of
a dominant position via a shock that increases lending rates.14 This may be
considered a reduced form representation of a variety of competition-infringing
behaviours that occur in the corporate bank lending markets. For example, banks
have been found to obstruct SMEs in their attempts to switch loans to alternative
finance providers through delays in waiving claims over collateral and completing
11Boone (2001) provides an axiomatic treatment of measures of the competitive environment.
12For concreteness, by anti-competitive actions we mean an unspecified abuse of a dominant
position, rather than cartels or mergers. The supposition that some banks enjoy sufficient market
power in their interactions with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to abuse a dominant
position is supported by the findings of the Office of Fair Trading (UK) (since taken over by
the newly-formed Competition and Markets Authority), which highlights barriers to entry and
difficulty for SMEs in differentiating providers as key reasons why banks enjoy significant market
power. See OFT (2014).
13This is backed up by Witmer and Zorn (2007), for example, who find empirical evidence
that the cost of equity is inversely related to firm size for a sample of North American firms. In
the context of banks, lower equity costs for larger banks may further be explained by implicit
government guarantees associated with banks that are “too big to fail”. Gandhi and Lustig
(2010) find that government guarantees do indeed reduce the cost of equity for large US banks.
14An important underlying question in the banking context concerns the appropriate welfare
standard. In this chapter, we will follow the approach taken by the majority of competition
authorities around the world (including in the US and EU) by using a consumer surplus standard.
Moreover, in the banking context, where customers include both individual consumers on the
deposit side and small and medium enterprises on the loans side, we consider both customer
groups to fall within the consumer surplus mandate of the competition authority. This is the
approach taken by the Financial Conduct Authority, for example, which states (see FCA (2013,
p.5)): “Our responsibilities extend to all consumers, [...] whether an individual, small company
or a major participant in the wholesale market.”
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documentation.15 Furthermore, banks were identified as far back as 2002 by the
then Competition Commission (UK) as bundling business current accounts with
loans.16 More recently, the new competition and consumer protection body for
the banking sector in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority, has launched a
‘skilled persons review’ into alleged abusive conduct on the part of a major British
highstreet bank towards firms in financial difficulty.17
Our results show that, especially when allowing for the sale of ancillary finan-
cial products to depositors, the difference in equity funding costs between banks
must be sufficiently large in order for increases in the capital requirement to in-
crease the incentives of a dominant bank to act anti-competitively. This is due
to the fact that the incentive effect is proportional to the size of a bank’s loan
book. While higher capital requirements increase the market share of the domi-
nant bank, they also reduce the market size overall, because equity is assumed to
be costly relative to debt for both banks. Hence the market share effect must be
not just positive, but also large enough to offset the market size effect in order for
the incentives for anti-competitive conduct to increase.
In considering anti-competitive actions on the deposit side, we wish to extend
the notion of competition policy beyond the traditional objective of ‘protecting
competition in the interests of consumers’, to a direct concern for consumer wel-
fare. In particular, we examine the incentives that banks face to exploit depositors
via the sale of ancillary financial products. In so doing, we view deposit accounts
as a type of gateway product,18 which banks can exploit as a channel via which to
sell more profitable ancillary products.19 In this context, a dominant bank may
abuse its position to misinform and more generally obstruct the switching process
of depositors looking for rival deals in the market. This is what the Financial Con-
duct Authority has termed a situational monopoly : “situational monopolies can
arise, where intermediaries sell add-on products at monopoly prices because con-
sumers do not shop around for better offers at the point of sale.”20 A well-known
episode of such mis-selling in the UK centred on payment protection insurance
(PPI) contracts.21
In this context, we show that the only switching that will occur in equilibrium
15OFT (2014)
16Further details available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/markets-work/SME-banking-
review/#.U1pPHvlSbpR.
17See http://www.fca.org.uk/news/update-on-independent-review-of-rbs-treatment-of-
business-customers-in-financial-difficulty for details.
18See, e.g., Armstrong and Zhou (2011, p.F386)
19This view of current accounts is also reflected in policy circles. The Financial Conduct
Authority, for example, notes that “[t]here is evidence that personal current accounts help banks
to sell a range of more profitable products.” See http://www.fca.org.uk/news/research-shows-
many-consumers-paying-too-much-for-overdrafts.
20Erta et al. (2013, p.22)
21Lloyds, the worst offender in the UK market, had by December 2013 set aside £8 billion
to cover PPI compensation claims (which might serve as a proxy for consumer harm) and also
faced a £28 million fine from the UK Financial Conduct Authority. See Financial Times (2013).
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is from the dominant bank (which charges a higher price for the ancillary financial
product) to the rival bank. Therefore, only the magnitude of the dominant bank’s
switching costs will matter. A natural characterisation of a harmful action in
the deposit market is, therefore, an unanticipated increase in the switching cost
that depositors of the incumbent bank face, once they have already deposited
their funds.22 We show that the effect of increases in the capital requirement
on the incentives of the dominant bank to exploit consumers depends on both
the magnitude of the equity funding cost difference, and the slope of the demand
curve.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 develops a
benchmark model, in which banks compete in the loan market by raising equity
and deposits. We describe the competition policy setting and derive initial results
on the effect of capital regulation on the nature of the equilibrium, and on the
incentives of the incumbent bank to abuse its dominant position in the loan mar-
ket. Section 4.3 expands the model to two stages. Following the first stage loan
market competition, banks offer ancillary financial products for sale in the second
period, to depositors who exhibit a degree of inertia in switching to the rival bank.
We first characterise a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which we again have
a dominant bank, before exploring the effects of increasing capital requirements
on the market structure and incentives for anti-competitive conduct. Section 4.4
concludes.
4.2 A Benchmark Model
4.2.1 Basic Model Set-up
Consider a banking duopoly consisting of an incumbent bank and a new entrant,
which we index with subscripts i = I,N , respectively. Banks are assumed to
invest in an amount l of loans that are of an equivalent risk class,23 and their
operations are funded by a combination of deposits d (assumed to be insured, at
a premium normalised to zero) and equity e. Throughout this chapter, we will
suppose that the balance sheet identity always holds for each bank as
li = di + ei. (4.1)
In this benchmark setting without ancillary financial products, this is guaranteed
to hold if cash on balance sheet yields no return, for example.
In this banking market, we assume that exogenously determined capital regu-
lation requires each bank to hold a minimum fraction equal to δ, 0 < δ < 1, of their
total assets (that is, loans) in the form of equity. To ensure that this constraint
22As will also be shown, to the extent that this increase in switching costs is anticipated by
other market participants, there will never be an incentive for the dominant bank to take this
action.
23This removes considerations related to risk-weighting of assets.
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on equity levels δ is always binding, and that increases in the minimum capital
requirement are consequently economically meaningful, we adopt the approach
taken elsewhere in the literature by assuming that equity is “costly” relative to
debt (that is, deposits).24 Specifically, we assume that there is an infinite mass of
potential depositors, each of whom holds a unit of funds that they are willing to
deposit at a rate no lower than γ > 0. This implies that banks face a horizontal
supply of deposits schedule at a cost of deposits equal to rDi = γ for both i.
25
Equity is costly relative to deposits in the sense that each bank has to pay an
equity funding premium of ρi > 0 per unit over the cost of deposits in order to
attract equity investors. Thus we can write bank i’s marginal equity funding cost
as rEi = γ + ρi. We make the further assumption that banks are asymmetric in
the dimension of their equity funding premium. In particular, we suppose that
the incumbent, for reasons such as its established market reputation and access
to internal loan databases,26 faces a lower equity funding premium than does the
new entrant.
Assumption 6. ρI < ρN
This assumption will be the source of dominance in our model.27 We further
assume that each bank faces constant marginal resource costs of loan monitoring,
equal to cLi > 0 for bank i. In the absence of compelling a priori arguments to the
contrary, we suppose that banks are initially symmetric in this dimension, so that
cLI = c
L
N = c
L.28 Taken together, these assumptions imply that banks operate
subject to constant marginal costs of issuing loans (equivalently, of raising funds),
equal for bank i to
ri = δ r
E
i + (1− δ) rDi + cL = γ + δρi + cL. (4.2)
24See, e.g., Schliephake and Kirstein (2013). Hellmann et al. (2000) and Gorton and Winton
(1997) offer theoretical justifications for considering equity to be “costly” in this sense.
25In other words, banks are assumed to be price-takers in the deposit market.
26Basel III regulations grant banks that use internal loan databases to create models to assess
the riskiness of their loans a reduction on their capital requirement. New banks have neither
the access to historic data nor the experience to make use of the advanced approaches, see ICB
(2011, §7.26). Thus, the difference in marginal equity costs can more broadly be considered to
reflect this “discount” that established banks can achieve on the amount of equity they need to
raise. According to the ICB (2011, §7.27) “a small bank using a standardised approach could
need to hold more than three times as much capital against a good-quality mortgage book as a
large diversified bank using an advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) approach.” Finally, new
entrants may also be more reliant on costly venture capital as a source of funds.
27Note that this will also be consistent with a story where larger banks enjoy lower equity costs
due to implicit guarantees associated with being “too big to fail”. In the interests of simplicity,
we do not make the equity funding premium a function of bank size, however. All we require for
our results is that, in equilibrium, the dominant bank enjoys a lower equity funding cost. While
there are other ways in which a bank might achieve dominance, which in turn affect its equity
cost in a way that is consistent with Assumption 6, the approach described here is sufficiently
rich for the results that we derive in this chapter.
28Resource costs related to debt and equity financing are normalised to zero.
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From Assumption 6, it therefore follows that rI < rN .
Banks are assumed to compete in the loan market in a Cournot fashion. Let-
ting upper-case letters denote aggregate variables, the inverse demand for loans
function is assumed to relate the lending rate rL to total loan volumes L via the
following linear specification,29
rL(L) = a− bL,
where a, b > 0. Moreover a is assumed to satisfy
a > γ + cL + δ(2ρN − ρI),
which ensures that both banks are active in equilibrium.
4.2.2 Initial Equilibrium
The assumption that equity is costly guarantees that the capital constraint δ
always binds. Denoting equilibrium values with stars, it follows that, in any
equilibrium,
e∗i = δ l
∗
i and d
∗
i = (1− δ) l∗i
for i = I,N . In combination with the balance sheet identity (4.1), either bank’s
optimisation problem can therefore be solved equivalently for li, di or ei. Letting
the choice variable be loans with no loss in generality, equilibrium loan rates are
determined as the Cournot-Nash outcomes, when each bank maximises profits
pii(li) = li [a− bL− ri] ,
with respect to its own loan volumes, taking the rival’s loan volumes as given.
From this, the Cournot equilibrium values for the market share and profits of
bank i = I,N follow straightforwardly as
s∗i =
1
2
+
3δ
4
(
ρj − ρi
a− γ − cL − δρ
)
, j 6= i, (4.3)
and
pi∗i =
(l∗i )
2
b
, (4.4)
respectively, where ρ = 12(ρI + ρN ) is the average equity funding premium and
l∗i =
a− γ − cL − δ(2ρi − ρj)
3b
, j 6= i,
is the equilibrium loan volume. Hence it follows from Assumption 6 that sI >
1
2 .
29In Appendix C.1, we extend the results of this benchmark setting to more general demand
functions.
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4.2.3 Capital Regulation
Now consider the impact of a marginal increase in the capital requirement δ on
this initial equilibrium. From (4.2),
∂ri
∂δ
= ρi. (4.5)
Therefore the effect of raising the capital requirement is to raise the marginal
funding cost of both banks. Moreover, due to Assumption 6 (ρI < ρN ), this
effect is asymmetric and exerts a greater impact on the marginal cost of the new
entrant. From (4.3), it is straightforward to see that the incumbent’s market
share is increasing in δ if and only if ρN > ρI , which holds due to Assumption
6. Therefore, using the Herfindahl index H =
∑
i(s
∗
i )
2 as our measure of market
concentration, we have the following result.
Lemma 13. Marginal increases in the capital requirement δ lead to a more con-
centrated market equilibrium, in the sense that the Herfindahl index rises.
Since the relevant derivative is positive for all feasible parameter values,30 this
result also holds for discrete changes in the capital requirement.31
Corollary 1. Lemma 13 also holds for discrete changes in the capital requirement
δ.
Therefore, we have identified a first sense in which higher capital requirements
may bring about anti-competitive effects. Since we can view an increase in the
capital requirement as a cost shock that impacts banks with higher equity fund-
ing costs more strongly, such an increase results in a less competitive market
environment, in the sense that the market concentration rises.
We next explore whether, in addition to this effect on the competitive envi-
ronment, increases in the capital requirement necessarily increase the incentives
of the dominant bank to engage in a generic anti-competitive action in the loan
market.
4.2.4 Competition Policy Setting
Before characterising the anti-competitive action that banks may take in the loan
market, it is worth considering the competition policy setting. This will be kept
very simple. Throughout the chapter, we have in mind that any bank that takes a
harmful action faces an exogenous probability of being caught by the competition
authority, and fined a fixed amount. Moreover, the probability of being caught is
30This follows since
∂s∗I
∂δ
=
3
4
(ρN − ρI)(a− γ − cL)
(a− γ − cL − δρ)2 .
31In Appendix C.1, we demonstrate that Lemma 13 and Corollary 1 are robust results, in the
sense that they hold for a broad class of both concave and convex demand functions, in addition
to linear demand.
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assumed to be independent of the precise characteristics (such as market share)
of the bank that takes the action. This implies that the incentive for any bank to
take a given action depends solely on the profit effect of doing so.
4.2.5 Anti-competitive Actions – Loan Market
We begin by identifying three conditions that any anti-competitive action (abuse
of dominance) should satisfy in the context of this simple banking duopoly.
C1. The action is ‘harmful’, in the sense that it lowers consumer surplus.
C2. The action is necessarily profitable for the bank that takes the action (ab-
stracting from the possibility of competition policy intervention).
C3. The action necessarily lowers the profits of the bank that does not take the
action.
A natural candidate to represent this generic anti-competitive action is therefore
a shock to the marginal costs of the bank that does not take the action. More
generally, this can also be interpreted as a negative demand shock.32 That is, the
effects of this anti-competitive action as captured in C1 -C3 are as if the marginal
cost of the small bank had increased. Moreover, as will be shown, the profit effect
from taking this action will be proportional to a given bank’s equilibrium loan
volumes, which renders it a natural candidate to represent an abuse of dominance.
We therefore define an anti-competitive action in the loan market as follows.
Definition 4 (Anti-competitive action in loan market). An anti-competitive ac-
tion in the loan market taken by bank i entails a cost shock that increases marginally
the funding cost rj, j 6= i, of the rival bank.
Without loss in generality, we may consider this increase in funding cost to
operate via the resource costs of loan monitoring, so that, if the action were taken
by bank i = I,N , post-shock we have cLi < c
L
j , j 6= i. Clearly, from (4.4), and
rewriting equilibrium loan volumes to account for asymmetric costs as
l∗i =
a− γ − (2cLi − cLj )− δ(2ρi − ρj)
3b
, j 6= i,
the effect of this action will be to increase the profits of the firm taking the action,
since
∂pi∗i
∂cLj
=
2
3b2
l∗i > 0.
That is, in the absence of competition policy intervention, there is a profit in-
centive to take the action, which, moreover, is proportional to the equilibrium
32For example, supposing that each bank faces a loan rate rLi (L) = ai − bL, the assumption
could be that the action, if taken by bank i, causes the parameter aj , j 6= i, to fall. This is the
approach to modelling abuses of dominance taken in Katsoulacos (2014), for example.
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loan volume of the bank taking the action. Therefore, there is always a greater
incentive for the dominant incumbent to take the action than for the new entrant.
The effect of increasing capital requirements on the incentive to engage in this
anti-competitive action is then simply determined by the cross-partial derivative33
∂2pi∗i
∂δ∂cLj
=
2
9b3
(ρj − 2ρi).
It follows that an increase in the capital requirement will always decrease the
incentive of the new entrant to take the anti-competitive action. This follows
because such an increase will cause aggregate loan volumes to fall34 and, moreover,
causes the share of the new entrant in the total market to fall. Since the profit
effect is proportional to the own loan volumes, the effect of increasing δ is always
to reduce the incentive of the new entrant to take the action. For the incumbent,
it is clear that the reduction in the total loan market size will be offset by the
increase in its share in the market, that is ∂l∗I/∂δ > 0, if and only if
ρN > 2ρI .
Hence we have the following result.
Proposition 9. The necessary and sufficient condition for increases in the capital
requirement δ to increase the incentives for the incumbent bank to take the anti-
competitive action is that ρN > 2ρI .
Therefore, despite the fact that increases in the capital requirement always
increases the market concentration (that is, reduces the intensity of competition in
the market overall) it does not necessarily increase the incentives of the dominant
bank to behave anti-competitively, and always reduces the incentives of the new
entrant to act anti-competitively. This follows because, as well as making the
market more concentrated, it reduces the size of the overall loan market.35
Having established this simplified benchmark case, we now move on to a richer
setting in which banks also compete to sell ancillary financial products to de-
positors. In this case, we can explore the incentives of banks to behave anti-
competitively or, more generally, in a way that is harmful to customers, both in
the loan market and via the sale of ancillary financial products.
4.3 Model with Ancillary Product Sales
4.3.1 Extended Model Set-up
Suppose now that, as motivated in the introduction, banks can use the provision
of a current account to depositors as a gateway via which to target depositors with
33Again, this effect also holds for discrete changes in δ when demand is linear.
34This follows since total equilibrium loan volumes can be written as L∗ = 2
3b
(a−γ−cL−δρ),
where cL and ρ are average loan monitoring cost and equity funding premium, respectively.
35In Appendix C.1, corresponding results are discussed for the case of general demand.
77
the sale of ancillary financial products. We now assume that banks and depositors
interact in a two-stage game. In the first stage, banks compete in the loan market
by issuing deposits and equity, as described in the basic set-up of Section 4.2.1. In
the second stage, banks compete to sell a homogeneous ancillary financial product
(such as an insurance contract, personal loan etc.) to depositors.
Each depositor is assumed to have inelastic unit demand for one unit of this
product, which is valued at common reservation value v > 0. Depositors, however,
are assumed to display inertia in their switching behaviour. Moreover, depositors
are differentiated with respect to their switching cost. While any depositor that
purchases the ancillary financial product from the bank that provides their deposit
account incurs no costs in addition to the sale price, a switching cost equal to σ
is incurred when they purchase from the rival bank. This σ is determined at the
start of the second period as the result of a random draw from a uniform density
on the interval [0, λ], where λ < v.36 The cost of offering this ancillary financial
product for the banks is normalised to zero.
As in Section 4.2, dominance in our model will result from an asymmetry in
the equity funding premium of the two banks. In particular, we shall now assume
that this difference in equity funding premia is sufficiently large, so that
ρN − ρI > (1− δ)
δ
5λ
18
. (4.6)
Thus we require that the difference in equity funding premia be sufficiently large
relative to the upper bound on the feasible search costs λ, and that the capital
requirement δ be high enough for this difference to matter.
Finally, we again assume that cash on balance sheet yields zero return, and,
furthermore, that deposits are always costly for banks (that is, depositors will
never pay to deposit their funds at a bank).37 This implies that the balance sheet
identity given in (4.1) again holds for both banks.
4.3.2 Initial Equilibrium
Let the price charged by bank i = I,N for this ancillary financial product in
the second stage be denoted by pi, and the associated quantity sold by qi. We
will consider a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which, as before, we have a
dominant bank that enjoys a lower equity funding cost that its rival.38
36As discounting between the two periods will not be important for our results, we do not
include a discount factor in the model. Our modelling of switching costs is close to standard
frameworks. See, e.g., Chen (1997).
37This is a fairly weak assumption. If we allowed for positive costs for banks of offering this
ancillary financial product, it will always hold when these costs are sufficiently high, for example.
38That is, our aim is not to characterise the full range of possible equilibria in this game, but
rather we restrict our attention to a dominant bank equilibrium that is the counterpart to the
one-stage equilibrium analysed in Section 4.2.
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Stage 2 – Ancillary Product Sales
We begin by considering the second stage competition for the sale of the ancillary
financial product. At this stage, we take the first-stage choices of loans (equiva-
lently: deposits or equity) as given. Assume, moreover, that in this dominant-bank
equilibrium, the first stage deposit volumes satisfy39
dI > dN . (4.7)
We posit, moreover, that the dominant bank will charge a higher price in this
second stage equilibrium, that is
pI > pN . (4.8)
Given that depositors face a cost of switching, (4.8) implies that switching can
only occur from the incumbent to the new entrant. A depositor whose deposits
are held by the incumbent will be indifferent between switching and not switching
if
v − pI = v − pN + σ,
which in turn implies that the quantity sold by the incumbent in the second stage
will be
qI = dI
[
1− (pI − pN )
λ
]
.
In other words, the incumbent will sell the ancillary product to that fraction
of its depositor base that does not have profitable switching opportunities. Hence
it follows that the quantity sold by the new entrant in the second period will be
equal to its own depositor base (none of whom will switch since we posit that
pN < pI) plus the share of the incumbent’s depositors that switch, so that
qN = dN + dI
(
pI − pN
λ
)
.
Given that the marginal costs of providing this ancillary product for the banks
are normalised to zero, second-period profits of the banks can be written as
piI2 = pIdI
[
1− (pI − pN )
λ
]
, (4.9)
piN2 = pN
[
dN + dI
(
pI − pN
λ
)]
. (4.10)
Maximising each profit function with respect to own price, the unique solution for
second period prices that satisfies the second-order conditions can then be solved
39We later show this is guaranteed to hold, given (4.6).
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as
p∗I =
λ(2dI + dN )
3dI
=
λ(2lI + lN )
3lI
, (4.11)
p∗N =
λ(2dN + dI)
3dI
=
λ(2lN + lI)
3lI
. (4.12)
Clearly, optimal second period prices will depend on the outcome of the first
period deposit (equivalently, loan) market competition. Note also that optimal
prices do not depend on the value of the product v. The degree to which banks
can move away from the Bertrand outcome at the second stage depends solely on
the magnitude of switching costs, as reflected in λ. Moreover, we see that p∗I > p
∗
N
if and only if dI > dN .
40 Therefore, the dominant bank will indeed always charge
a higher price in the second-stage equilibrium. The one maintained assumption
that we are carrying forward is therefore that dI > dN .
Substituting (4.11) and (4.12) into the profit expressions and expressing ev-
erything in terms of loans rather than deposit volumes, second period equilibrium
profits are then equal to
pi∗I2 = (1− δ)λ
(2lI + lN )
2
9lI
, (4.13)
pi∗N2 = (1− δ)λ
(2lN + lI)
2
9lI
. (4.14)
Stage 1 – Loan Market Competition
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, each agent will be optimising, given the strate-
gies of the other players. This means that depositors must be indifferent between
depositing their funds with either bank in the first period, given the expected
surplus derived from ancillary product sales in the second period. Since every
potential depositor has a reservation return of γ, each bank will offer a deposit
rate in period 1 that makes depositors indifferent between depositing and not
depositing.
The total expected surplus of a depositor who deposits their funds with the
incumbent in period 1 is equal to
rDI +
[
v −
∫ λ
p∗I−p∗N
p∗I
λ
dσ −
∫ p∗I−p∗N
0
p∗N + σ
λ
dσ
]
.
40For completeness, to rule out the undercutting case where dI > dN and pI < pN , note
that, if pI < pN , second-period profits can be written as piI2 = pI [dI + dN (pN − pI)/λ] and
piN2 = pNdN [1− (pN − pI)/λ] for the incumbent and new entrant, respectively. Maximising
these with respect to price returns the same optimal prices as in (4.11) and (4.12), except that
we have dN in the denominator rather than dI . Nonetheless, dI > dN ⇒ p∗I > p∗N , thereby
contradicting the premise of this undercutting case.
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Solving this and setting it equal to the reservation rate of γ, we can solve for the
required deposit rate for the incumbent as
rDI (p
∗
I , p
∗
N ) = γ − v + p∗I −
(p∗I − p∗N )2
2λ
.
Thus the required rate of return paid to depositors of the incumbent (that is, the
incumbent’s average cost of deposits) is increasing in the reservation rate γ and
decreasing in the value of the ancillary product sold in the second period. The
additive p∗I term reflects the fact that, if consumers are charged a higher price
in the second period, they will have to be compensated more for depositing their
funds in the first period. The last term reflects the fact that, the greater the
extent of divergence between the prices, the more opportunities depositors will
have to switch in the second period, so the less they care about higher prices
charged by the incumbent.
Similarly, the average cost of raising deposits for the new entrant is equal to
rDN (p
∗
N ) = γ − v + p∗N .
Notice that the divergence between prices does not matter for the new entrant,
since there will never be switching from the new entrant to the incumbent when
p∗I > p
∗
N (equivalent, lI > lN ).
Substituting in the expressions for optimal second period prices, see (4.11) and
(4.12), the required return per depositor (that is, the average cost of deposits) can
be expressed as a function of loans as
rDI (lI , lN ) = γ − v +
λ
3lI
[
2lI + lN − 1
6lI
(lI − lN )2
]
, (4.15)
rDN (lI , lN ) = γ − v +
λ
3lI
(2lN + lI). (4.16)
Therefore, we can write the total cost of deposits for the two banks as a function
of loan volumes as
CDI (lI , lN ) = (1− δ)lI
{
γ − v + λ
3lI
[
2lI + lN − 1
6lI
(lI − lN )2
]}
, (4.17)
CDN (lI , lN ) = (1− δ)lN
{
γ − v + λ
3lI
(2lN + lI)
}
. (4.18)
We can then express each bank’s total profits across the two periods as a
function of the chosen loan volumes as
ΠI(lI , lN ) = lI [a− bL− δrEI − cL]− CDI (lI , lN ) + pi∗I2(lI , lN ), (4.19)
ΠN (lI , lN ) = lN [a− bL− δrEN − cL]− CDN (lI , lN ) + pi∗N2(lI , lN ). (4.20)
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Before considering the new Cournot-Nash outcome of maximising these profits,
we will make some simplifications to the respective objective functions, based on
the nature of the dominant bank equilibrium we are exploring. Before considering
the first-order condition of (4.19) with respect to lI , consider first the derivative
of the total cost of deposits function for the incumbent. This is equal to
∂CDI (lI , lN )
∂lI
= (1− δ)
{
γ − v + λ
18
[
11 +
(
lN
lI
)2]}
.
Therefore, when the degree of dominance is large (so that the ratio lN/lI is small)
the cost of deposits function quickly approaches a linear function. Graphically, the
marginal cost of deposits function can be drawn for illustrative parameter values
as in Figure 4.1, above. Notice that, when lI > 1, it converges to a constant very
quickly.
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Figure 4.1: Marginal Cost of Deposits when δ = 12 , γ = 5, v = 4, θ = 3, lN = 1.
Given that we are investigating a dominant bank equilibrium, in which indeed
lI > lN , it is therefore a natural simplification to approximate the cost of deposits
function at a point where the degree of dominance is large (that is, where (lN/lI) ≈
0), so that it becomes a linear function. Formally, this equivalent to a first-order
approximation of CDI (lI , lN ) around the point where lN = 0.
Similarly, the first derivative of the incumbent’s second-period profits is ap-
proximately constant when the degree of dominance is large, since
∂pi∗I2
∂lI
= (1− δ)λ
9
[
4−
(
lN
lI
)2]
.
So again, the second period profits will be approximated well by a linear function
whenever the degree of dominance is large.
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Similar results hold for the new entrant’s cost of deposits term CDN (lI , lN ) and
second period profits pi∗N2(lI , lN ). In each case, the first derivatives with respect
to lN will depend on the endogenous variables lN and lI only via the ratio lN/lI .
In a dominant bank equilibrium such as we are describing here, it is therefore
again a natural simplification to approximate these functions at a point where the
degree of dominance is large (again, where (lN/lI) ≈ 0).
Using, therefore, first-order approximations around lN = 0 for the cost of
deposits functions and second-period profits, (4.19) and (4.20) can be written as
ΠI(lI , lN ) = lI
[
a− bL− (δρI + γ + cL) + (1− δ)
(
v − λ
6
)]
, (4.21)
ΠN (lI , lN ) = lN
[
a− bL− (δρN + γ + cL) + (1− δ)
(
v +
λ
9
)]
(4.22)
+ lI(1− δ)λ
9
.
These profits are straightforward to maximise, yielding unique solutions for first
period loan volumes equal to
l∗I =
a− γ − δ(2ρI − ρN )− cL + (1− δ)
(
v − 4λ
9
)
3b
, (4.23)
l∗N =
a− γ − δ(2ρN − ρI)− cL + (1− δ)
(
v +
7λ
18
)
3b
. (4.24)
Notice, finally, that our maintained assumption that l∗I > l
∗
N will hold whenever
(4.6) holds, which closes the description of this dominant bank equilibrium.
The final terms in these expressions represent the change in net profitability
of issuing deposits, which is positive for both banks because they can now pay
a return on deposits below the reservation return γ (since depositors anticipate
surplus in period 2), and also earn profits directly from their depositors in the
second period. Therefore, the cost advantage of funding via deposits rather than
equity is strengthened.
Substituting these equilibrium loan values into (4.19) and (4.20), total equi-
librium profits are equal to
Π∗I =
(l∗I )
2
b
, (4.25)
Π∗N =
(l∗N )
2
b
+ l∗I (1− δ)
λ
9
. (4.26)
4.3.3 Capital Regulation
We are now in a position to consider the marginal effect of increases in the capital
requirement δ on this initial subgame perfect dominant bank equilibrium. Note
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that the market share of the incumbent bank can now be written as
s∗I =
1
2
+
3
[
δ(ρN − ρI)− (1− δ)
(
5λ
18
)]
4
[
a− γ − δρ− cL + (1− δ)
(
v − λ
36
)] .
By inspection, since the numerator of the second additive term is increasing
in δ and the denominator is decreasing in δ, higher capital requirement will again
increase the market concentration. Moreover, there is now an additional effect
relative to the benchmark case. Not only does higher δ give greater importance
to equity as a source of funds (for which, as we know, the incumbent enjoys a cost
advantage). Given the second-stage competition in which the incumbent charges
higher prices due to its dominant position, and the fact that depositors anticipate
this in the first stage, the cost of deposits is now higher for the incumbent than for
the new entrant.41 Therefore, a higher capital requirement also makes that source
of funds (namely, deposits) for which the incumbent is at a cost disadvantage less
significant.
4.3.4 Anti-competitive Actions – Loan Market
So again, increases in the deposit rate increase the market concentration. We may
now consider the effect of an increase in the capital requirement on the incentives
of the incumbent42 to engage in anti-competitive conduct in the loan market, as
described in Section 4.2.5. Allowing for asymmetry in cLi in (4.25), the incentive
to take the anti-competitive action in the loan market is equal to the profit effect,
in turn determined by
∂Π∗I
∂cLN
=
2l∗I
3b2
> 0.
It follows that the incentive to take this anti-competitive action is again pro-
portional to the size of the dominant bank. Considering now the effect of increases
in the capital requirement on the incentives to take this action, note that
∂2Π∗I
∂δ∂cLN
=
2
9b3
[
(ρN − 2ρI)−
(
v − 4λ
9
)]
.
As before, the effect of increasing δ on the incentives to take the action will
depend on its effect on l∗I , since the profits from this action are proportional to
loan volumes. Since we know that banks pay a cost above γ for equity and a
cost below γ for deposits, a shift in the funding mix towards more costly equity
is now more likely to decrease loan volumes in absolute terms (even if they rise
41This follows since the marginal cost of deposits can be written (to an approximation) as
cDI (lI , lN ) = γ− v+ (11λ/18) and cDN (lI , lN ) = γ− v+ (λ/3) for the incumbent and new entrant,
respectively.
42In this section, we focus on the incentives of the dominant bank to behave anti-competitively.
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in relative terms) than when the difference in funding costs was solely due to the
equity funding premia ρi. In order for l
∗
I to rise when the funding requirement
shifts in favour of more costly equity, we now require the difference in funding
premia to be sufficiently large also to offset the increase in costs that occurs due
to the opportunity cost of reduced deposits.
Proposition 10. Allowing for second stage ancillary product sales, the necessary
and sufficient condition for increases in the capital requirement to increase the
incentives of the incumbent to take the anti-competitive action in the loan market
is
ρN > 2ρI +
(
v − 4λ
9
)
.
Hence, due to the additional profit opportunities associated with deposits in
this two-stage game, higher capital requirements are less likely to increase the
incentives of the incumbent to act anti-competitively.
4.3.5 Anti-competitive Actions – Deposit Market
We now consider the final avenue for anti-competitive actions, namely exploiting
depositors directly via the sale of ancillary financial products in the second period.
First notice that, to the extent that depositors’ switching costs differ depending on
which bank they have deposited their funds with, only the incumbent’s switching
costs will matter in equilibrium, since the only switching that will ever occur in this
dominant bank equilibrium is from the incumbent to the new entrant. A natural
avenue for an abuse of dominance relating to the sale of ancillary financial products
is, therefore, an increase in the switching costs of the incumbent’s depositors.43
An important distinction here will be whether or not this increase in switching
costs (formally, an increase in the upper bound on the switching cost distribution,
λ) is anticipated by the other market participants. To the extent that the increase
in λ is anticipated, it follows from (4.25) and (4.23) that this will always reduce
equilibrium profits of the incumbent, since
∂Π∗I
∂λ
= −l∗I (1− δ)
8
27b2
< 0.
We therefore have to refine the model slightly to accommodate an increase in the
switching costs in the second period, that is not anticipated by depositors or the
new entrant in the first period.44 This means that depositors will not demand
43For example, the incumbent may hide disadvantageous terms in the small print or offer
misleading advice to consumers concerning the product of the rival bank. This corresponds to a
classic consumer protection issue.
44This assumption of myopic agents appears reasonable, since we are modelling an action that
exploits consumers. In this case, the action is exploitative precisely because consumers do not
have the opportunity to factor this increase in switching costs into their decision about where to
deposit their funds in the first period. This assumption is also realistic, when one bears in mind
the complexity of many financial products and the many potentially unforeseen ways in which
banks might exploit this complexity in order to obstruct depositors’ attempts to switch.
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a corresponding increase in the return on deposits in order to be compensated
for the expected higher prices for the ancillary prices in period 2, and the new
entrant will not anticipate the increased profitability of deposits in period 2, and
therefore will compete less strongly for deposits in period 1.
Suppose, therefore, that depositors and the new entrant expect in period 1
that the switching costs will be determined as a random draw from a uniform
density function on [0, λ], where λ is, in a sense, the fair value of switching costs
(in the sense that this is the cost that people face of switching when they are
not otherwise obstructed). However, suppose that the incumbent knows that it
can somehow obstruct its depositors from switching by increasing (unexpectedly)
at the start of period 2 the true upper bound on the switching costs to λ + ∆.
Given that depositors do not anticipate this increase in period 1, the cost of
deposits is unaffected for both banks. Moreover, the new entrant will maximise
total profits in period 1 on the basis of expected switching costs λ. Hence the
objective functions of the two banks can now be written as
Π̂I(lI , lN ) = lI
[
a− bL− δρI − γ − cL + (1− δ)
(
v − λ
6
+
4∆
9
)]
(4.27)
+ lN (1− δ)
(
4∆
9
)
,
Π̂N (lI , lN ) = lN
[
a− bL− (δρN + γ + cL) + (1− δ)
(
v +
λ
9
)]
(4.28)
+ lI(1− δ)λ
9
.
Setting ∆ = 0 returns the two standard profit functions (see (4.21) and (4.22)).
Notice that there is now an additional lN term in the incumbent’s objective
function. The reason is that, the higher is the new entrant’s loan volume, the more
closely aligned will be the second period prices of the two banks, and therefore
the lower will be the degree of switching when the incumbent marginally increases
switching costs via ∆ (holding this lN fixed).
Maximising each objective function with respect to the corresponding loan
variable and solving simultaneously, the unique solution that satisfies the second-
order conditions is now
lˆ∗I =
a− γ − δ(2ρI − ρN )− cL + (1− δ)
(
v − 4λ
9
+
8∆
9
)
3b
,
lˆ∗N =
a− γ − δ(2ρN − ρI)− cL + (1− δ)
(
v +
7λ
18
− 8∆
9
)
3b
.
Notice that the increase in switching cost, to the extent this is unanticipated,
represents a pure market stealing effect from the new entrant to the incumbent.
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Substituting these equilibrium loan values into the profit expression (4.27) yields
equilibrium profits of the incumbent equal to
Π̂∗I =
(lˆ∗I )
2
b
+ lˆ∗N (1− δ)
(
4∆
27
)
.
We are now in a position to investigate the incentives for the incumbent to in-
crease marginally the switching costs above expectations. This incentive effect is
determined by
∂Π̂∗I
∂∆
∣∣∣∣∣
∆=0
= (1− δ) 4
27
(
4
b2
lˆ∗I + lˆ
∗
N
)
> 0,
where all equilibrium terms on the right hand side are evaluated at ∆ = 0. There-
fore we have the following intermediate result.
Lemma 14. A marginal increase in the incumbent’s switching cost is strictly
profitable for the incumbent when such an increase is not anticipated by the other
market participants (that is, depositors and the new entrant).
Now consider the effect of an increase in the capital requirement on this in-
centive to increase the switching costs.
∂2Π̂∗I
∂δ∂∆
∣∣∣∣∣
∆=0
= − 4
27
(
4
b2
lˆ∗I + lˆ
∗
N
)
+ (1− δ)
(
4
b2
∂lˆ∗I
∂δ
+
∂lˆ∗N
∂δ
)
,
where, again, everything on the right-hand side is evaluated at ∆ = 0. The first
term is clearly negative and reflects the direct effect of an increase in the capital
requirement. This will reduce the amount of deposits in favour of equity, which
will necessarily reduce the profitability of increasing the switching costs for those
depositors that remain.
The more interesting term is the second. This captures the changes in the
relative amounts of deposits of the two banks. As noted, the profits of the incum-
bent now also depend on the new entrant’s loan (equivalently, deposit) volumes,
since these determine the potential for switching when the costs of doing so are
increased. Writing this indirect effect out in full, we see that it is equal to
(1− δ)
3b3
[
ρI(b
2 − 8)− ρN (2b2 − 4)− 4
(
v − 4λ
9
)
− b2
(
v +
7λ
18
)]
,
from which it follows that a sufficient condition for the indirect effect to be negative
is
ρI(b
2 − 8) < ρN (2b2 − 4).
This is satisfied whenever the slope of demand is sufficiently steep, so that b >√
2. Therefore, despite the fact that increasing the switching cost increases the
incumbent’s loan volume lˆ∗I , the fact that the new entrant’s loan volumes lˆ
∗
N fall
may cause the net indirect effect to be negative when demand is sufficiently steep.
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On the other hand, if demand is flat (b <
√
2), then the indirect effect may
turn positive if the difference in equity funding premia is sufficiently large, in
which case an increase in the capital requirement may increase the incentives to
exploit consumers. This will be especially true if the capital requirement is raised
from an initially very low level (so that (1− δ) is close to unity). Hence we have
the following.
Proposition 11. Increases in the capital requirement δ will decrease the incen-
tives for the incumbent to exploit depositors when demand is sufficiently steep,
but may increase the incentives when demand is flat and the difference in equity
funding premia ρN − ρI is sufficiently large.
Therefore, the degree to which we have a conflict between capital regulation
and consumer protection depends on the slope of demand and the magnitude of
the difference in equity funding premia.45
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the following question: when do increases in stability-
oriented capital requirements conflict with competition and consumer protection
objectives in the banking sector. While higher capital requirements increase the
market concentration, they do not necessarily increase the incentives for banks
to behave in a way that harms consumers. The incentive of the incumbent to
engage in a generic abuse of dominance in the loan market was shown to increase
only if the difference in equity funding cost relative to the new entrant was suf-
ficiently large. On the deposit side, the incentive to exploit consumers via an
unanticipated increase in switching cost will decrease when capital requirements
are raised, unless the equity funding costs are sufficiently divergent, and the slope
of demand is sufficiently flat. Thus capital regulation, in the present framework,
appears more likely to conflict with competition policy than consumer protection
policy.
Extensions to this work should consider in more detail the appropriate reme-
dies that a competition and consumer protection authority should implement to
correct for the incentive effects of capital regulation. Our modelling of the com-
petition authority was kept very brief in this chapter, to allow the analysis to
focus on the profit effect of various harmful actions. The question of optimal
enforcement (including optimal fines, the appropriate base on which to levy fines
etc.) becomes particularly interesting when consumers are boundedly rational. In
this case, existing work has already shown that there may be conflicts between
45Note that this unanticipated increase in the switching cost has an ambiguous effect on the
new entrant’s profits. While the new entrant’s loan volumes clearly fall, it nonetheless benefits
from the realised higher switching costs in the second period, irrespective of the fact that these
were not anticipated. It can be shown that a sufficient condition for the new entrant’s profits to
increase when the switching costs are raised marginally is b2 > (1− δ) 2
27
.
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competition and consumer policy.46 This issue is left as the subject of future
work.
Finally, it should be noted that some aspects of this model may also describe
other settings in which regulation has a differential effect on competing firms’
marginal costs (e.g. environmental regulation). The specific framework we de-
velop here, with costly equity, binding capital constraints and gateway products
that imply switching costs, is specific to the banking sector, however.
46Armstrong (2008)
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This thesis has studied the optimal enforcement of competition policy in innova-
tive industries and in the banking sector. In both cases, it was argued that the
presence of important, competing regulatory aims (the promotion of innovation
incentives in the former and the maintenance of stability in the latter) complicate
the enforcement of competition policy.
Part I of the thesis focused on the case of innovative industries. In the context
of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property, Chapter 2 investigated the
welfare impact of a compulsory licensing policy. While the model does exhibit the
trade-off between innovation incentives and increased competition that has been
discussed in the existing literature, it also offers a simple mechanism via which the
trade-off can be resolved: whenever the risk free rate of interest is sufficiently low,
the benefits of increased competition will outweigh the reduction in innovation
incentives from a consumer surplus point of view. In terms of total welfare, the
impact of compulsory licensing was further related to a parameter capturing the
“competitiveness” of the industry within which firms are competing. Provided
the industry is sufficiently uncompetitive, compulsory licensing was shown to be a
beneficial policy in total welfare terms. Finally, compulsory licensing was shown
to be an effective policy if the competition authority follows a structural competi-
tion objective, which aims to prevent foreclosure in the market. Since compulsory
licensing guarantees that the technological gap between the competing firms re-
mains constant, it ensures that the leader cannot foreclose its less efficient rival by
innovating successfully. These results are particularly relevant, given the differing
views that competition authorities in the US and EU have taken of compulsory
licensing in numerous high-profile refusal to license cases.
In Chapter 3, we explored the enforcement of competition policy in the context
of a much more generally defined abuse of dominance. The aim of this chapter
was to explore the extent to which the stringency of competition policy should
differ, according to whether the abusive conduct was carried out in isolation or
in combination with innovation. On this point, the existing literature has so far
emphasised that recognising the benefits of innovation always leads to a more
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lenient policy when competition infringements occur with innovation, rather than
in isolation.
In our model, the firm’s decision to engage in this potentially anti-competitive
abuse of dominance was treated separately from its decision to innovate. Since the
firm’s decision with respect to innovation falls outside the scope of competition
policy, this effectively defines a firm’s counterfactual behaviour. On that basis,
we were able to develop a concept of ‘true harm’ that takes explicit account of
a firm’s innovation behaviour in the counterfactual position. In a decision error
cost framework, we then demonstrated a particular sense in which the optimal
stringency of competition policy should be harsher towards firms that innovate
in addition to taking the anti-competitive action. This followed because firms
that are observed as innovating as part of a competition infringement were also
shown to be more likely to innovate in the counterfactual. This implies that the
competition authority’s estimate of harm, in each case calculated relative to the
status quo position in which the firm would simply have done nothing, is more
likely to be biased downwards (thereby inflating type II (acquittal) and deflating
type I (conviction) errors) when firms innovate as part of a competition offence.
The optimal liability standard, a measure inversely related to the stringency of
competition policy, was therefore shown to be lower for such firms.
In Part II of the thesis, we considered the implications of prudential regula-
tion, in particular in the form of minimum capital requirements, for competition
and consumer protection policy in the banking sector. It was argued that, despite
recent instances in which dominant banks have abused their market position to
the detriment of customers on both the loans and deposits side, the main focus of
regulators and academics (in particular in the wake of the recent financial crisis)
has been on stability objectives. In that context, we derived a very robust result,
showing that increases in the capital requirement increase the market concentra-
tion. In a sense, capital requirements therefore exert a negative effect on the
competitive environment characterising the industry as a whole. Nonetheless, this
increase in market concentration does not necessarily increase a dominant bank’s
incentives to abuse its position, either via a generic abuse of dominance in the
loan market, or via the sale of ancillary financial products to depositors. In order
for the incentives for anti-competitive conduct to increase (in either market), it
was shown that the divergence in equity funding premia between the competing
banks muse be sufficiently large. Moreover, the incentives of the dominant bank
to exploit consumers via the sale of ancillary financial products is further influ-
enced by the slope of the demand for loans curve: only to the extent that this is
sufficiently flat might increases in the capital requirement increase the incentives
for harmful conduct. Thus, the central contribution of this chapter was to clar-
ify the conditions under which stability-focused capital regulation conflicts with
competition and consumer protection policy in the banking sector.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1 Collected Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The sum of marginal costs (equivalently, cost gaps) is
the same, regardless of which firm innovates. Therefore, on the basis of existing
results,1 since the variance of marginal costs is greater when the leader wins, we
know that industry profits are also greater in that case: Σ(G+ g, 0) > Σ(G, g).
Proof of Lemma 3. Lemma 2 confirms the equality between hazard rates under
compulsory licensing, while (2.11) confirms the rankings in the voluntary licensing
regime. We can also see that compulsory licensing cannot lead to an increase in
the hazard rate chosen by the follower, since, by (2.12),
Y C − Y V = PFRAND − piF (G+ g, g) + piF (G+ g, 0) ≤ 0.
The inequality is strict if we have φ < 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. We can write the rate-adjusted hazard rates under com-
pulsory licensing as
XC = piL(G+ g, g)− piL(2G+ g,G+ g) + PF + PFRAND,
Y C = piF (2G+ g,G+ g)− piF (G+ g, g) + PF + PFRAND.
The follower will remain the predicted winner of the race if and only if Y C > XC ,
which is to say
Σ(2G+ g,G+ g) > Σ(G+ g, g).
Given (2.21), (2.26) and (2.27), this is always satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 5. Compulsory licensing reduces the hazard rate of the leader
and (weakly) reduces the hazard rate of the follower. By (2.27)
XC −XV ≤ Σ(G+ g, g)− Σ(G+ g, 0) < 0.
1Salant and Shaffer (1999)
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Also,
Y C − Y V = (1− φ) [piF (G+ g, 0)− piF (G+ g, g)] ≤ 0,
since φ ≤ 1.
A.2 Voluntary Licensing and the ‘Regulatory Threat’
We wish to show that, when firms anticipate the possibility of a compulsory li-
censing remedy in case no voluntary agreement is reached, the licensing conditions
(2.5) and (2.8) do not change. As described in Section 2.3.2, let θj , 0 ≤ θj ≤ 1, be
the common probability with which firms anticipate a compulsory licence being
imposed on the innovating firm j = L,F , if a voluntary deal is refused. Moreover,
let P j(FRAND) now denote the FRAND licence price that applies in case firm
j = L,F innovates successfully and is forced to license by compulsory licence.
Then, in case the leader innovates and licenses, the cost gaps are (gLVL , g
LV
F ) =
(G+ g, g), while, if the leader innovates and does not license, the cost gaps would
be (gLNL , g
LN
F ) = (G+ g, 0) with probability (1− θL), and (gLNL , gLNF ) = (G+ g, g)
with probability θL. It follows that the minimum price that the leader would be
willing to accept for the licence, and the maximum that the follower would be
willing to pay, can be written as2
PL = (1− θL)[piL(G+ g, 0)− piL(G+ g, g)] + θLPL(FRAND)
and
P
L
= (1− θL)[piF (G+ g, g)− piF (G+ g, 0)] + θLPL(FRAND),
respectively. That is, the reservation prices are now a weighted average of those
that apply under voluntary licensing (see (2.3) and (2.4)) and the appropriate
FRAND fee. Therefore, the leader will still license if and only if
Σ(G+ g, g) > Σ(G+ g, 0).
Similar derivations for the case when the follower innovates shows that the
reservation prices in that case can be written as
PF = (1− θF )[piF (G, g)− piF (G+ g, g)] + θFPF (FRAND)
and
P
F
= (1− θF )[piL(G+ g, g)− piL(G, g)] + θFPF (FRAND).
Therefore, if the follower innovates, licensing will again take place if and only if
Σ(G+ g, g) > Σ(G, g).
Since, in our general set-up of Section 2.2.3, it must hold that Σ(G + g, 0) >
Σ(G, g),3 the same intuition concerning the incentives of the leader to refuse to
2Note that the expectation of exogenously-determined FRAND licence fees does enter into
these expressions (unlike the endogenously-determined, voluntary licence fees). While this does
not change the conditions under which licensing will occur, it does affect the price level at which
the licence would be exchanged.
3Salant and Shaffer (1999)
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license carry over to this setting. Given (2.10), the leader has no (strict) incentive
to license for all 0 ≤ θL ≤ 1. It follows that the threat of compulsory licensing
alone cannot resolve the refusal to license problem.
Note that, when θL = 1, the leader’s decision to license has no perceived effect
on industry profits, because firms anticipate a compulsory licence with certainty in
case no voluntary deal is reached. Therefore, the licensing conditions break down,
and firms are indifferent between licensing and not licensing. We may assume
that the leader still does not license in that case. Alternatively, note that θL = 1
implies that PL = P
L
= PL(FRAND), so that the only voluntary deal that may
be reached is the one which exactly replicates the compulsory licence. Therefore,
from an analytical point of view, we can still talk of compulsory licensing with no
loss in generality.4
A.3 Spillovers
We wish to demonstrate that our welfare results are robust to the inclusion of
spillovers, a standard method in the context of tournament models of R&D to
combat the excess investment problem. Suppose, to that end, that a fraction s,
0 < s < 1, of the technical progress engendered in any innovation spills over to the
non-innovating firm. So, in the absence of licensing, if the leader innovates, the
cost gaps would be (gLNL , g
LN
F ) = (G+ g, sg), while if the follower innovates they
would be (gFNL , g
FN
F ) = (G+ sg, g). Therefore, we will have persistent dominance
if and only if
Σ(G+ g, sg) > Σ(G+ sg, g). (A.1)
This always holds (Salant and Shaffer (1999)), so that we still have persistent
dominance in our baseline scenario.
Now, given the assumption of fixed fee licensing, it is straightforward to see
that, if the leader innovates, licensing will take place if and only if
Σ(G+ g, g) > Σ(G+ g, sg),
4This model therefore also nests the voluntary licensing regime of Section 2.3.1 (when θL =
θF = 0) and the compulsory licensing regime of Section 2.3.3 (when θL = 1 and θF = 0).
Note that, in principle, it is also possible to allow θF to increase from zero under a compulsory
licensing policy. This would shift the reservation prices, and therefore also the actual price
at which the follower licenses towards PF (FRAND). There are then two possibilities. To the
extent that PF (FRAND) is low, this would reduce the voluntary licence price PF , and therefore
reinforce the negative incentive effect that is already present in the model. To the extent that
PF (FRAND) is very high (that is, close to the total economic benefit piL(G + g, g) − piL(G, g)),
however, an increase in θF could actually increase the voluntary licence fee PF , and therefore
provide an offsetting incentive effect relative to the voluntary licensing scenario. This possibility
notwithstanding, since we typically think of compulsory licensing as a tool to combat the refusal
by dominant firms to license, rather than one by which follower firms can extract higher prices
for their licences, we stick with the model where θF remains constant at zero. This is, moreover,
consistent with a setting in which compulsory licensing only affects dominant firms.
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while, if the follower licenses, we will have licensing if and only if
Σ(G+ g, g) > Σ(G+ sg, g).
Given (A.1), it is still true that, if any firm were to refuse to license, it would be
the leader, as in Section 2.3.1. Moreover, all of the analysis in the main body of
the chapter goes through unchanged, up to and including Section 2.4.1.
What we now require in order for total welfare to be higher under compulsory
licensing rather than voluntary licensing (abstracting from cost savings and letting
TW (gL, gF ) denote the total welfare levels associated with cost gaps (gL, gF )) is
that
TW (G+ g, g) > TW (G+ g, sg).
This is equivalent to the requirement that5
8 >
(11s+ 3)(1 + s)
1− s g + 14G.
Therefore, the total welfare effect is still positive when the industry is less com-
petitive (that is, when  is higher) – thus, the nature of Proposition 2 does not
change. Nonetheless, the precise threshold level of “un-competitiveness” above
which the total welfare effect turns positive is clearly increasing in the degree of
the spillover s.
5Clearly, setting s = 0 returns the corresponding expression from the no-spillovers case
analysed in the main body of the chapter, see (2.19).
96
Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 10
It is sufficient to show that, for each potential counterfactual j ∈ {0, I}, there is
at least one profitable, potentially illegal action k ∈ {A, I + A}. We proceed by
proving that (i) piA(δcA) > pi0 for all δcA ∈ DA, and (ii) piI+A(δcA , δcA) > piI(δcI )
for all δcA ∈ DA and δcI ∈ DI , which confirms the result.
(i) piA(δcA) > pi0 for all δcA ∈ DA. From (3.23), this is trivially true if the
counterfactual situation is one of perfect competition, so that µ = σ = pi0 = 0, or
if δcA ≥ δm > 0, so that the effect of the action is to maintain or lower price and
hence either maintain or increase revenue, while, as we have seen, the fraction of
revenue going towards profits unambiguously increases. Using (3.23), we see that
piA > pi0 if and only if
(η − 1)
(
δm − δcA
1 + δcA
)
<
(1− σ)δm
σ + δm
.
A sufficient condition for this to hold for any value of δcA ∈ DA is
η − 1 < 1− σ
σ + δm
, (B.1)
which, if we substitute (3.16) into (B.1), is equivalent to
δm <
1− µ
µ+ η − 1 ,
which is guaranteed to hold by (3.17).
(ii) piI+A(δcA , δcI ) > piI(δcI ) for all δcA ∈ DA and δcI ∈ DI . The necessary and
sufficient condition for piI+A > piI is(
σ + δm
1 + δm
)[
1− (η − 1)
(
δm − δcI+A
1 + δcI+A
)]
− σ
[
1 + (η − 1)
(
δcI
1 + δcI
)]
> 0.
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A sufficient condition for this to be positive for any value of δcA ∈ DA is(
σ + δm
1 + δm
)[
1− (η − 1)
(
δm − δcI
1 + δcI
)]
− σ
[
1 + (η − 1)
(
δcI
1 + δcI
)]
> 0,
which is the same as(
σ + δm
1 + δm
)[
1− (η − 1)
(
δm
1 + δcI
)]
− σ +
(
δcI
1 + δcI
)(
δm
1 + δm
)
(η − 1)(1− σ) > 0.
A sufficient condition for this to hold for any value of δcI ∈ DI (and therefore also
any δcI > δ
∗
cI
) is (
δm
1 + δm
)
[(1− σ)− (η − 1)(σ + δm)] > 0,
or, equivalently,
η − 1 < 1− σ
σ + δm
,
which, by the closing arguments in step (i) of the proof, is always satisfied.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 11
The necessary and sufficient condition for the firm to prefer action I + A over
k = A can, on the basis of (3.23) and (3.24), be written as
∆pi ≡ piI+A − piA = R0(η − 1)
(
δcI
1 + δcI
)(
σ + δm
1 + δcA
)
− z > 0, (B.2)
or, equivalently,
z < R0(η − 1)
(
δcI
1 + δcI
)(
σ + δm
1 + δcA
)
. (B.3)
Therefore, irrespective of the firm’s counterfactual action choice, if the realisation
of ∆cA is sufficiently high, the firm will prefer action k = A over k = I +A.
To show that there is also a probability that the firm might also choose action
k = I + A over k = A, irrespective of counterfactual behaviour, consider the
marginal non-innovative firm, for which δcI is arbitrarily close to δ
∗
cI
. Inserting
the threshold value δ∗cI (see (3.22)) into (B.3), we see that, when δcA = 0, this
firm will prefer action k = I +A to k = A whenever
1 <
σ + δm
σ
,
which is satisfied for all δm > 0. Hence a non-innovative firm may still choose
action k = I+A, which it will do whenever the realisation of ∆cA is sufficiently low,
and the firm is sufficiently close to the boundary of becoming innovative. Since, for
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an innovative firm, δcI > δ
∗
cI
, the same argument implies that the least innovative
firm with δcI only marginally above δ
∗
cI
would still choose action k = I +A when
the realisation of ∆cA is sufficiently low. Hence there is strictly positive probability
that a firm will choose either anti-competitive action, irrespective of whether or
not it would innovate in the counterfactual.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 12
We wish to show that the conditional probability of the firm being innovative is
greater when the potentially illegal action chosen is k = I + A than when it is
k = A. From (3.21) and (B.2), since both piI(δcI ) and ∆pi are increasing in δcI ,
and given that ∆cA and ∆cI are distributed independently (so that higher values
of δcI are not systematically associated with higher values of δcA) the result follows
immediately.
To be more precise about the firm’s behaviour, we can define the following
threshold value for ∆cA on the basis of (B.2). Let δ
∗
cA
(δcI ) be the threshold value
of ∆cA for a firm with innovation cost savings equal to δcI , such that
∆pi
{
≥ 0 if δcA < δ∗cA(δcI ),
< 0 if δcA ≥ δ∗cA(δcI ).
(B.4)
Hence the firm will choose action k = I + A over k = A if and only if δcA < δ
∗
cA
.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (B.2) implies that
dδ∗cA(δcI )
dδcI
> 0.
We can therefore represent the firm’s action choices in (∆cI ,∆cA) space as in
Figure B.1 below. For realisations of ∆cI to the right of the δ
∗
cI
line, the firm would
innovate in the counterfactual. From this graph, the result concerning conditional
probabilities is also immediate.
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
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Figure B.1: counterfactual behaviour and action choices in (∆cI ,∆cA) space
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 General Demand in Benchmark Case
We here consider briefly the robustness of the results in Section 4.2 to more
general demand specifications. Suppose, therefore, that the inverse demand for
loans curve rL(L) now satisfies the following standard assumptions:
A1. Twice continuously differentiable with
drL(L)
dL
< 0 whenever rL(L)>0.
A2. rL(0) > ri > r
L(L) for L sufficiently large, i = I,N .
A3. Demand is not “too convex” so that
drL(L)
dL
+ L
(
d2rL(L)
dL2
)
< 0.
Denoting the elasticity of the slope of demand by
Θ(L) ≡
(
d2rL(L)/dL2
drL(L)/dL
)
L,
assumption A3 is equivalent to the requirement that Θ(L) > −1. This specifica-
tion allows for demand to be convex (−1 < Θ < 0), concave (Θ > 0) and linear
(Θ = 0).
C.1.1 Initial Equilibrium
Note that the assumption of a positive equity funding premium ρi still implies that
banks would choose to hold zero equity voluntarily. Therefore, in any equilibrium,
e∗i = δ l
∗
i and d
∗
i = (1− δ) l∗i
for i = I,N . Under assumptions A1 -A3, moreover, the existence and uniqueness
of a Cournot equilibrium is guaranteed.1 This equilibrium displays intuitive com-
parative statics properties. Denoting the equilibrium profits of bank i by pi∗i , we
1Novshek (1985)
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have2
∂pi∗i
∂ri
< 0 and
∂pi∗i
∂rj
> 0, j 6= i,
so that profits are decreasing in level of the own funding costs, but increasing in
the level of the rival bank’s funding cost.
C.1.2 Capital Regulation
The marginal effect of raising the capital requirement is still given by (4.5), so
that we again seek to represent the increase in the capital requirement via a
shock to marginal costs. We follow the approach of Fe´vrier and Linnemer (2004)
(hereafter FL) by representing this cost shock associated with an increase in the
capital requirement by the continuous variable wδ ≥ 0. This cost shock wδ results
in funding cost for bank i of ri + γ
δ
iw
δ, where γδi represents a sensitivity factor
associated with the capital increase. From (4.5), this must satisfy
γδi = ρi
for i = I,N . We may now explore the impact of a marginal increase in the capital
requirement by examining the impact of this cost shock on equilibrium outcomes.3
As a first step, we evaluate the effect on market shares. The market share of bank
i as a function of the shock wδ may be written as4
s∗i =
1
2
+
r − ri + (ρ− ρi)wδ
2 [rL(L∗(wδ))− r − ρw] , (C.1)
where r and ρ are the average funding cost and equity funding premium, and
L∗(wδ) is the function relating the equilibrium total loan volume to the magnitude
of the shock wδ. We first demonstrate that, in this general demand setting, an
increase in the capital requirement still increases the market concentration.
Lemma 15. Marginal increases in the capital requirement δ lead to a more con-
centrated market equilibrium, in the sense that the Herfindahl index rises.
Proof. Differentiating (C.1) with respect to wδ shows that the sign of ∂s∗i /∂w
δ is
the same as the sign of
(ρ−ρi)
[
rL(L∗(wδ))− r − ρwK
]
−
[
r − ri + (ρ− ρi)wδ
] [drL(L∗(wδ))
dL
∂L∗
∂wδ
− ρ
]
,
2Amir et al. (2013), Linnemer (2003)
3That is, we evaluate the effect of increases in δ on the equilibrium value of a given variable zi
via the sign of ∂z∗i /∂w
δ|wδ=0. Our main focus in this Appendix will be on the effect of marginal
changes in the capital requirement, since results for asymmetric cost shocks for general demand
do not exist when the cost changes in question are discrete (except in the special case where such
shocks leave the average cost unchanged, see Salant and Shaffer (1999)). Where our results do
extend to discrete changes, in which case we may drop the wδ = 0 constraint from the derivative,
this will be noted in what follows.
4See FL, Lemma 1.
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which, evaluated at wδ = 0 for a marginal change in δ, has the same sign as5
(ρ− ρi)
[
−dr
L(L∗)
dL
L∗
]
+ 2(r − ri)
[
ρ(1 + Θ∗)
3 + Θ∗
]
. (C.2)
where starred values denote the equilibrium value of a given function when wδ = 0.
Therefore, since for the incumbent ρI < ρ and rI < r, we have
∂s∗I
∂wδ
∣∣∣∣
wδ=0
> 0,
while for the new entrant bank we have ρN > ρ and rN > r, so that
∂s∗N
∂wδ
∣∣∣∣
wδ=0
< 0.
Hence the dominant position of the big bank is strengthened and the Herfindahl
index rises.
Note that this result is independent of whether demand is convex, concave or
linear. We also note the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 2. Lemma 15 also holds for discrete changes in the capital requirement
δ.
Proof. Follows proof of Lemma 15. Without the condition that wδ = 0, (C.2)
becomes
(ρ− ρi)
{
−dr
L(L∗(wδ))
dL
L∗(wδ)
}
+ 2[r − ri + (ρ− ρi)wδ]
{
ρ
[
1 + Θ∗(wδ)
]
3 + Θ∗(wδ)
}
,
from which the result is immediate.
Thus the result that higher capital requirements increase the market concen-
tration is fairly robust.
C.1.3 Anti-competitive Actions – Loan Market
We now consider the profit incentive of a given bank to take the anti-competitive
action in the loan market defined in Section 4.2.5. To make the comparative static
analysis in this section manageable, we impose one further condition on the form
of the inverse loan demand. Specifically, we focus on the family of constant-Θ
demand functions, which means that demand takes the form
rL(L) = max
{
a− b
1 + θ
L1+θ; 0
}
, a, b > 0,
5This step draws on intermediate results from FL.
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so that Θ(L) = θ for all L, and A3 now guarantees that θ > −1. Nonetheless,
this specification still allows us to distinguish between demand that is convex
(−1 < θ < 0), concave (θ > 0) and linear (θ = 0). Indeed, the distinction will
turn out to be important for the results we develop in this section.
Following the same definition of the anti-competitive action, we can represent
this via another cost shock, associated with the continuous variable wA, with
associated sensitivity parameters γAj > 0 and γ
A
i = 0, j 6= i, when the bank taking
the action is bank i. The profit effect when bank i takes the anti-competitive
action is given by6
∂pi∗i
∂wA
= l∗i
{
γAj +
γAj
3 + θ
[θ(s∗i − 1)− 1]
}
, j 6= i (C.3)
which is positive for all θ > −1.
By inspection of (C.3), it is clear that the incentives of a given bank to engage
in this anti-competitive action are affected by the curvature of the demand curve
θ, the equilibrium loan volume l∗i and (via θ) the market share s
∗
i .
Since the latter two of these variables are, in turn, affected by changes in
the capital requirement δ, it follows that changes in the capital requirement will
alter the incentives of any bank to engage in the anti-competitive action. To
investigate when the effect of changes in δ increases the incentives to engage the
action, we consider in turn the effects of the cost shock reflected in wδ, associated
with sensitivity parameters γδi = ρi, on l
∗
i and s
∗
i .
From Lemma 15 and Corollary 2, we know that the cost shock associated with
the increase in the capital requirement (characterised by sensitivity parameters
γδi ) increases the market share of the incumbent at the expense of the new entrant,
in other words
∂s∗I
∂wδ
> 0,
∂s∗N
∂wδ
< 0.
Moreover, the incentive effect of increases in δ running via s∗i depend on the
curvature of the demand curve. Increases in the capital requirement δ increase
the incentives of the incumbent (respectively, the new entrant) to take the action
if and only if demand is concave (respectively, convex).
To analyse the effect of increases in δ (as reflected in wδ) on the equilibrium
loan volume l∗i , first note that
l∗i (w
δ) =
L∗(wδ)
2
+ r − ri + (ρ− ρi)w
δ
−[drL(L∗(wδ))/dL] .
Differentiating this with respect to wδ, evaluating at w = 0 for a marginal change
and rewriting, the necessary and sufficient condition for an increase in δ (equiva-
lently, wδ) to increase the equilibrium loan volume of a given bank is
ρi
ρj
<
2 + θ
4 + θ
, j 6= i.
6See FL Proposition 2.
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Therefore, as before, increases in the capital requirement will always reduce the
incentive effect of the new entrant running via l∗N , and will increase the incentive
of the incumbent to take the action if and only if the difference in equity funding
premia is sufficiently large. Therefore, we have the following result.
Lemma 16. A sufficient condition for (marginal) increases in the capital require-
ment δ to increase the incentives for the incumbent to take the anti-competitive
action is
θ ≥ 0 and ρN > ρI
(
4 + θ
2 + θ
)
.
Clearly, the incentive effect is more likely to be positive, the more concave
is demand. This follows because, when demand is concave, the impact of a cost
shock that (on average) increases firms’ marginal costs is to shift demand from
inefficient firms to efficient firms (that is, from small firms to dominant firms).
The results for linear demand presented in the main body of the chapter are
therefore a special case of this result when θ = 0, in which case the necessary and
sufficient condition becomes
ρN > 2ρI .
105
Bibliography
[1] Acemoglu, D. and U. Akcigit (2012) ‘Intellectual Property Rights Policy,
Competition and Innovation’, Journal of the European Economic Associa-
tion, 10, pp. 1-42.
[2] Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R. and P. Howitt (2005) ‘Com-
petition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 120, pp. 701-728.
[3] Ahlborn, C., Evans, D. and A.J. Padilla (2004) ‘The Antitrust Economics
of Tying: A Farewell to Per Se Illegality’, The Antitrust Bulletin, 49, pp.
287-342.
[4] Ahlborn, C., Evans, D. and A.J. Padilla (2005) ‘The Logic and Limits of
the “Exceptional Circumstances Test” in Magill and IMS Health”, Fordham
International Law Journal.
[5] Allen, F. and D. Gale (2004) ‘Competition and Financial Stability’, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 36, pp. 453-480.
[6] American Bar Association (2003) ‘Intellectual Property and An-
titrust: Unilateral Refusals to Deal’. (downloadable at http:
//apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-cic/pdf/
unilateralrefusalstodeal.pdf)
[7] Amir, R., Encaoua, D. and Y. Lefouili (2013) ‘Optimal Licensing of Uncer-
tain Patents in the Shadow of Litigation’, mimeo.
[8] Arguedas, C. (2005) ‘Bargaining in Environmental Regulation Revisited’,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, pp. 422-433.
[9] Armstrong, M. (2008) ‘Interactions between Competition and Consumer
Policy’, Competition Policy International, 4, pp. 97-147.
[10] Armstrong, M. and J. Zhou (2011) ‘Paying for Prominence’, Economic Jour-
nal, pp. F368-395.
106
[11] BCBS (2010) ‘An Assessment of the Long-term Economic Impact of
Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements’. (downloadable at http:
//www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf.)
[12] Beath, J., Katsoulacos, Y. and D. Ulph (1989a) ‘The Game-theoretic Analy-
sis of Innovation: A Survey’, Bulletin of Economic Research, 41, pp. 163-184.
[13] Beath, J., Katsoulakos, Y. and D. Ulph (1989b) ‘Strategic R&D Policy’,
Economic Journal, 99, pp. 74-83.
[14] Beath, J., Katsoulacos, Y. and D. Ulph (1995) “Game-theoretic Models of
Innovation”, in Stoneman, P. (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innova-
tions and Technological Change (Basil Blackwell, Oxford).
[15] Becker, G.S. (1968) ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’,
Journal of Political Economy, 76, pp. 169-217.
[16] Beckner, C.F. and S.C. Salop (1999) ‘Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules’,
Antitrust Law Journal, 67, pp. 41-76.
[17] Besanko, D. and G. Kanatas (1994) ‘The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do
Capital Standards Promote Bank Safety?’, Journal of Financial Intermedi-
ation, 5, pp. 160-183.
[18] Besanko, D. and D.F. Spulber (1993) ‘Contested Mergers and Equilibrium
Antitrust Policy’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 9, pp. 1-29.
[19] Bolotova, Y., Connor, J.M. and D. Miller (2008) ‘The Impact of Collusion on
Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases’, International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 26, pp. 1290-1307.
[20] Bond, E. and K. Saggi (2012) ‘Compulsory Licensing, Price Controls, and
Access to Patented Foreign Products’, Vanderbilt University Department of
Economics Working Papers, No. 12-00006.
[21] Boone, J. (2000) ‘Competitive Pressure: The Effects on Investments in
Product and Process Innovation’, RAND Journal of Economics, 31, pp.
549-569.
[22] Boone, J. (2001) ‘Intensity of Competition and the Incentive to Innovate’,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19, pp. 705-726.
[23] Boyd, J.H. and G. De Nicolo´ (2005) ‘The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and
Competition Revisited’, Journal of Finance, 60, pp. 1329-1343.
[24] Brander, J.A. and T.R. Lewis (1986) ‘Oligopoly and Financial Structure:
The Limited Liability Effect’, American Economic Review, 76, pp. 956-970.
107
[25] Caminal, R. and C. Matutes (2002) ‘Market Power and Banking Failures’,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, pp. 1341-1361.
[26] Carletti, E. and P. Hartmann (2002) ‘Competition and Stability: What’s
Special about Banking?’, ECB Working Paper, No. 146.
[27] Carletti, E. and X. Vives (2008) ‘Regulation and Competi-
tion Policy in the Banking Sector’, mimeo. (downloadable at
https://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/!PORTAL.wwpob_
page.show?_docname=1005863.PDF.)
[28] Carlton, D.W. (2007) ‘Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?’, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 21, pp. 155-176.
[29] Carlton, D.W. and R.H. Gertner (2002) ‘Intellectual Property, Antitrust
and Strategic Behavior’, NBER Working Paper, No. 8976.
[30] Carlton, D.W. and A.L. Shampine (2013), ‘An Economic Interpretation of
FRAND’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 9, pp. 531-552.
[31] Chami, R. and T.F. Cosimano (2010) ‘Monetary Policy with a Touch of
Basel’, Journal of Economics and Business, 62, pp. 161-175.
[32] Chen, Y. (2014) ‘Refusals to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and An-
titrust’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, forthcoming.
[33] Christiansen, A. and W. Kerber (2006) ‘Competition Policy with Optimally
Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules Vs. Rule of Reason”’, Journal
of Competition Law and Economics, 2, pp. 215-244.
[34] Connor, J.M. and R.H. Lande (2005) ‘How High Do Cartels Raise Prices?
Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines’, Tulane Law Review, 80, pp. 513-570.
[35] Connor, J.M. and R.H. Lande (2006) ‘The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Im-
plications for U.S. and EU Fining Policies’, Antitrust Bulletin, 51, pp. 983-
1022.
[36] Cseres, K.J. (2007) ‘The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard’,
Competition Law Review, 3, pp. 121-173.
[37] D’Amato, A. (1983) ‘Legal Uncertainty’, California Law Review, 71, pp.
1-55.
[38] Dasgupta, P. and J. E. Stiglitz (1980) ‘Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and
the Speed of R&D’, Bell Journal of Economics, 11, pp. 1-28.
[39] Davis, K.E. (2011) ‘The Concept of Legal Uncertainty: Definition and
Measurement’, mimeo. (downloadable at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
events/2011-10-04-law-economics-workshop-kevin-e-davis.)
108
[40] Dethmers, F. and E. Engelen (2011) ‘Fines under article 102 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the EU’, European Competition Law Review, 2, pp.
86-98.
[41] Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy (EAGCP) (2005) ‘An
Economic Approach to Article 82’, Report for the Directorate General
Competition. (downloadable at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/
economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.)
[42] Easterbrook, F.H. (1984) ‘The Limits of Antitrust’, Texas Law Review, 63,
pp. 1-40. Reprinted in Competition Policy International, 179 (2005).
[43] Easterbrook, F.H. (1992) “Ignorance and Antitrust”, in Jorde, T.M. and
D.J. Teece (eds.), Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness (University
Press, Oxford).
[44] Etro, F. (2007) “Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust”, New York:
Springer.
[45] Encaoua, D. and A. Hollander (2002) ‘Competition Policy and Innovation’,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 18, pp. 63-79.
[46] Erta, K., Hunt, S., Iscenko, Z. and W. Brambley ‘Applying behavioural
economics at the Financial Conduct Authority’, FCA Occasional Pa-
per, No.1. (downloadable at http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/
occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.pdf.)
[47] Evans, D. and A.J. Padilla (2005a) ‘Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing
Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach’, The University of Chicago
Law Review, 72, pp. 73-98.
[48] Evans, D. and A.J. Padilla (2005b) ‘Excessive Prices: Using Economics to
Define Administrable Legal Rules’, Journal of Competition Law and Eco-
nomics, 1, pp.97-122.
[49] Farrell, J. and M.L. Katz (2006) ‘The Economics of Welfare Standards in
Antitrust’, Competition Policy Center, Institute of Business and Economic
Research, UC Berkeley. (downloadable at http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/1tw2d426.)
[50] FCA (2013) Business Plan 2013/14. (downloadable at http://www.fsa.
gov.uk/static/pubs/plan/bp2013-14.pdf.)
[51] Feldman, J. (2009) ‘Compulsory Licenses: The Dangers Behind the Current
Practice’, The Journal of International Business and Law, 8, pp. 137-167.
[52] Fe´vrier, P. and L. Linnemer (2004) ‘Idiosyncratic Shocks in an Asymmetric
Cournot Oligopoly’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22,
pp. 835-848.
109
[53] Financial Times (2013) ‘Lloyds and RBS face £90m in fines’. Last accessed
on 25 June 2014.
[54] Fridolfsson, S.-O. (2007) ‘A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control’,
IFN Working Paper, No. 686.
[55] Furlong, F.T. and M.C. Keeley (1989) ‘Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-
taking: A Note’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 13, pp. 883-891.
[56] Gandhi, P. and H. Lustig (2010) ‘Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Re-
turns: A Fiscal Explanation’, NBER Working Paper, No. 16553.
[57] Gilbert, R.J. and C. Shapiro (1996) ‘An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Re-
fusals to License Intellectual Property’, Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences USA, 93, pp. 12749-12755.
[58] Gorton, G. and A. Winton (1997) ‘Bank Capital Regulation in General
Equilibrium’, NBER Working Paper, No. 5244.
[59] Grimmett, G.R. and D.R. Stirzaker (1982) “Probability and Random Pro-
cesses”, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[60] Grossman, G.M. and C. Shapiro (1987) ‘Dynamic R and D Competition’,
Economic Journal, 97, pp. 372-387.
[61] Ha¨ckner, J. (2000) ‘A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differen-
tiated Oligopolies’, Journal of Economic Theory, 93, pp. 233-239.
[62] Hakenes, H. and I. Schnabel (2011) ‘Capital Regulation, Bank Competition,
and Financial Stability’, Economics Letters, 113, pp. 256-258.
[63] Harrington, J. (2013) ‘Corporate Leniency Programs when Firms have Pri-
vate Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption’,
Journal of Industrial Economics, 61, pp. 1-27.
[64] Harrington, J. (2011) ‘When is an Antitrust Authority not Aggressive
Enough in Fighting Cartels?’, International Journal of Economic Theory,
7, pp. 39-50.
[65] Harrington, J. (2010) ‘Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous
Firms’, RAND Journal of Economics, 41, pp. 92-117.
[66] Harris, C. and J. Vickers (1985) ‘Patent Races and the Persistence of
Monopoly’, Journal of Industrial Economics, 33, pp. 461-481.
[67] Hege, U. (1998) ‘Bank Debt and Publicly Traded Debt in Repeated
Oligopolies’, CentER Working Paper, No. 9871.
110
[68] Hellmann, T.F., Murdock, K.C. and J.E. Stiglitz (2000) ‘Liberalization,
Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Re-
quirements Enough?’, American Economic Review, 90, pp. 147-165.
[69] Heyer, K. (2006) ‘Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why not the
Best?’, Economic Analysis Group Working Paper, No. EAG-06-8.
[70] Hylton, K.N. and H. Lin (2014) ‘Innovation and Optimal Punishment with
Antitrust Applications’, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 10, pp.
1-25.
[71] Hylton, K.N. and M. Salinger (2001) ‘Tying Law and Policy: A Decision
Theoretic Approach’, Antitrust Law Journal, 69, pp. 469-526.
[72] ICB (2011) Final Report of the Independent Commission on Bank-
ing. (downloadable at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/
bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk.)
[73] Immordino, G., Pagano, M. and M. Polo (2011) ‘Incentives to Innovate and
Social Harm: Laissez-faire, Authorization or Penalties?’, Journal of Public
Economics, 95, pp. 864-876.
[74] Immordino, G. and M. Polo (2008) ‘Judicial Errors and Innovative Activity’,
IGIER Working Paper, No. 337.
[75] Immordino, G. and M. Polo (2012) ‘Antitrust in Innovative Industries: The
Optimal Legal Standards’, IGIER Working Paper, No. 434.
[76] Jensen, M.C. and W. Meckling (1976) ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure’, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, 20, pp. 305-360.
[77] Joskow, P.L. (2002) ‘Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and
Remedies’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 18, pp. 95-116.
[78] Kamien, M.I., Oren, S. and Y. Tauman (1992) ‘Optimal Licensing of Cost-
reducing Innovation’, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, pp. 483-508.
[79] Kamien, M.I. and Y. Tauman (1986) ‘Fees versus Royalties and the Private
Value of a Patent’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, pp. 471-491.
[80] Katsoulacos, Y. (2009) ‘Optimal Legal Standards for Refusals to License IP:
A Welfare-based Analysis’, Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 5,
pp. 269-295.
[81] Katsoulacos, Y. (2014) ‘A Simple Model for Examining the Impact of Ex-
clusion’, mimeo.
111
[82] Katsoulacos, Y. and D. Ulph (2009) ‘On Optimal Legal Standards for Com-
petition Policy: A General Welfare-based Analysis’, Journal of Industrial
Economics, 57, pp. 410-437.
[83] Katsoulacos, Y. and D. Ulph (2011a) ‘Optimal Enforcement Structures for
Competition Policy: Implications of Judicial Reviews and of Internal Error
Correction Mechanisms’, European Competition Journal, 7, pp. 71-88.
[84] Katsoulacos, Y. and D. Ulph (2011b) ‘Competition Authority Sub-
stantive Standards and Social Welfare’, mimeo. (downloadable at
http://www.cresse.info/uploadfiles/Substantive%20Standards%
20and%20Social%20Welfare%20July%2017%202011.pdf.)
[85] Katsoulacos, Y. and D. Ulph (2013) ‘Antitrust Penalties and the Implica-
tions of Empirical Evidence on Cartel Overcharges’, Economic Journal, 123,
pp. F558-F581.
[86] Katsoulacos, Y. and D. Ulph (2014a) ‘Decision Errors, Legal Uncertainty
and Welfare: A General Treatment’, mimeo.
[87] Katsoulacos, Y. and D. Ulph (2014b) ‘Legal Uncertainty, Competition Law
Enforcement Procedures and Optimal Penalties’, mimeo.
[88] Katz, M.L. and C. Shapiro (1985) ‘On the Licensing of Innovations’, RAND
Journal of Economics, 16, pp. 504-520.
[89] Katz, M.L. and H.A. Shelanski (2007) ‘Mergers and Innovation’, Antitrust
Law Journal, 74, pp. 1-85.
[90] Keeley, M.C. (1990) ‘Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Bank-
ing’, American Economic Review, 80, pp. 1183-1200.
[91] Kreps, D.M. and J. Scheinkman (1983) ‘Quantity Precommitment and
Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes’, Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics, 14, pp. 326-337.
[92] Ku¨hn, K.-U. and J. Van Reenen (2008) ‘Interoperability and Market Fore-
closure In the European Microsoft Case’, Centre for Economic Performance
Special Paper, No. 20.
[93] Lee, T. and L. Wilde (1980) ‘Market Structure and Innovation: a Reformu-
lation’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, pp. 395-410.
[94] Lianos, I. and I. Kokkoris (eds.) (2010) “The Reform of EC Competition
Law”, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International.
[95] Linnemer, L. (2003) ‘Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm’, Journal
of Economics and Management Strategy, 12, pp. 231-259.
112
[96] Loury, G. (1979) ‘Market Structure and Innovation’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 93, pp. 429-436.
[97] Lyons, B. (2002) ‘Could Politicians Be More Right Than Economists? A
Theory of Merger Standards’, CCR Working Paper, No. CCR 02-1.
[98] Maksimovic, V. (1988) ‘Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies’, RAND
Journal of Economics, 19, pp. 389-407.
[99] Manne, G.A. and J.D. Wright (2010) ‘Innovation and the Limits of An-
titrust’, Journal of Competition Law & Economics’, 6, pp. 153-202.
[100] Manzini, P. and M. Mariotti (2003) ‘A Bargaining Model of Voluntary En-
vironmental Agreements’, Journal of Public Economics, 87, pp. 2725-2736.
[101] Nalebuff, B. ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 119, pp. 159-187.
[102] Neven, D.J. and L.-H. Ro¨ller (2005) ‘Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Stan-
dard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control’, International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 23, pp. 829-848.
[103] Nocke, V. and M.D. Whinston (2013) ‘Merger Policy with Merger Choice’,
American Economic Review, 103, pp. 1006-1033.
[104] Nocke, V. and M.D. Whinston (2010) ‘Dynamic Merger Review’, Journal
of Political Economy, 118, pp. 1200-1251.
[105] Novshek, W. (1985) ‘On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium’, Review of
Economic Studies, 52, pp. 85-98.
[106] OFT (2014) ‘Review of Banking for Small and Medium-sized Busi-
nesses (SMEs) in the UK: Update on Work to Date’. (down-
loadable at https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/
533550c5e5274a566000000b/sme-updates.pdf.)
[107] Pate, R.H. (2003) ‘Antitrust and Intellectual Property’, Address at the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, January 24, 2003.
[108] Reinganum, J. (1982) ‘A Dynamic Game of R&D: Patent Protection and
Competitive Behaviour’, Econometrica, 50, pp. 671-688.
[109] Reinganum, J. (1983) ‘Uncertain Innovations and the Persistence of
Monopoly’, American Economic Review, 73, pp. 741-748.
[110] Reinganum, J. (1985a) ‘Innovation and Industry Evolution’, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 100, pp. 81-100.
113
[111] Reinganum, J. (1985b) ‘A Two-Stage Model of Research and Development
with Endogenous Second-Mover Advantages’, International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization, 3, pp. 275-292.
[112] Salant, S.W. and G. Shaffer (1999) ‘Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents
in Cournot Equilibrium’, American Economic Review, 89, pp. 585-604.
[113] Salinger, M. (1995) ‘A Graphical Analysis of Bundling’, Journal of Business,
68, pp. 85-98.
[114] Salinger, M. (2006) ‘Looking for the Keys under the Lamppost: Insights
from Economics into Standards for Unilateral Conduct’, Comments for ABA
Section of Antitrust Law.
[115] Salop, S.C. (2010) ‘Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Wel-
fare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard’, Loyola
Consumer Law Review, 22, pp. 336-353.
[116] Schinkel, M.P. and J. Tuinstra (2006) ‘Imperfect Competition Law Enforce-
ment’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, pp. 1267-1297.
[117] Schliephake, E. and R. Kirstein (2013) ‘Strategic Effects of Regulatory Cap-
ital Requirements in Imperfect Banking Competition’, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 45, pp. 675-700.
[118] Schmutzler, A. (2013) ‘Competition and Innovation – A Unified Approach’,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, pp. 477-487.
[119] Segal, I. and M.D. Whinston (2007) ‘Antitrust in Innovative Industries’,
American Economic Review, 97, pp. 1703-1730.
[120] Segerson, K. and T.J. Miceli (1998) ‘Voluntary Environmental Agreements:
Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?’, Journal of Environmen-
tal Economics and Management, 36, pp. 109-130.
[121] Sen, D. and Y. Tauman (2007) ‘General Licensing Schemes for a Cost-
Reducing Innovation’, Games and Economic Behaviour, 59, pp. 163-186.
[122] Shapiro, C. (2002) ‘Competition Policy and Innovation’, OECD Science,
Technology and Industry Working Papers, No. 2002/11.
[123] Sidak, J.G. (2013) ‘The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties’, Journal of
Competition Law and Economics, 9, pp. 931-1055.
[124] Sorgard, L. (2009) ‘Optimal Merger Policy: Enforcement vs. Deterrence’,
Journal of Industrial Economics, 57, pp. 438-456.
[125] Spagnolo, G. (2000) ‘Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device’, mimeo.
114
[126] Spulber, D.F. (2008) ‘Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation’,
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4, pp. 915-966.
[127] Stavropoulou, C. and T. Valletti (2013) ‘Compulsory Licensing and Access
to Drugs’, mimeo.
[128] Stenbacka, R. (1994) ‘Financial Structure and Tacit Collusion with Re-
peated Oligopoly Competition’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Orga-
nization, 25, pp. 281-292.
[129] Tom, W.K. and C. Pak (2000) ‘Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason’, Antitrust
Law Journal, 68, pp. 391-428.
[130] Ulph, A. and D. Ulph (1998) ‘Labour Markets, Bargaining and Innovation’,
European Economic Review, 43, pp. 931-939.
[131] Vickers, J. (2005) ‘Abuse of Market Power’, Economic Journal, 115, pp.
244-261.
[132] Vickers, J. (2007) ‘Economics and the Competition Rules’, Presentation at
the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 12 September
2007.
[133] Vickers, J. (2010) ‘Competition Policy and Property Rights’, Economic
Journal, 120, pp. 375-392.
[134] Vives, X. (2008) ‘Innovation and Competitive Pressure’, Journal of Indus-
trial Economics, 56, pp. 419-469.
[135] Vives, X. (2011) ‘Competition Policy in Banking’, Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy, 27, pp. 479-497.
[136] Vives, X (2013) ‘Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation,
mimeo.
[137] Will, B.E. and D. Schmidtchen (2008) ‘Fighting Cartels: Some Economics
of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003’, CSLE Discussion Paper, No. 2008-02.
[138] Witmer, J. and L. Zorn (2007) ‘Estimating and Comparing the Implied Cost
of Equity for Canadian and U.S. Firms’, Bank of Canada Working Paper,
No. 2007-48.
115
